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This thesis examines the impact of Iranian elites’ conceptions of national identity on 
decisions affecting Iran's nuclear programme and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations. 
“Why has the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle been portrayed as a 
unifying symbol of national identity in Iran, especially since 2002 following the 
revelation of clandestine nuclear activities”? This is the key research question that 
explores the Iranian political elites’ perspectives on nuclear policy actions. My main 
empirical data is elite interviews. Another valuable source of empirical data is a 
discourse analysis of Iranian leaders’ statements on various aspects of the nuclear 
programme. The major focus of the thesis is how the discourses of Iranian national 
identity have been influential in nuclear decision-making among the national elites. In 
this thesis, I examine Iranian national identity components, including Persian 
nationalism, Shia Islamic identity, Islamic Revolutionary ideology, and modernity 
and technological advancement. Traditional rationalist IR approaches, such as realism 
fail to explain how effective national identity is in the context of foreign policy 
decision-making. I thus discuss the connection between national identity, prestige and 
bargaining leverage using a social constructivist approach. According to 
constructivism, states’ cultures and identities are not established realities, but the 
outcomes of historical and social processes. The Iranian nuclear programme has a 
symbolic nature that mingles with socially constructed values.  
 
There is the need to look at Iran’s nuclear intentions not necessarily through the lens 
of a nuclear weapons programme, but rather through the regime’s overall nuclear 
aspirations. The Iranian government, military, and people broadly support the 
peaceful nuclear programme. However, neither the officials nor the people advocate 
acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, as they say, it is against Islamic rules. Iranian 
officials always support their claim of having a peaceful nuclear programme by a 
fatwā issued on 3 June 2008, by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei forbidding 
the development and use of nuclear weapons. The domestic reality about Iran’s 
nuclear programme is that the nuclear case is a national issue and thus, all political 
factions, parties, groups, and politicians with different perspectives agree on Iran’s 
right to a peaceful nuclear programme and a nuclear fuel cycle. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction – From Legitimation to Acceptance: What Makes the 
Iranian Nuclear Programme a Matter of National Identity? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has argued, the respect and 
dignity of the Iranian people as well as the fundamental issue of the progress of the 
Iranian nation should always be preserved and protected (Khamenei 2015). Moreover, 
whilst security issues characterised by self-defence, deterrence, and uncertainty are 
the main issues for some countries in developing a nuclear programme (Tellis 2013), 
for Iran, it is national beliefs and values that have framed the core of its nuclear policy 
(Cardinal 2016). For the Iranian government, the nuclear programme has been the 
cornerstone of its efforts to modernise the country and close the technological gap 
with the West (Jain 2011).  
 
This Ph.D. thesis examines the perception of national identity as well as self-interest 
over time to illustrate why Iran is insisting on pursuing a nuclear programme. Three 
central questions guide an analysis of Iranian political elites’ perspective on the 
nuclear policy outcomes: Why has the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel 
cycle been portrayed as a unifying symbol of national identity in Iran, especially since 
2002? And following the revelation of clandestine nuclear activities, how has it 
affected Iran’s highest formal decisions and policy-making processes? How can one 
explain the paradoxical implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear 
behaviour? In answering these questions, there are several issues that must be 
addressed. In the first instance, what are the components of Iranian identity and how 
do they shape Iran’s nuclear narrative? This is important because it establishes not 
only who Iran and Iranians are, but also the relationship between national identity and 
the state’s major foreign policy decisions in general. A better understanding of Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions should provide a foundation upon which to build a better answer to 
the overall research questions. This chapter aims to present the basic dimensions of 
the research by outlining its central issue, research aims and strategy, justification, the 
statement of the problem, its argument and contribution to knowledge, the limitations 
of the study and the outline of the thesis. The following chapters demonstrate that the 
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stance taken by the actors with respect to symbolic identity aspects reflects their 
various political or technological ambitions. 
1.2 The Research Project 
(i) The central issue 
The whys and how’s of Iran’s nuclear decisions and the narrative of its nuclear 
ambitions drawing on the wider constructivist scholarship, make the case that the 
shaping and implementing of a country’s foreign policy can originate from a nation’s 
values and beliefs. The social construction of the environment in which the Iranian 
political elite makes decisions regarding the nuclear programme is therefore of 
paramount importance. The question here is how does the social environment 
influence political decisions? Assessing this question will illuminate issues of 
resistance, competition, convergence, norm reinterpretation and reformulation. The 
central issue of the thesis is thus an investigation of the effect of national identity 
conceptions on Iranian nuclear decision-making 
 
The common understanding of Iranian nuclear intentions is based on a traditional 
realist approach; this traditional approach emphasises the systemic distribution of 
power and hence, does not consider the influence of social agents and structures 
(Wendt 1987a). Furthermore, the emphasis is on materialistic structures and does not 
pay attention to the effective roles that non-material and non-traditional structures 
play in shaping politics (Mohammad Nia 2011). In order to delve further into the non-
traditional aspects of Iranian nuclear behaviour, this thesis examines the impact of 
national identity conceptions on Iranian nuclear decision-making from the social 
constructivist point of view that is generally missing from dominant traditional 
approaches.  
 
The thesis argues that the main goal of Iran’s nuclear programme has stretched 
beyond merely security issues and towards non-material factors, such as ideas, 
cultures, identities, and beliefs. In so doing, the thesis argues that discursive 
frameworks, connecting conceptions of national identity, national rights and national 
technological advancement, constitute the Iranian nuclear programme. In order to 
implement this point of view, theory of social constructivism in international relations 
will be carried throughout the thesis to better understand the role of Iranian identity 
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conceptions in Tehran’s nuclear ambitions in a non-material sense. The thesis uses 
primary sources including statements made by Iranian elites, to examine the role 
played by discourses of national identity in decisions and policy-making regarding the 
nuclear programme. It argues that the norms of identity including religion and 
ideology, culture and nationalism have become embodied in the ideational framework 
of nuclear strategies in Iran (Bowen et al. 2016).  
(ii) Research aims 
The main purposes of this research are as follows: 
• To examine ways in which conceptions of national identity(ies) have affected 
Iranian nuclear policy by identifying the presumptions of Iranian national 
identity and its construction and interpretation over time; thus, the research 
does not hypothesise based upon a fixed identity. 
• To develop a constructivist scholarship by applying it to the case of Iranian 
nuclear ambitions and further demonstrating the ways in which the foreign 
policy of a country is heavily influenced by national identity. 
(iii) Research strategy 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a grounded understanding of the Iranian elites’ 
nuclear intentions by answering the following questions: Why has the development of 
an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle been portrayed as a unifying symbol of national 
identity in Iran, especially since 2002, and following the revelation of clandestine 
nuclear activities? How has it affected Iran’s highest formal decisions and policy-
making processes? To what extent do discourses of identity explain the paradoxical 
implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear behaviour?          
(iv) The justification for the research 
I began this thesis seeking an answer to a very specific question: Why has the 
development of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle been portrayed as a unifying symbol 
of national identity in Iran, especially since 2002, and following the revelation of 
clandestine uranium enrichment facilities? This is the key question of the research, 
which will be answered the Iranian political elites’ perspectives on nuclear policy 
actions. The moment Iranian secret nuclear activities were revealed in 2002, 
catchwords such as ‘religion’, ‘Islamic revolutionary ideologies’, ‘dignity’ and 
‘technological advancement’ gained superiority over deterrence and security. 
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Justifying the Iranian nuclear programme in the name of national identity can be 
interpreted as what Ali Asghar Soltanieh 1 , Iran’s former ambassador to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), referred to as “the borders of identity 
and dignity of Iran.” 
 
Answering this question is important, first of all for policy-makers and then for policy 
experts and academics. Understanding the origins of Iranian national identity and how 
it affects policy making, especially about nuclear policies could make an important 
contribution to understanding and resolving the conflict. This puzzle led me to a more 
general version of the question motivating this research project. That is, how is 
Iranian identity constructed and understood in relation to the nuclear programme; and 
why is Iranian identity deployed in the way that it is. My research objective is to 
specify the relationship between the Iranian elites’ perception of national identity and 
nuclear policies. 
 
To discern the impact of Iranian elites’ conception of national identity on decisions 
affecting Iran’s nuclear programme and nuclear negotiations, a discourse analysis of 
elites’ interviews, speech and media analysis has been carried out. The thesis focuses 
on the period from Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2005 to Rouhani’s presidency and 
the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and 
the P5+1 in 2015. Nuclear policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran results from 
complex, multifaceted interactions occurring between various actors. These actors 
pursue different and often conflicting goals, whilst also promoting a series of aims 
relating to the Islamic identity of the government and its interaction with wider 
Iranian identities. 
 
One cannot begin to understand the impact of national identity conceptions on Iranian 
elites’ nuclear decision-making without taking identity politics into account. Iranian 
identities explain the relatively smooth processes of decision-making to a large 
degree. For the purpose of this research, this thesis examines contemporary nuclear 
policies and the way Iranian national identity conceptions have been shaped and 
                                                




interpreted through nuclear policies and decision-making. As for the theoretical 
paradigm, the thesis utilises the constructivist approach to examine Iranian nuclear 
behaviour.  
 
The nuclear programme has been a matter of national identity for both Ahmadinejad 
and Rouhani administrations. While different administrations pursue the nuclear 
policies in their own unique way, Iran’s nuclear policies are not the mere posturing of 
a single president or leader. In other words, official state policies affect the way each 
administration grasps the politics of Iran’s nuclear programme.  As a country with 
nuclear technology, both the Ahmadinejad and the Rouhani administrations have been 
of the opinion that Iran will be able to meet its own energy demands. The scientific 
and technological outcome of the nuclear programme also regarded as providing the 
national basis for a modern Iranian symbol. Tehran’s determination to have a uranium 
enrichment capability may have aroused less suspicion in the West if understood as 
demonstrating to the world Iran’s technological sophistication, skill, ability and 
competence. So, for the Islamic Republic, technology has assumed symbolic 
importance. Additionally, it is connected to an Iranian desire to take the country in the 
same direction as travelled by Turkey, China, Japan, and those Asian countries that 
fell behind Western Europe following the European renaissance and enlightenment. 
At various times, these countries were humiliated by the advanced Western nations, 
but are now catching up. There is a very powerful motive for Iranian decision makers 
to take Iran back into the ranks of leading Asian powers and states and this thesis 
argues that the nuclear programme is very intimately connected to that. 
 
The Western powers have toughened economic sanctions and applied pressure to 
isolate Iran in order to deny Tehran the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. 
However, not only did sanctions fail to stop Iran’s nuclear activities, but they also 
strengthened a policy of resistance to the West. Ahmadinejad stated that although the 
West is waiting for Tehran to retreat from its nuclear activities, Iran would not 
proceed in talks with anyone about the inalienable right of the Iranian nation to enrich 
uranium indigenously (Ashrafi and Soltani Gerdframarzi 2018). Ahmadinejad being 
determined that the Iranian nation will stand by their leader in awareness and faith, 
acting in opposition to the arrogant Western powers. Iranians will not let the West 
prevent them from reaching the peaks of scientific research and they will defend their 
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rights to the end without any negotiation. I argue that putting more pressure on Iran 
has not only been unable to prevent Tehran from pursuing its nuclear activities but 
also strengthened the nationalistic sense, in a way that emphasises the symbolic aspect 
of the nuclear programme. The West, for example, during the presidency of George 
W. Bush in the U.S. assumed that the Islamic Republic was vulnerable to pressure 
(Coats and Robb 2008). However, their efforts to coerce Iran into altering its nuclear 
policy were not completely successful due to a lack of understanding of the extent to 
which Iranian national identity affects the country’s decisions on nuclear development 
and its openness to cooperation with Western powers. In order for any diplomacy 
towards Iran to be successful, a give-and-take policy is necessary (Hadley 2012). 
There is the need to look at Iran, not necessarily through the lens of a nuclear 
weapons programme, but rather, through the lens of the regime’s overall nuclear 
aspirations. There is a lack of understanding for Iran’s political and cultural dynamics 
in the West, especially by the United States’ government. As the issue of national 
identity is not well established and understood within policy circles, there is no real 
appreciation of the Iranian national identity; there is mostly just a black and white 
perception of Iran, one that has persisted over the course of the past four decades. 
1.3 Literature Review 
(i) Non-traditional security studies 
The field of identity politics urges the scholar to pay equal attention to the decision-
making process and the policy outcome as well as focus on the subjective issues 
influencing the policies. This thesis decidedly does not examine traditional strategic 
and realist explanations of the Iranian nuclear programme, such as the security issues 
in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, for these have been covered at length by 
many other experts and Western government officials. On the surface, mostly from a 
Western point of view, Iran’s quest for indigenous uranium enrichment has been seen 
as a cover for developing a nuclear bomb, which is a threat to the United States and 
its allies in the region, especially, Israel. It also increases Iran’s power over the Arab 
states in the Persian Gulf (Mousavian and Mousavian 2018). Traditional rationalist 
theories, such as realist approaches, can explain this point of view. Theories are not 
necessarily right or wrong in identifying a specific theme. However, in comparison to 
each other, some theories have gaps in directing our attention to better grasp the key 
elements, which shape our understanding of the world. When we come to the 
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understanding that our ideas, memories, choices and experiences are socially 
constructed, then we realise that realism has some fallibilities in dealing with them 
(Copeland 2000). In light of this, one demonstrates whether realism or neorealism 
cannot adequately explain the rather paradoxical implications of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran’s nuclear behaviour. Realism is not so clear about the constitutive forces of 
states, and the ways it develops state social structures, or the ways it is constituted by 
social structures in turn, politicises its historical and cultural interests and constructs 
its foreign policy. Realist (neorealist) perspectives posit that Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
are mostly a result of its rivalry with Iraq, desire to become hegemonic in the Persian 
Gulf, threat to Iran from Israel’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and recently the 
threat from the United States’ military presence in the region, following the 2003 
invasion of Iraq (Solingen 2009). Realists’ core insight, as argued by Hans 
Morgenthau (1973), is that we must see the world as it is, rather than as we want it to 
be. Realism in its political core believes that politics, like society, is governed by 
objective rules (Barkin 2010). The classic critique of this stance, coming from the 
constructivist corner of IR theory, is now well known: material facts do not speak for 
themselves but acquire meaning through social interaction. People act on the basis of 
intersubjective meanings. 
 
Identity conceptions are largely absent from mainstream literature on this issue. For 
the purpose of this research, I chose to analyse Iranian elites’ conception of national 
identity and the impact on nuclear decisions using the framework of social 
constructivism. This is because there is a gap in this regard that realist theories cannot 
address. Constructivism makes a very strong case for the relationship between 
ideational factors and policy-making, and within discourses of identity, this is central. 
Here are the reasons why rational choice theories do not explain the relationship 
between ideational factors and policy-making like constructivists do. Firstly, 
rationalist theories emphasise the systemic distribution of power and ignore the effect 
of human agents, social structures and social institutions in determining state’ foreign 
policy priorities (Wendt 1987b). Secondly, rationalist theories concentrate on self-
oriented materialistic structures and ignore the independent and effective role of non-
material structures and capabilities in shaping states’ foreign policy (Mohammad Nia 
2011).  
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Social constructivism can better explain the oversights and gaps that realism is unable 
to explain using its mere materialistic approach. Recent writings, such as Benedict 
Anderson’s (2006) Imagined Communities, with focus on collective political 
identities such as nation, ethnicity, and race insist that these qualities are imagined 
communities, discursively constructed through the definition of who we are and who 
we are not. This viewpoint draws upon the constitutive effects of mapping, naming, 
and imagining our community, our nation, and our world, and by the processes 
through which our identity is constructed, as well as through our differences (Pettman 
2005). Other works, such as neoclassical realism perception of identity only offer a 
surface examination of the issue and none undertake to discuss the intersubjective 
aspects of the debate. Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy explain the 
importance of identities alongside interests of the state (Kitchen 2010). In so doing, 
they depart from Wendtian constructivism. In so doing, most of the relevant body of 
work centres on the regime’s efforts to use conceptions of national identity to 
legitimise their nuclear ambitions via the energy needs of the country (Chubin 2010a), 
or that the threat of war is justified by manipulating the politics of identity. Mary 
Kaldor (2007) has written extensively on this subject. Some other scholars argue that 
the religion-centric devising of the Iranian identity was also of great use for the 
Iranian regime when it came to identifying their nuclear ambitions (Crane et al. 
2008). 
(ii) Normative effects on security and the concept of identity 
The previous part of the literature review discussed why the social constructivist 
theory of international relations could better explain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In the 
following, I examine the ideational nature of Iran’s nuclear ambitions with examples 
from other scholarly works, arguing that it shapes and constructs Iran’s nuclear 
behaviour, based on national identity conceptions. The goal is thus to trace the social, 
political, and cultural life of Iran’s nuclear programme. This goal arose from the 
realisation that much scholarship focuses on the material drivers of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, and hence, interprets it as a threat to international security (Hecht 1998). 
National identity consists of unique components and conceptions by which people and 
elites in society define themselves and the way they choose specific policies and 
decisions. Accordingly, the values, ideologies, identities and symbols that constitute 
nuclear policies are reinterpreted over time. Gabrielle Hecht (1998), for example, 
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believes that technological advancement leads to social progress. Therefore, it can be 
seen to act as a unique vehicle for state elites when making national policy decisions.  
 
Originated from Zoroaster’s teachings, the Iranian philosophy of identity that 
considers human beings as the principle and the truth has existed since the dawn of 
civilisation and the culture of Iran (Ahmadi and Mahmoodi 2015). According to C.F. 
Whitley (1957), Zoroaster, the Iranian religious reformer/ prophet was the first who 
introduced the battle between good and evil in philosophical terms. Similarly, in 
Iranian Islam (or Shia Islam) there has always been an emphasis on the battle between 
right and wrong. In other words, Iranian Islam requires humankind to fight with the 
perdition in the world in order to live honourably and victoriously (Mojtahedzadeh 
2012). The spirit of pride and endurance as another indicator of Iranian identity serves 
various functions in science, politics, technology, social issues, sports, etc., and 
designs a strategy for eliminating threats and turning them into opportunities to 
promote national pride (ISNA 2018). Some other ways to measure this indicator 
include the extent to which a nation is proud of their country and nationality, the 
importance of religion in people’s lives, and whether they think there is a clear 
boundary between right and wrong. 
 
Along with other components of Iranian national identity, such as language, history, 
nationalism, and religion, there is another newer component called Islamic 
Revolutionary ideology. The Islamic Republic and its ideals, principles and values are 
of paramount importance in understanding the discourses of Iranian national identity 
since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Thus, the identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
contains elements of Islamic identity, the Islamic Republic, and Iranian nationalism. 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran had its own identity and ensuing cultural effects. The 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran has been interpreted as a movement that originated 
from national awareness of the Iranian nation along with the nation’s history of 
durability, longevity and greatness (Keddie and Richard 1981).  As Thaler et al. 
(2010) argued, Iran’s sense of pride and greatness is influenced by feelings of 
victimisation, insecurity, and inferiority arising from historical exploitation by outside 
powers. A noticeable feature of the Revolution is that this movement turned rapidly to 
a narrative of Iranian history, for within a decade it had been re-defined as an Iranian 
Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic 
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Republic and the first Supreme Leader of Iran from 1979 to 1989 was totally aware 
that in order to frame the revolutionary narrative, it was necessary to classify it as an 
inspiring narrative (Ansari 2012). The nuclear programme has also been a symbol of 
Iran’s self-sufficiency and independence from the West. Thus, the history of Iran’s 
nuclear programme is also a narrative of the history of technological advancement in 
Iran. Nuclear engineering choices must be recognised as part of Iran’s struggle 
towards modernity. When nuclear technology becomes iconic or symbolic, it becomes 
a matter of national identity (Reardon 2012). In the case of Iran, regaining its former 
glory and independence from the West is not just about the past, rather, the nuclear 
programme as a narrative of national identity has constructed a bridge that connects 
the country’s past with its future. 
 
Despite the rich volume of scholarship on the strategic and objective dimension of 
security in dealing with the concept of identity, there are not many academic 
resources that pay attention to the non-material and ideational aspects of security from 
a constructivist point of view. The relationship between identity and security has been 
approached in different academic resources and with regard to various ranges of case 
studies. The concept of identity has also been constituted from dominant theories of 
IR (Williams 1998). Williams stresses the absence of identity concerns in rationalist 
theories of IR, with a focus on neorealism. He disclaims that this absence of identity 
happened because of the materialist ontology of neorealism, while in critical theories 
such as constructivism, scholars emphasise normative and intersubjective elements as 
well as material ones. In William’s argument, two implications can be made using 
neorealist and critical perspectives. First is the place of liberal sensibility in the 
origins of security, which is a fundamental source of materialism and objectivity. And 
the second implication is that neorealism does not inherit “a neutral and non-political 
orientation toward the world”, but it attempts to “transform the theory in order to 
transform the practice” (1998, pp. 216–217). 
Whether or not the appeal to identity is helpful in understanding state behaviour, one 
can say that identity involves the creation of boundaries that separate self and others 
(Chafetz et al. 1998). In order to understand a state’s behaviour and preferences, we 
need to consider both the domestic and international factors that shape states’ 
identities (Bozdağlıoğlu 2007). The self-schema, which is the cognitive basis for 
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identity, is the most highly resistant of all schemas because a stable self-concept is so 
important to an actor's stability and well-being. The main implication of this 
resistance is that international actors tend to change their concepts regarding their 
roles only reluctantly and with difficulty. Two factors impede change, each arising 
from identity defence mechanisms. First, at the individual level, is the need for 
predictability and consistency. Second, at the group level, neither government 
bureaucracies nor society at large can function without a minimal level of stability of 
expectations. To an actor, the importance of a given identity depends on two factors: 
the relevance of the situation’s salience and the overall psychological significance of 
an identities centrality. There is a criticism of realists’ understanding of national 
interests and identity that claims that realists, reviewing past state policies, may 
declare these policies to have been in the national interest because they were executed 
by the state. For the concept of national interest to mean something, realists and other 
proponents must be able to derive its existence independently of outcomes. The same 
criticism applies to the concept of identity (Chafetz et al. 1998).  
(iii) The case of Iran 
In the last section, I reviewed the existing social constructivist literature on the impact 
of identity on Iran’s decision-making process. This section of the literature review 
focuses on the scholarly social constructivist works that examined the impact of 
identity on Iran’s nuclear decisions in particular. The scholarly literature discussing 
the ideational drivers of Iran’s nuclear decision-making is extremely limited. This is 
due to the complex, multi-faceted, and interdisciplinary nature of the enterprise. 
According to Homeira Moshirzadeh (2007), Iran’s nuclear policy can be explained 
via changes to the structure of the state’s identity. These kinds of changes can be 
explained by a constructivist approach rather than rationalist approaches to the IR. 
Therefore, she uses the constructivist approach in order to explain the identity of Iran 
following the Islamic Revolution and beyond. Hegemonic and revolutionary 
discourses are the two main discourses that shaped and redefined the Islamic tradition 
and the domestic and foreign policy behaviour of the Islamic Republic respectively 
(Karimifard 2012). Iran’s nuclear policy and the identity that constitutes it become 
meaningful via constructivism.  
The constructivist approach helps us understand the changes and resistances in Iran’s 
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nuclear policy. Moshirzadeh (2007) declares that the three elements of independence, 
justice, and resistance, which have constituted the identity, interests, and priorities of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, are the main discourses that are understandable using the 
constructivist approach. This context is able to explain the legitimacy of a state’s 
resistance in following a particular policy and also its elites’ decisions towards this 
policy because these elites are the main actors in the system. Without taking domestic 
issues into consideration, one cannot effectively analyse foreign policy (Ibid.). In 
Moshirzadeh’s words, there are three main discourses – independence, justice, and 
resistance – that form the identity of the Islamic Republic. The discourse of 
independence has long been a very important discourse in constituting Iran’s identity 
as an independent state. There are three main elements, which have formed the 
discourse of independence: Iran’s glorious past, historical victimisation by invaders, 
and (semi)-colonial/imperial encounters leading to Iran’s dependence and 
underdevelopment. These three elements that originate from Iranians’ historical 
experiences form the basis of the discourse of independence, which can be a part of 
Iran’s national identity. There is also the discourse of hyper-independence which has 
two aspects: one of these with a negative dimension is to confront foreign dominance, 
the influence of hegemonic powers, and cultural, political, and economic dependence; 
and the other, with a positive dimension, is about seeking self-definition, self-reliance, 
and in general, self-control (Moshirzadeh 2007).  
Khamenei’s quote summarises Iran’s identity of independence and development who 
says, “if we had continued to rely on others and beg them for our basic necessities as 
it was the case for many years under the former regime, the situation would still be 
the same today and we would not be independent and self-sufficient” (Khamenei 
2006a). If dependence originates from and reproduces weakness, becoming 
independent requires power. Therefore, an independent country has to be powerful. 
According to the document known as ‘Iran’s Strategic 20-Year Vision Document’ 
([1384] 2005), in 2025, ‘Iran is a developed country ranking the first in the region 
economically, scientifically, and technologically’. It is within this discourse and in the 
context of these rules and norms that Iranian nuclear policy has been formed and is 
represented as a step towards actualising Iran’s potential as the prominent regional 
actor. There is an analogy between Iran’s nuclear policy and the Oil Nationalisation 
Movement of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Oil Nationalisation Movement was 
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a successful step towards nationalisation of the oil industry in Iran. The nuclear issue 
is another nationalist matter that demands national support and sacrifice. On the other 
hand, there is an analogy between any withdrawal from the country’s nuclear 
programme and the Treaty of Turkmanchāy (1828),2 the most notorious example of 
withdrawal by Iran in terms of its sovereign rights in the country’s modern history, 
and which affected Iran’s sovereignty and independence. Such analogies help to de-
legitimise any efforts aimed at compromise. Thus, according to the discourse of 
independence, following the nuclear programme gives legitimacy to Iran’s ambitions 
and subsumes it as part of Iran’s national identity (Golshani and Jadidi 2014).  
Iranians’ aspirations for justice also have their roots in historical nationalist narratives 
and religious discourses. Justice has always been important in both Zoroastrian and 
Islamic narratives. In the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, one of the most important 
elements in Iran’s confrontation with the West was the necessity of resistance against 
foreign forces that might jeopardize Iran’s sovereignty and independence. During 
Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005), the nuclear policy was mostly based on 
cooperation. But it is the 2005 presidential election that can be regarded as reviving 
the discourse of resistance and also the reinforcement of the idea of hyper-
independence in foreign policy. Nuclear discourse, Moshirzadeh believes, has been 
understood through the main elements of these discourses. Therefore, Iran’s nuclear 
policy turned out to be a matter of identity. A study of the discursive resources of 
Iranian foreign policy explains “how the nuclear issue has gained significance in 
Iran’s foreign relations, how its priority has been justified within this meaning 
structure, and how it has enjoyed a significant degree of popularity inside Iran” 
(Moshirzadeh 2007, p. 523).  
In analysing the impact of Iranian national identity conceptions on nuclear policies in 
Iran, Moshirzadeh (2007) discusses the main points of Islamic Republic identity, 
while this research examines the entirety of Iranian national identity conceptions, of 
                                                
2 The Treaty of Turkmanchāy (1828) concluded a war between Iran and Russia that Iran initiated in 
1826 with the aim of recovering territory in the Caucasus region that it had lost to Russia in 1813. The 
war went very badly for Iran, which was forced to accept unfavourable peace terms in the treaty signed 
in the village of Turkmanchāy, about 80 miles southeast of Tabriz, on 21 February 1828. Under the 
treaty, Iran ceded its remaining provinces north of the Aras River (Yerevan and Nakhichevan) to 
Russia; extended preferential trade rights to Russian subjects; recognized Russia's exclusive naval 
rights in the Caspian Sea; accepted the application of Russian law to Russian subjects in Iran involved 
in civil or criminal legal cases; and agreed to pay Russia an indemnity of 20 million rubles.  
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which the Islamic Revolutionary ideology is just one. Iranians’ aspirations for justice 
also have their roots in historical nationalist narratives and religious discourses. 
Justice has always been important in both Zoroastrian and Islamic narratives. 
According to some scholars, justice-seeking is considered as one of the components 
of Iranian national identity. Seyed Mohammad Ali Hosseinizadeh (2016) suggested 
that the embrace of Shiism in Iran is due to the justice-seeking spirit of Iranians. One 
can see this reflected in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which constitutes 
another aspect of Iran’s identity. Countries such as Israel, India, and Pakistan, all of 
whom have been nuclearised against international norms, and more or less been 
accepted as nuclear powers, now condemn Iran for its nuclear programme. Therefore, 
on the basis of the discourse of justice, the Iranian nuclear policy is considered as a 
justice-seeking effort.  
In the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, one of the most important elements in Iran’s 
confrontation with the West was the necessity of resistance against foreign forces that 
might jeopardise Iran’s sovereignty and independence (Moshirzadeh 2007). In its 
entirety, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is based on resisting subjugation and 
defending the rights of all Muslims worldwide (Karimifard 2012). The discourses of 
independence, justice and resistance have become very significant, especially in terms 
of Iran’s contemporary history and in constituting its national identity. Iran’s desire to 
be a powerful regional actor is deeply rooted in its history and this can be seen as 
evidence for Iran’s persistence regarding nuclear technology. These elements, 
according to Moshirzadeh (2007), were formed in the course of Iran’s modern history, 
and particularly in the constitution of the identity of the Islamic Revolution and later 
the Islamic Republic. Nuclear discourse has also been articulated within these main 
discourses. Therefore, Iran’s nuclear policy has become a matter of identity. These 
discourses can explain how the nuclear issue has been proposed in Iran’s foreign 
relations, and how it has become popular within Iran. Furthermore, they can explain 
the variances of Iran’s nuclear policy in different periods.  
Iranian leaders’ ambition for processing the nuclear programme is part of Iran’s 
national identity, given the desire, they have for survival; this comes from the threats 
made against Iran and also Iran’s pride and historical self-conception as a great 
civilisation, which is a significant issue in this regard. During Mohammad Khatami’s 
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presidency (1997 to 2005), Iran’s nuclear policy was mostly based on cooperation. 
But the 2005 presidential election can be regarded as reviving the discourse of 
resistance as well as reinforcing the idea of hyper-independence in foreign policy 
(Ibid.). Cooperation in Iran’s nuclear policies between Iran and the IAEA and 
resuming nuclear talks are good news. But the bad news is that the West does not trust 
Khatami’s descendant, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, no matter how close his nuclear 
policies are to those of his descendant, Hassan Rouhani. 
Moshirzadeh’s work on the status of Iran’s nuclear ambitions remains one of the few 
comprehensive attempts to assess the topic. However, while she discusses some very 
significant aspects of Iran’s nuclear decisions based on three ideational discourses, the 
author herself falls short in offering a complete image of the impact of national 
identity conceptions on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Discussing Iran’s foreign policy and 
nuclear programme, Volker Perthes (2010) talks about shaping Iran’s foreign policy 
and relations with the West, the Middle East, neighbouring countries and others like 
Russia, China, India, as well as actors in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Perthes 
evidences the use of constructivism by discussing policy-makers’ behaviour and 
decisions. According to him, Iran’s ambition to pursue a nuclear programme stems 
from serious geopolitical competition for predominance in the Middle East (Perthes 
2010). Shahram Chubin (2006) also argues that Iran’s nuclear ambitions collide with 
its neighbours’ interests. Tehran’s nuclear rationale plus the nature of the Islamic 
Republic is a source of concern for the West and for Iran’s neighbours. 
 
There are two types of policy-makers in Tehran: those with little trust of the outside 
world and those with no trust at all. Two drivers can determine Iran’s political 
development in this time period: ‘regime strength’, which is largely a function of 
regime legitimacy, cohesion, and the availability of material resources; and ‘external 
conflict’– mainly, but not exclusively, the nuclear dispute. Then, one can imagine 
four scenarios: circling the wagons, dysfunctionality, military rule, and dual détente. 
None of these scenarios is predictable and there are other outcomes that can be 
imagined. The United States, Europe and other countries should consider broader 
policies than just resolving Iran’s nuclear issue. This means that while they try to 
resolve this issue, they should also regard their future cooperation with Iran. This kind 
of policy has four key elements. Firstly, the West should prepare the conditions for 
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more far-reaching future negotiations. Secondly, the West should concentrate more on 
human rights issues in Iran. Thirdly, they should not just focus on resolving the 
nuclear conflict but should explore the possibilities of cooperation. Finally, the West 
should answer the question asking, what if Iran crosses the line and gains a military 
nuclear capability? The point that the U.S. has troops in the Persian Gulf demonstrates 
that they will enhance the security of Israel and small Arab Gulf countries, but the 
U.S. still has a message for Iran arguing that despite Washington’s stance for its 
friends, they do not want to lose the possibility of engaging and further cooperating 
with Iran (Mousavian and Toossi 2017).  
The behaviour of states towards each other and their fears and ambitions affect their 
decision-making. According to social constructivism, although states want to focus on 
self-help and deter each other from becoming more powerful and hegemonic, they are 
also committed to developing their cooperation (Wendt 1992). This means that 
changes in actors’ behaviour are always possible and that the idea of the self is shaped 
by the idea of the other. The political elites in Iran are influential people who make 
strategic decisions and define the country’s political norms and values. Thus, Iranian 
leaders’ acts and speeches determine their will in terms of becoming a major regional 
power and the amount of trust they offer to the international community. Therefore, it 
is the desire of political elites to elevate a particular problem to some level of 
legitimacy (Perthes 2010). In another debate on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Shahram 
Chubin (2010a) discusses the U.S.-Iran relationship and the U.S.-West’s fear of a 
nuclear Iran in the Middle East and also the inefficiency of threats, punishments and 
also inducements, mostly following the June 12, 2009, presidential elections in Iran. 
Chubin argues about ambitions, regime identity and the function of threats, 
punishments and inducements. He expresses the efforts of the Iranian regime, since 
the June 12, 2009 elections, to legitimate its nuclear ambitions and to empower itself 
as a regional power. He believes there is a gap for the role of Iran in the international 
community; there are those who see Iran as a normal state who respects international 
concerns and those who consider Iran as an equaliser aimed at confronting the West 
by acquiring nuclear weapons. Chubin believes that the nuclear issue is just an excuse 
for regime change in Iran because the West has been unable to trust the Iranian 
regime for more than 30 years, which is because of the regime’s behaviour and nature 
during that time. Chubin claims that the U.S. considers Iranian moderates as 
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ineffective. However, these moderates wish to normalise Iran’s relations with the 
world on the basis of mutual respect (Geranmayeh 2015). As a regional power, Iran’s 
aspirations are to be respected and honoured, meaning it is treated as a leading player 
in the region and in the Islamic world. This claim for being honoured is supported by 
both the nation and the elites in Iran (Guldimann 2007).  
The Iranian regime benefits from strong popular support for its argument that as a 
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it has an inalienable right to 
develop an indigenous civil nuclear industry, stipulated in Article IV (Blackstock and 
Milkoreit 2007). The reason Iranians feel singled out and punished is that they 
compare themselves with non-signatories of NPT such as Israel, India and Pakistan, 
countries that are not penalised despite possessing nuclear weapons (Miller 2012). 
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic has used two approaches; one being to 
consider the interests of the Islamic nation all over the world, and the other to 
consider the interests of the Iranian nation. There has always been fluctuation in the 
government’s preferred foreign policy behaviour. The nuclear policies of Iran have 
been challenging for the international community, becoming a source of distrust. 
Unlike different nuclear policies of compromise from Khatami and Ahmadinejad’s 
more radical nuclear behaviour, Iranian elites have not appeased the West’s demand 
to halt its nuclear programme (Soltani and Amiri 2010). As Chubin (2010a) declares, 
for revolutionary regimes like Iran, foreign policy is a way to express their values and 
also validate their struggles. Foreign policy, therefore, is at once an extension of 
domestic politics, an expression of the regime’s identity, and a barometer of its 
intentions. He disclaims that the U.S. needs to balance its concern to halt Iran’s 
nuclear programme and its objective of stabilising the Middle East. Iranians in Iran 
also have to determine their own future. They seek both independence and freedom, 
which is consistent with U.S. values. Constructivists believe that international 
relations are defined by norms and ideas and the international structure leads actors to 
redefine their interests and identities in the process of interacting. In this article, the 
author claims that Iranians’ independence and freedom-seeking is consistent with 
U.S. values and very much in the interest of both countries. In his hypothesis, Chubin 
(2010b) argues for the acknowledgement of the potential that values and ideas have in 
harmonising international relations, Iranians’ will to normalise their relations with the 
world and the U.S. goal to settle stability in the Middle East. Thus, he advises the 
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U.S. to consider the goal of stabilising the Middle East while dealing with Iran’s 
nuclear issue.  
According to constructivists, the international system only exists as a common 
understanding among people. Therefore, if ideas and values change, then the 
international system itself will change. Constructivism argues that the study of 
international relations must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the 
international scene as well as the shared understandings between them (Wendt 1992). 
Disclaimers notwithstanding, the decision to negotiate with Iran today inevitably 
confers a degree of recognition on the regime, which it is not slow to exploit 
domestically. There is no doubt that the price of engaging Tehran involves selling out 
the people who hope for change in Iran and are the United States’ natural 
interlocutors. The United States should be careful to ensure that any engagement with 
Tehran does not imply endorse nor confer any form of legitimacy on the Iranian 
regime. It should rightly be conceived as a process, and not a goal, intended to 
encourage a change in behaviour. Indeed, since a meaningful change in behaviour 
would require a change in the regime, engagement should be seen as a means of 
encouraging regime evolution, eventually empowering those elements in Iran who are 
most interested in mutually respectful relations. For this purpose, the U.S. should 
intensify its public diplomacy in communicating its goals and policies to the Iranian 
people, including any inducement packages offered and refused by the current regime 
(Chubin 2010a). 
‘European Union discourses and practices on the Iranian nuclear programme’ by Ruth 
Hanau Santini (2010) attempts to analyse different European security discourses 
related to Iran’s nuclear issue post-2003. The EU has played a fundamental role in 
finding a diplomatic solution to resolve disputes over Iran’s nuclear programme by 
investing remarkable energy into helping Iran and the EU-3+3 (the P5+1) to achieve a 
comprehensive and long-term agreement via diplomatic negotiations (Meier 2013). 
There are three main discursive themes that exemplify the main identity 
representations of Iran and Europe, the main stances towards Iran, and the 
representations of the nature of European foreign policy. These three themes include 
securitisation, democratisation and cultural diplomacy. The author evidences the use 
of constructivism by proposing these three themes. Over the years, securitisation was 
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the dominant discourse, but these days, there is much more consideration of 
democracy promotion and cultural diplomacy-inspired discourses. In this article, the 
author aims at making sense of an actor’s foreign policy decisions and their evolution 
vis-a-vis another actor. This means, in order to account for European foreign policy 
vis-a-vis the Iranian nuclear programme, one can establish links between discourses 
and identity representations and also establish a relationship between these elements 
and the policies adopted by the European Union in this field (Hanau Santini 2010).  
There are three historical views about the historical genealogy of Western and 
European perceptions and depictions of Persia and Iran. One mainstream view 
throughout Western historiography dates back to the Greeks, whose encounters and 
confrontations with the Persians lasted centuries. To Greeks, Asians were people 
ruled by tyrants, almost socially immobile, with an immense gap between ruler and 
the ruled (Lockman 2009). The second view is an alternative reading based on 
“French travel biographies portrayed an image of Iran as an opulent, joyful and 
sophisticated country, with whom France has always sought to deepen cultural and 
economic relations” (Christou and Croft 2014, p. 133). A third perspective was 
offered by British historians, who, since when the Indo- European language family 
has been discovered at the end of the eighteenth century, emphasised the resemblance 
between Persia and Europe, referring to ‘noble’ Persians of European descent as 
though those ‘noble Persians’ were close to Europeans by race (Ibid.).  
‘Orientalism’ a term Edward Said (1979) introduces it is a practice immersed since 
the eighteenth century by Western scholars to understand and describe the inhabitants 
of the East, including the Middle East, India, and China. Said examined what has 
come to be a binary relationship of the dominant ‘Occident’ [the West] and the 
inferior ‘Orient’ [the East], or the other (Burney 2012). According to Alam Saleh 
(2013), since the second half of the eighteenth century, Orientalism had a profound 
impact on Iranians’ self- identification. Grounded on Edward Said's ‘Orientalism’ and 
Benedict Anderson's ‘Imagined Communities’, Mostafa Vaziri (1993, p. 63) also 
discussed that Iranian national identity was a product of Orientalism's authoritarian 
and nationalist paradigm that links language, history, and geography to construct a 
continuous and uninterrupted historical narrative. 
By looking at the debate in Europe over the Iranian nuclear issue from 2003 onwards, 
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three discursive themes can be identified that indicate the main structural positions. 
The first discursive theme includes an image of untrustworthiness towards the Iranian 
regime and its foreign policy, in particular, its nuclear policy. The second discursive 
theme portrays an image of the Iranian regime as authoritarian with reference to 
human-right violations, lack of respect for civil liberties and political repression. The 
third theme focuses on Iranian rights and resources. This theme has historical roots 
and is culturally inspired, referring to acknowledgements of Persia as a rich and 
sophisticated country (Christou and Croft 2014). 
As mentioned above, three discourses emerged at the beginning: one underlining the 
dangers posed by an aggressive and often seemingly irrational Iranian foreign policy, 
one focusing on Iranian domestic concerns, especially human-rights violations, and 
the last stressing Iranian resources and demands, from its great civilisation to its 
geopolitical perceptions. Each discourse has had consequences: strong coercive 
diplomacy and securitisation of the issue in the first case, democracy promotion and 
engagement with civil society in the second, and cultural diplomacy and the search 
for a more comprehensive approach considering Iranian security concerns in the third 
(Moshirzadeh and Masoudi 2010). The first discursive theme became hegemonic at 
the EU level with the departure of British Foreign Minister, Jack Straw, who had 
consistently opposed military intervention against Iran. At the discursive level, Iran as 
a complex domestic and foreign policy actor disappeared from the analysis, while the 
discourse iterated claims of the regionally and internationally dangerous 
consequences of the nuclear programme. At the policy level, this enabled 
securitisation logic with the representation of an aggressive and irrational actor 
situated an opponent to a peaceful and restrained international community and Europe 
(Christou and Croft 2014).  
Nina Tannenwald (1999) argues that it is necessary to use a normative element to 
explain the reason for states not using nuclear weapons since 1945, that is because the 
U.S. used them to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. She asserts these ideas in her 
article on ‘The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear 
Non-Use’. Thus, this article’s case study analyses and compares U.S. decision making 
on nuclear use in four historical cases: Japan, 1945; the Korean War, 1950– 53; the 
Vietnam War during the 1960s; and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. According to 
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Tannenwald, the investigation of reasons for non- use of nuclear weapons, which is in 
the context of deterrence, has some incentives. First, when there is no fear of nuclear 
retaliation; second, when we pose the question why nuclear weapons, as deterrent 
weapons did not prevent non- nuclear states from attacking nuclear states; third, the 
security situation of small, non-nuclear states having not been considered as a 
hazardous situation in the nuclear age. Finally, one faces the following question: 
when states are sure about deterrence, why don’t non-nuclear states attempt to 
develop nuclear weapons?  
Realist arguments, which say the U.S. nuclear umbrella is sufficient for non-nuclear 
states, are not justified reasons because the U.S. does not assure all of these states that 
they can be sheltered under the U.S. umbrella. Thus, we feel the need for a normative 
element that prohibits states from using or developing nuclear weapons. A taboo is 
one of the elements, which can explain nuclear non-use post-1945, but realists, 
especially structural realists, argue that this is not an acceptable reason for nuclear 
non-use and instead believe in material forces. The nuclear taboo is accepted among 
nuclear policy analysts as revulsion against nuclear weapons and thus, non- use of 
them. The taboo is a normative belief about the behaviour of nuclear non- use, which 
means this behaviour is right or wrong. Tannenwald discusses three types of 
normative effects in order to show the role of taboo: regulative (or constraining), 
constitutive, and a subset of constitutive effects which has been called ‘permissive’.  
Regulative effects, emphasised by rationalist approaches, refer to how norms 
constrain or regulate existing activities; whereas constitutive effects, emphasised by 
constructivist perspectives, refer to how rules and norms, through actors’ practices, 
create or define forms of behaviour, roles, and identities. The taboo can have two 
forms: first, it can enter instrumentally into a decision- making process, which is cost-
benefit reasoning; second, it can be a form of non-cost-benefit reasoning which acts 
according to the values and what is not good to do. Norms work through three 
pathways: force, self-interest, and legitimacy. In this context, the taboo operates both 
as a constraint on self-interested decision makers, and as reflected in beliefs about the 
growing illegitimacy of nuclear use. It is worth noting that there was no nuclear taboo 
in 1945, but from the Korean War onwards, the taboo has emerged to restrain states 
from using nuclear weapons. Thus, states have to consider moral issues and use an 
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alternative technology in wars in order to be considered civilised states and nations. 
The core analytical distinction of this article is between how norms constrain and how 
they constitute. The analysis highlights the mutual shaping of norms and interests. 
Norms enter into, and change, the cost-benefit calculations of interests (constraining), 
but they also help to constitute interests, identities, and practices (Tannenwald 1999). 
1.4 How the Argument Proceeds: Chapter Outline 
It is essential to organise and clarify the subjects and parameters at the outset. Chapter 
2 allocates the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework of this research 
depicts the connection between conflict, security, prestige, bargaining leverage and 
nuclear proliferation. I will investigate the theoretical commitments underpinning the 
different explanations, including most importantly, theories of identity in international 
relations as a means for identifying and refining a specific research question for this 
thesis. The research benefits from the social constructivist approach to international 
relations to examine the main questions.  
Chapter 3 proceeds with the epistemological implications and methods, outlining the 
choice of media outlets, semi-structured elite interviews and the application of the 
case study, addressing the discursive and analytical issues of the thesis. Discourse 
analysis of speeches, interviews and literature is the method chosen to conduct this 
research. All the approaches to political identity, with the exception of some studies 
of nationalism, are constructivist in that they consider the actors’ identities, whether 
individual, subnational, national, or supranational, are affected by social interactions. 
In this regard, some scholars argue about different cases. There is a distinction 
between the internal and external treatments of identity (Abolhassani 2008). One can 
discuss the concept of the public sphere, which refers to both the real and the 
metaphoric places where political actors can argue, negotiate, and discuss, and which 
includes the media, the Internet, diplomacy, and other means of communication. 
When it comes to the concept of ‘identity’ and its origins, social constructivism 
attempts to explore it by taking an ideational approach. According to constructivism, 
identity does not merely exist objectively; rather, it is intersubjectively constructed, 
like all other social realities. To sum up, security and identity are not only related, but 
they mutually reinforce each other. Realist approaches are flawed in their denial of 
the role of intersubjectively constructed identities. While identities are 
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intersubjectively constructed and can change over time, they remain relatively fixed 
entities, which means they are essential reference objects for security.  
Chapter 4 explores a policy analysis of the history of Iran’s nuclear programme. It 
describes the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the key figures and 
authorities involved in nuclear decision-making. Accordingly, authority in Iran is not 
one dimensional, but a shared responsibility between the Supreme Leader, the 
President, the clergy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Parliament 
(Majles), and other influential bodies. It then explores in detail the foundations and 
processes of the nuclear programme in Iran, providing a history of the main nuclear 
sites and their activities, cyber-attacks on the programme, the assassination of Iranian 
nuclear scientists, the imposition of sanctions, the negotiation process, the Joint Plan 
of Action (JPOA) or the interim agreement, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran deal.  
Chapter 5 proceeds with presenting the conceptions of Iranian national identity, their 
importance in Iran’s foreign and domestic policies and in what way(s) Iran’s nuclear 
programme has been portrayed as a unifying symbol of national identity. Drawing 
upon the literature from the previous chapters, chapters 6, 7, and 8 apply this 
discursive information to examine the nuclear behaviour of Iranian elites during the 
Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations. In doing so, using interviews and 
speeches, these chapters examine on the one hand, how the identity of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has been affected and thus, constructed by its normative discourses 
at both domestic and international levels. And on the other hand, these chapters 
analyse how identity formation at both the domestic and international levels shape 
Iranian foreign policy behaviour and in particular, its nuclear decisions. 
1.5 Originality of the Study 
It is worth mentioning that newspaper articles and speeches for the previous 
governments are not online and the majority of them no longer exist even in hard 
copy. However, I overcame this barrier and conducted this research by travelling to 
places where I could find Iranian officials, such as Washington DC, Vienna, during 
the final round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 over signing the Iran 
Nuclear Deal, as well as Brussels for the EU Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 
Consortium following the signing of Iran Nuclear Deal (The Joint Comprehensive 
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Plan Of Action). I thus gained access to Iranian and Western diplomats and experts 
and could conduct my research interviews. I expanded the social constructivist 
approach to international relations for this topic on the implications of the Iranian 
elites’ conceptions of national identity regarding nuclear policies and nuclear 
negotiations. This is a new and original work that has not been undertaken in an 
academic area before. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This study looks critically at the perception of national identity and also self-interest 
over time to illustrate why Iran is insisting on pursuing a nuclear programme. As 
Suzanne Maloney (2002) explains, any dominance of the discourses of national 
identity in Iran (especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution) occurred as a result of 
the defining and shifting perceptions of self and others by the Iranian elites. The elites 
of the Islamic Republic see Iran as the essential, and driving force of the Middle East, 
or even the Muslim world. This perception stems from a solid belief in Iranian 
identity and the country’s historic role as a regional and world power. Iran’s sense of 
uniqueness and importance comes from the feelings of victimisation and the sense of 
insecurity that are the result of being conquered by other powers over time. The 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 greatly influenced Iran’s strategic culture and identity by 
formalising its sense of victimisation, whilst introducing a radical Shia ideology of 
moqāvemat [resistance] against zolm [injustice]. The Islamic Republic’s elites’ 
conception of national identity is based upon the following factors: the Islamic 
character of Iran’s social and political system; Iran’s insistence on independence 
(Thaler 2010) and self-sufficiency, which is also the basis for technological 
advancement in all aspects of energy and science. Normative-value conflicts between 
Iran and Western powers started to become more obvious, particularly following the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 and after raising concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme. 
The identity differences between Iran and the West do not allow too much 
compromise on many policies, including Iran’s nuclear policy. The domestic reality 
about Iran’s nuclear programme is that the nuclear case is a national issue and thus, 
all political factions, parties, groups, and politicians with different perspectives agree 
on Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear programme and a nuclear fuel cycle. 
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1.7 Translation, Transliteration, and the Persian Calendar 
For the purpose of this research, I have carried out all translations from Persian to 
English. Transliterations from the Persian language into English are based on the 
Iranian Studies scheme outlined in the International Journal of Middle East Studies 
transliteration chart (IJMES Transliteration chart). All transliterated terms will be in 
italics. The Persian/Iranian calendar is a solar calendar that starts on the 21st of March. 
To convert a solar date to a Gregorian date, we need to add 2/21/21 to the 
months/days/years’ figures respectively. Whenever a specific date is given in the 



























Chapter 2. Theorising Identity and Foreign Policy  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the theoretical approaches informing and shaping my 
analysis of Iran’s nuclear behaviour, specifically during the Ahmadinejad and 
Rouhani administrations. The sequence of this chapter flows from a focused 
discussion of constructivism’s contribution to security studies through what is perhaps 
its strongest offshoot – i.e. securitisation theory and its constructivist underpinnings. 
It proceeds on a few sections and subsections, each dealing with a significant aspect 
of the theoretical orientation the thesis will pursue, thus providing the reader with the 
necessary knowledge of, and insight into, the themes which constitute its analytical 
underpinnings. First, beginning with a review of social constructivism, the chapter 
attempts to discuss the role of interests and norms in shaping state identities. Second, 
it dismisses the realist approaches to IR, arguing why realist approaches are not 
enough to analyse Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This provides, third, the baseline to 
advance a more coherent, i.e. pragmatic, approach for examining Iranian nuclear 
ambitions from a constructivist standpoint.  
 
I review how and why a Wendtian-constructivist perspective raises relevant questions 
and brings crucial insights into the logic and motivation of states’ behaviour, at both 
domestic and international levels. I will describe the limits of realist analysis that 
dominates mainstream explanations of identity in foreign policy. In order to 
strengthen the relevance of my theoretical framework, thus I explain why realism is 
not enough to convey Iran’s nuclear behaviour. This thesis does not exclude or ignore 
the material factors; it is just that these motivations for behaviour are insufficient 
without an appreciation of the intersubjective, normative elements. Development of 
peaceful nuclear technology is an expression of social goals such as identity and the 
interests used by the political elite. Identities shape actors’ material as well as non-
material interests (Ersoy 2014). As Fukuyama (2006) argues, human beings are not 
solely economic or material animals, and hence, history is characterised by humans’ 
struggle for recognition, prestige, status and dignity through the seeking of national 
rights. In other words, human beings can and are willing to sacrifice their material 
needs for the sake of their ideological, cultural or religious beliefs (Choi 2015). 
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Domestic and international social environments crucially influence elites’ decision-
making regarding nuclear policies. In almost all diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue 
of Iran’s nuclear programme, the focus of negotiations has been on the balance of 
power and security, alongside other material interests such as weapons and relief from 
the crippling sanctions that have reduced Iran's oil exports (Reuters 2015). However, 
like his predecessor, the current Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, emphasises the 
role of national identity as a significant determinant of foreign policy decision-
making. A commentary in The Christian Science Monitor (2013), for example, 
claimed that Rouhani asserted Iran’s nuclear programme as a “core of Iran’s identity”. 
Additionally, Iranian leaders believe that being nuclear is a key component of having 
energy independence; the Iranian Supreme Leader asserted that with the mastery of a 
nuclear programme, Iran will be able “to stand up to big powers such as the United 
States like a lion” (the lion being an ancient Persian symbol of power). Thus, this 
research uses a constructivist approach to argue for the necessity of engaging with 
national identity conceptions and examining how they shape nuclear policy actions. 
Within the discourse analysis, one can explain the meanings, symbols, values and 
norms that constitute a collective Iranian national identity.  
 
This chapter outlines the thesis’ theoretical approach to studying the influence of 
national identity conceptions on elite nuclear policy making. In so doing, the chapter 
draws on social constructivism and outlines different ways that social constructivism, 
in the traditional sense outlined by Alexander Wendt, is a better approach than a 
realist approach to examining normative and ideational elements affecting elites’ 
nuclear decision-making. It also explains how the constructivist theory connects 
norms, identity conceptions, interests and actions. This chapter firstly reviews the 
traditional realist approach and argues why a realist approach cannot address the 
normative processes of nuclear policies. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 Social Construction of Identity in Foreign Policy 
The idea that identity is an influential concept to the study of foreign policy decision-
making is not a new interpretation. However, for many years identity has been 
marginalised by state-centric, rational choice theories. These days, the concept of 
identity receives more attention in theories of IR; as Lapid and Kratochwill (1996) 
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identify it, ‘the return of culture and identity in IR theory’. Although the term ‘return’ 
should not be considered as implying a renewed interest in the identity theories of the 
past, as they have been explored in theories of both feminism and multiculturalism, 
while new identity theories concentrate on social constructions (Ibid.). According to 
Ted Hopf (2002, p. 7) “We cannot simply assign identities to people, events, and 
things as if they were objectively knowable. Instead, we have to reconstruct the 
phenomenological intersubjectivity that characterises a collection of identities.”  
 
Intersubjective relations exist through the ways in which actors engage in the 
processes of mutual discovery and, in so doing, create identities that are in a process 
of continuous transformation (Smith 1998). Taking what Martha Finnemore (1996a) 
terms a ‘sociologically standard’ approach, this study understands norms as 
intersubjective understandings of expected behaviour within particular contexts. 
There is a large degree of intersubjective understanding present in social practices, 
which is manifest in the interactions between actors and structures. In foreign policy 
analysis, our focus shifts to the interdependent link between individuals and their 
social contexts. This addresses the construction of subjects by recognising the 
mutually constitutive relationship between individuals and their social order (Harré 
1980). In order to understand the shaping and interpreting of national identity 
conceptions and national interest, it is of paramount importance to identify the 
relevant discourses. Therefore, the argument in this research suggests that for 
constructivism to be a useful analytical framework for Foreign Policy Analysis, the 
following is needed: attention to decision makers as agents and the environment in 
which they perform a particular foreign policy or the structure (Smith et al.2012). In 
this thesis, I will investigate this relationship in terms of the role played by agents and 
structures in shaping foreign policy, the process of decision-making, and the effect of 
elites’ conceptions of national identity on nuclear policies. That is, with regard to the 
impact the international community has on how foreign policy is conducted by states 
(here, Iran). 
 
According to Hollis and Smith (1990), explanation and understanding in international 
relations theories fit two basic epistemological approaches. The first approach or the 
explanatory approach (objectivism), attempts to find causal relations within social 
reality. On the other hand, and as Hopf (2007) argues, the second approach or 
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interpretivism relies on reconstructing the intersubjective meaning of existing 
structures. Hence, the goal of interpretivism is to explain the way in which political 
elites understand, interpret and reshape the social reality and thus implies symbolic 
interactionism (Benes 2010). The fact that the social world is intersubjectively 
constructed is a fundamental principle of social constructivism. This means all the 
concepts in the social world are determined beyond individuals’ understanding 
(Huysmans 2002), signifying that meaning emerges through interactions (Leeds-
Hurwitz 2006). International norms, referred to as the shared expectations of proper 
behaviour have an intersubjective dimension, meaning that for their development and 
continued existence, they depend on social interaction and common agreement 
(Ruggie 1998). According to Jutta Weldes (1996), the identity of states are 
significantly determined by their foreign policy. While applying constructivism to 
foreign policy decisions, we should keep in mind that both ideational and material 
factors can influence decisions (Berman 2001). Moreover, how a particular policy is 
made depends on collective understanding, the nature of the state, and its identity 
(Wendt 1994). According to Roxanne Lynn Doty: 
 
“Moving toward construction of reality which is not necessarily the product of 
a particular individual suggests that the subject may be a social collective, i.e., 
a group of decision makers, a bureaucracy, or the state. This raises the 
possibility that the source of meaning, the social register of value, and agent of 
action may not be the individual. Perhaps subjects in general, whether 
individual or collective, are themselves constructed (Doty 1993, p. 300).” 
2.2.2 Realism and its Shortcomings in Grappling with Identity Dynamics in 
Foreign Policy 
The majority of analysis of the Iranian nuclear programme stems from a realist 
perspective, but this is not sufficient to explain the aims and ambitions of the Iranian 
elite in pursuing a nuclear programme. Traditional rational IR approaches fail to 
explain how effective national identity features in the context of foreign policy 
decision-making. Investigation of the role of national identity in foreign policy 
decision-making can demonstrate some links between two schools of thought- realism 
and constructivism. The absence of identity in traditional rational IR approaches 
happened because of the materialist ontology of realist approaches, while in critical 
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theories such as constructivism, scholars emphasise normative and intersubjective 
elements as well as material ones (Williams 1998). Realists ignore the role of identity 
and ideational interpretations in shaping the power of political leaders and shaping 
their interests. Influential political actors can embrace their ideological interests as a 
political weapon to bring about opportunities (Snyder 1993). Realists attribute both 
objective and subjective issues to materialism, and hence, for them, identities are 
nothing more than indicators of the distribution of materialist power (Hopf 2002). 
Hans Morgenthau (1951) argues that in order to make realistic decisions, 
policymakers need to pursue national interests based on the assessment of the 
distribution of power. A criticism of Morgenthau would be that interests based on the 
predictions of materialistic approaches in realist discourses of decision-making ignore 
the normative and subjective role of identities.  
 
According to neorealism, the relationship between identity and security is minimal. 
However, according to constructivism, social facts like ‘identity’ do not exist in any 
objective sense (Hopf 1998). Much of the early scholarships on the ways in which 
nuclear weapons affect affairs in the international community are mentioned by realist 
approaches. However, the constructivist school of thought explains the 
institutionalisation of nuclear weapons, including the idea of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD) and the norm of the nuclear taboo. In the constructivist debate, 
scholars analyse the way proliferation asserts itself in the behavioural relations 
between different actors such as state and non-state actors (Whyte 2011). The 
apparent absence of concern over identity in conceptions of security needs to be 
understood as a historical legacy that contains a conscious attempt to exclude identity 
concerns from the political realm. The roots of realism’s conception of an objective 
national interest lie in the liberal sensibility, in an attempt to construct a material and 
objective foundation for political practice, even though that process is predicated on 
liberal faith in the power of science to subdue political conflict (Williams 1998). By 
tracing the influence of identity on foreign policy, Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and 
Benjamin Frankel (1998) evidence the use of constructivism by discussing the role of 
identity in foreign policy. A successful and strong foreign policy is steadily directed 
by a shared sense of national identity, considering actors’ intentions and interests (Hill 
and Wallace 1996). Dissatisfied with being labelled as materialists, realists have 
sought to include non-military threats affecting people rather than states. This thus 
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expanded their security agenda by including concepts such as human security and 
regional security – together with ideas of culture and identity (Eroukhmanoff 2017).  
 
Jutta Weldes (1996) argues that realists are wrong to believe threats are self-evident; 
that is why the realist approach to international politics cannot address the 
construction of threats, and as a result, is unable to explain why certain actions in 
relation to perceived threats are framed as in the national interest. Challenging 
traditional approaches to security in international relations, securitisation theory 
asserts that issues are not essentially threatening in their own nature; rather, it is by 
referring to them as ‘security’ issues that they become security problems 
(Eroukhmanoff 2017). Securitisation theory argues that what is said and how it is 
expressed is not exactly what we see, which is assumed by realists. However, it is 
constitutive of that social reality (Balzacq 2009). Even if states adhere to specific 
norms and regimes, the norms perpetuated by them can eventually become part of 
their nature and thus, constitutive of their own identities and interests (Jepperson et al. 
1996). Unlike realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), who conceive of the structure of 
the international system as the distribution of material capabilities, Wendt argues that 
collective identities and interests are both affected and constituted by the international 
system. Thus, in order to understand states’ foreign policy behaviours, it is necessary 
for the material and ideational aspects of the system to be problematized. Wendt 
essentially argues that identities constitute and shape states’ preferences and actions 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Nick Ritchie (2012) argues that collective identities 
are essentially shaped by the social construction of a relatively stable sets of norms, 
values and images of ourselves and others. Indeed, political behaviour can be 
considered to be a process of interpreting the values and ideas that underpin identities 
through action and interaction. 
 
Given the above argument, a theory of IR that better lends itself to the adequate 
expression of the subject should be applied to the analysis of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 
that is, one that avoids the mere description of events on the surface and instead 
explores the intersubjectivity underlying Iran’s nuclear decisions. This theory needs to 
consider the role played by ideational factors and explain how shared knowledge and 
intersubjective understandings impact on actors’ decisions. Constructivism, this thesis 
maintains, is the appropriate theory for this purpose. By means of the constructivist 
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school of thought in IR, this chapter will show the impact of the ontological aspects of 
security - here national identity - as an important component of decision-making in a 
country’s political arena. International politics is determined and shaped by the beliefs 
and expectations that states have about each other (Wendt 1999). Therefore, it should 
be remarked upon that the focus of this research on national identity conceptions does 
not simply ignore the more traditional and material aspects of security such as power, 
survival and self-help. As Alexander Wendt (1994) argues, however, it is not a 
predictable fact that the international environment is a self-help system. Rather, “the 
international environment is created and recreated in processes of interaction” 
(Zehfuss 2002, p. 38) among the individuals and the society.  
 
The security environment is an influencing factor on policy-making, whereas the 
leaders are determining factors in making policy choices. However, in the case of 
nuclear policies, Khan (2010) believes that leaders’ personal proclivities to go nuclear 
are not enough for a country to become nuclear. Rather, nuclear decisions are part of 
leaders’ national identity conceptions. There are a set of beliefs and experiences 
among state representatives and the main political currents that connects these 
contexts and motives. Arguably, the profound formation and transformation of Iran’s 
nuclear behaviour cannot be merely explained by referring to material structures. As 
Mark J. Smith (1998) argues, the way individuals’ view collective communication 
and interaction is shaped through the ways in which they engage in the process of 
mutual understanding. In doing this, their identities evolve in a process of continual 
transformation. Social construction extends not just to the intersubjective 
development of shared concepts, language and norms of behaviour, but also to the 
identities of actors in the social realm (Phillips and Malhotra 2008). This chapter aims 
to use the conceptions of national identity and foreign policy in constructivism to 
explore the current puzzles in resolving the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme. 
2.3 Why Does Social Constructivism Sufficiently Explain Identity Dynamics in 
Foreign Policy? 
2.3.1 Social Constructivism: Definition and Types 
Social constructivism has emerged as a metatheoretical criticism of rationalist 
ontological and epistemological theories, and a powerful model for explaining the 
way ideational phenomena, such as norms, identities, and beliefs, affect interests and 
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actions. Nicholas Onuf (2012), as the first theorist to use the term ‘constructivism’ in 
1989 demonstrated that, like individuals, states live in a world of our own making, 
which means that human actions and interactions construct the social world. He 
emphasised that as opposed to natural kinds governed by unchanging physical laws, 
social kinds come into being through shared understandings that give meaning to the 
world in which we live (O’Brennan 2006). As Nicholas Onuf (2012) put it, it could be 
argued that the most important principle of social constructivism is the belief that all 
knowledge is socially constructed. This principle, in turn, is based on the realisation 
that language, meanings and ideas influence all human experience, including 
knowledge production. Thus, social constructivism does not deny the possibility of 
material conditions about the world, but it is mainly about interpretation. In other 
words, the most important aspect of international relations is social, not material 
(Jackson et al. 2005).   
 
Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the 
following core claims: “(1) states are the main units of analysis for international 
political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather 
than material; and (3) state identities and interests are constructed by social 
structures.” Some of the core concepts of constructivism such as discourses, norms, 
identity, and culture are frequently used regarding issues like security policy (Checkel 
2008). According to Alister Miskimmon et al. (2014), social constructivists focus on 
the way ideas and identities shape the construction of interests. As Nina Tannenwald 
(2006) mentions, however, ideas do not hold the necessary mechanisms to show the 
independent effect on policy, and thus, need to be connected to social and political 
processes, institutions, and organisation.  
 
At its heart, constructivists believe that identity is all about change and dynamism 
(Adler 2005). Although all constructivists share the above-mentioned views and 
concepts, there is considerable variety within constructivism. Conventional 
constructivists such as Alexander Wendt believe that it is possible to explain world 
events in causal terms, and so they are interested in exploring relationships between 
norms, interests and identities (Hopf 1998). Critical constructivists, on the other hand, 
want to reconstruct an identity, since they believe that identity components are created 
through written or spoken communication among and between people. Language thus 
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plays a key role in critical constructivists because it is crucial in the construction of 
social reality (Pouliot 2004). However, for this thesis, I use Alexander Wendt’s 
conventional constructivism, which posits the view that the material world shapes and 
is shaped by human action and interaction. According to Wendt (1994, p. 385), 
‘anarchy is what states make of it,’ that is, the nature of international anarchy appears 
to be conflictual if states show conflictual behaviour towards each other, and 
cooperative if they behave cooperatively towards one another. Whenever there is a 
mention of constructivism or social constructivism in this thesis, it means 
conventional constructivism. 
 
Political culture has become an important and controversial explanation for state 
behaviour (Lantis 2002). According to Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (1963), 
political culture is a set of beliefs and societal values that are related to political 
system decision making. By coining the term ‘strategic culture’ in the late 1970s, Jack 
Snyder (1977) suggests that culture can remarkably affect both security strategy and 
state behaviour through the lens of national identity. Alistair Johnston (1995, p. 46) 
also defines strategic culture as “an integrated “system of symbols (e.g., 
argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors), which acts to establish 
pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences.”  
2.3.2 Agent-Structure 
The constructivist approach in IR centres on identity formation in relation to history, 
culture, and traditions (Lantis 2002). Political science is the domain of various 
competing ontologies, and as competing approaches, IR theories tell us all about the 
differences in this realm. Therefore, each theory attempts to answer the ontological 
question of the nature of the object or reality that is referred to as the agent-structure 
problem, which is central to Wendt’s constructivism. As Wendt (1987a) argues, all 
social scientific theories imply at least one underlying solution to the agent-structure 
problem. According to the constructivist approach, while interests are shaped by 
identities, identities are subject to change in the process of interaction (Adler 2005). 
The world represented and constructed by the Iranian elite and Iranian society is a 
world of constitutive norms, values and ideas (Brown 2010). This brings us to a brief 
discussion of international structures and agents. In line with constructivist thinking, 
this thesis discusses the idea that agents and structures are mutually constitutive and 
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that the mutual constitution of agents and structures is essential to an analysis of 
identities and interests. 
 
Constructivists consider international relations to be socially constructed, and they 
place centrally state actors as the principal unit of analysis (Wendt 1994). The phrase 
‘socially constructed’ indicates that they give greater importance to the ‘social’ and 
consider the world ‘as coming into being through a process of interaction’ between 
agents and structure (Clarke 2008). According to constructivist logic, any change in 
the intersubjective narratives, thoughts and ideas of actors in the international system 
causes a change in the system itself, since the system is constructed by intersubjective 
ideas, thoughts, rules and norms (Jackson et al. 2005). Alister Miskimmon et al. 
(2014) emphasises the importance of communication and narratives in the process of 
the construction and reinterpretation of identity. Alexander Wendt (1996) also argues 
that symbolic actions, dialogues and persuasive and ideological narratives influence 
identities. If identities were stable, it would be a meaningless analytical tool.  
2.3.3 Security: Material Forces 
According to social constructivism, the political arena is not where actors struggle to 
gain power and interests. Constructivism is a social science theory about the 
relationship between structures and actors in the international system as well as an 
international relations theory. Thus, according to constructivism, the world is a not 
just made up of material issues, but also thoughts, beliefs, ideas, languages, rules, 
discourses and shared understandings among human beings (Wendt 1999). As Louis 
Althusser (2006, p. 88) puts it, “the material existence of ideas is merely useful in 
order to reveal what every at all serious analysis of any ideology will immediately and 
empirically show to every observer, however critical.” 
 
The constructivist theory claims that the thoughts, ideas and values of political actors 
are determined through mutually constitutive discourses with others, thus, a state’s 
foreign policy is defined beyond mere power-seeking purposes and security-seeking 
incentives (Ferrero 2009). Others perceive each entity or state in this way, clarifying 
their domestic attitudes and the interaction between nation-states. Unlike the 
underlying tenets of rational choice theories, constructivism casts doubt on using 
objective rationality to explain the behaviour of states. It asserts that rationality is 
 46 
relative to each actor or society’s social goals and norms and that value-oriented 
behaviour differs between and within states in the international system (Slaughter 
2011). Hence, the idea of an Iranian nuclear crisis cannot be regarded as an objective 
reality. Instead, the ideologies, identities and interests of an actor are related to its 
ideational structure, influencing its interactions with other actors or states (Lebow 
2003). The key point in this argument is that, according to Alexander Wendt (1996), 
actors’ identities are not a given but are shaped or changed through interaction 
(Zehfuss 2001). Wendt asserts that identities are the foundation for interests and that 
different forms of anarchy are constructed through interaction between states (Wendt 
1999). Constructivism is perceptive to the role of social norms in international 
politics; thus constructivists distinguish between a ‘logic of consequences or 
rationality’, where in order to maximise the interests of a state, actions are chosen 
rationally, and a ‘logic of appropriateness’, where rationality is excessively affected 
by social norms (Slaughter 2011). Olsen (2008, p. 193) describes “the logic of 
appropriateness as a perspective on human action. To act appropriately,” he argues, 
“is to proceed according to the institutionalised practices of a collectivity and mutual 
understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good. Actors seek to 
fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a membership 
in a political community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be 
adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity.” 
2.3.4 Intersubjectivity 
Constructivism considers international relations as a complex sphere of interaction, 
which shapes a state’s identities and interactions. Due to this complexity, international 
relations should not ignore human consciousness, values, ideas, identities, interests 
and beliefs (Jackson et al. 2005). State interests and identities do not merely depend 
on the structure of the system, but also upon the shared meanings and ideas embodied 
in the structure and which reconceptualise the national interest (Wendt 1992).  
According to the constructivist school of thought, the international system can be 
regarded merely as a common understanding among actors. Accordingly, the 
international system is affected by ideas and values; in other words, changing the 
ideas and values of the actors or societies results to shifts in the nature of the 
international system (Reus-Smit 1999). Constructivism indicates that the focus of 
international relations should mostly be on the ideas and beliefs of the actors in 
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international society as well as the shared understandings between them (Jackson et 
al. 2005). However, this does not mean that Alexander Wendt ignores or denies the 
objectivity of social reality. Indeed, he argues that some intersubjective 
understandings can become so embedded, or reified, as to appear to all intents and 
purposes as real or objective (Wendt 1992).  
 
In order to provide a clearer understanding of the structure of debates between (neo) 
realist and social constructivism, and also to try and show that these debates have had 
dubious concepts of the relationship between identity and security, one could assess 
the rethinking of critical analysis in relation to security studies. Identity and security 
are two intertwined concepts, but there is a difference in the neorealists and 
constructivists accepting this issue. The dominant realist/neorealist approaches ignore 
the relationship between identity and security, while social constructivism considers 
that identity is intersubjectively constructed (Steans et al. 2005). According to more 
classic realist approaches such as neorealism, there is a minimal relationship between 
identity and security. However, according to constructivism, identity as a social 
reality with subjective sense does not exist in any objective rationale (O’Bryan 2011). 
The main point asserted by Alexander Wendt is that discursive social practices which 
help states to redefine their view of self and others over time mostly depends on the 
cultural identity which they hold (Guzzini and Leander 2005). Maaike Warnaar 
(2013, pp. 25–26) argues that “constructivists in their analyses often move beyond 
mere questions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and look at how interests are socially constructed 
in the context of worldviews that go beyond matters of identity.” According to 
constructivism, realism's shortcoming lies in marginalising the role of ideational 
structures in power politics by focusing on the deterministic role of international 
anarchy and defining state identity and interests with material structures (Jung 2013). 
Security and deterrence are the most common themes within mainstream IR literature 
on the Iranian nuclear programme. These two themes, which have been used to 
identify Iran’s nuclear ambitions, have received substantial attention from academics, 
policymakers, and analysts alike (Milani 2009). When it comes to the concept of 
‘identity’ and its origins, social constructivism attempts to explore it by taking an 
ideational approach. According to constructivism, identity does not merely exist 
objectively; rather, it is intersubjectively constructed, like all other social realities. 
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Constructivists point to the importance of identity, culture, norms, regimes, and ideas 
(Hansen 2013). Unlike constructivism, which acquires its central analytical leverage 
through subjective capabilities, such as norms, perceptions and preferences, realism 
derives its fundamental analytical dominance by elucidating social constructions 
through variations in the distribution of objective material power capabilities (Legro 
and Moravcsik 1999). Contrary to the realist schools that focus on material forces in 
empirical analysis, constructivists believe that shared ideas should also be considered 
alongside material forces. Thus, as Wendt (1999) states, no matter if a system’s 
function is conflictual or peaceful, it is still a product of a shared culture, which has 
been created through discursive social practices rather than anarchy and power (Ibid.). 
Whether states’ intentions towards conflict are driven by security or non-security 
factors, one can explain the reason for conflict not just via material structure, but also 
through ideational structures, including intersubjective shared ideas, interests, norms, 
and values (Copeland 2000). While rationalist theories like neorealism reflect on the 
persistent role of interests and identities in order to identify the causal role of power, 
constructivism offers an explanation of how actors define and shape their behaviour 
through ideational structures (Onuf 2012). Whether national identities have a 
foundational basis or they are constructed with the conceptions changing over-time 
have long been debated. Constructivists point to the importance of identity, culture, 
norms, regimes, and ideas (Hansen 2013). Cohesion and solidarity within societies 
and nations have generally been attributed to several factors. These have ranged from 
real or constructed myths regarding ethnic origin and history to the all-important 
virtue of shared values and cultures (Hunter 2014). Thus, one needs to know about the 
norms, cultures, identities and interests that constitute the interaction of actors and 
structures. Identities matter as they tell others who you are and you who others are. 
Social constructivism assumes that identities depend on the social, political and 
historical context of a society. Constructivism, however, does not ignore material 
power, but it says “both material and discursive power are necessary in understanding 
and explaining world affairs” (Hopf 1998, p. 177). According to the historical and 
social context of a society, constructivism can tell how and where change may occur. 
In this context, as Hopf (1998, p. 181) states, “state interests are part of the process of 
identity construction”. Sending a message to others about who we are related to, our 
reputation, and value. A good or bad reputation is a reflection of how actors introduce 
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themselves and how others interpret their identity (Balmer et al. 2006). Moreover, 
identities demonstrate the nature, intentions, attitudes and interests of each state in 
different social, historical, political and cultural contexts. Actors share their 
understandings of the world and therefore construct social reality according to their 
interpretations (Hopf 1998). Thus, constructivism attempts to explain the ways that 
actors acquire their identities and how these identities shape the actors’ interests, 
whether material or ideational (Van Wyk et al. 2007). Identities can simultaneously 
secure and strengthen a society’s sense of solidarity as well as threaten or jeopardise 
their well-being (Gilchrist et al. 2010).   
2.3.5 Interests 
In order to proceed with the discussion of identities and the significant role they play 
in shaping nuclear policies, this section addresses the role of identities in shaping and 
reshaping interests. The essence of rationalism is that states have selfish identities and 
interests and their ultimate goal of survival imposes interests upon them (Halabi 
2004). On the other hand, constructivists claim that actors’ identities and interests are 
an interpretation of social norms and ideas rather than material conditions (Jackson 
2004). By bridging the divide between domestic and international systems and 
structures, social constructivism explains how intersubjectively shared ideas 
constitute actors’ identities and interests (Bozdağlıoğlu 2007). In determining that 
state identities are not pre-given, Wendt (1994) argues that identities have subjective 
as well as intersubjective features and thus, states’ understanding of their identities is 
related to their interaction within their own system as well as with other actors. Also, 
identities shape interests in a way that helps interpret situations and whether or not the 
available options are legitimate.  
 
According to Alexander Wendt (1994), the social identity of actors develops from 
four basic interests: first is physical security, distinguishing actors from each other; 
second is ontological security, creating an appealing environment where actors can 
predict their relationship with others; third refers to recognition, which is the way 
actors are recognised by other actors and concerns their status rather than their 
survival; and fourth relates to development, in the sense that actors aspire to a better 
life by means of  their humanity, thus defining the range of subjective interests of  
actors (Ropp and Sikkink 1999). As Wendt (1992) notes, identities form the principal 
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constituent of interests. In other words, actors do not have a set of solid interests, 
which is separate from their social circumstances; rather their interpretation of 
interests is constituted in the process of shaping the social context (Weber 2005). The 
relevance of identity to security in a constructivist approach, according to Matt 
McDonald (2008), consists of two central elements: the first of those is the way 
ideational factors are of paramount importance in the construction of security within 
global politics, and second is the way interests are understood in terms of norm 
compliance, which is necessary in order to reproduce certain conceptions of an actor’s 
identity. Social constructivists argue that foreign policy can be a product of 
socialisation, meaning that states can decide on which norms to follow, because they 
calculate their costs and benefits, or because norms become internalised. Therefore, 
identities and interests are central determinants of foreign policy for constructivists, as 
they rely on ideational factors in explaining foreign policy and the structure of 
international politics (Finnemore 1996b). 
2.3.6 Norms 
From a constructivist perspective, norms shape the conceptualisations of interests 
through the social construction of identities (Katzenstein 1996). Therefore, “actors 
comply with norms in order to validate their social identities” (Price and Tannenwald 
1996, pp. 124–5); it is in the process of validating identities that interests are 
constituted (Tannenwald 2007). Actors acquire identities that are based on their 
expectations and understanding of their specific roles, which constructs shared 
behaviours and motivations (Zehfuss 2001). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 891) 
refers to a very simple definition of norms, citing them as the ‘standards of 
appropriate behaviour’. Based on the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, equality, respect, 
non-intervention and self-determination have been states’ key behavioural norms 
(Held 2002). Institutions embody rather stable structures of identities and interests; 
while there are actors that codify the norms and rules of an institution by their 
interpretation of social reality which is based on a common understanding (Wendt 
1992). Rational theories claim that the interests of states or actors develop and dictate 
the structure of the international system and its norms. That is, as Michael Desch 
(1998) puts it, ideas and norms only matter when they coincide with the interests of 
powerful states. Hence, constructivists view the development of international norms 
as the mutual constitution of agents and structures (Dixon 2013). However, according 
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to identity-based theorists, states’ action would be meaningless without constructivist 
norms (Griffiths et al. 2014). Constructivist scholars believe that norms are not mere 
byproducts of the balance of power or a reflection of converging state interests, but 
link the ideational realm with real-world actions and the interactions of actors. Thus, 
norms become a crucial concept that help us understand how certain actions in 
international relations become conceivable, meaningful and legitimate to begin with 
(Florini 1996).  
 
To understand the international social environment for states seeking 
nonproliferation, Maria Rost Rublee (2009) focuses on the normative and non-
material incentives for states in a socially constructed international system. The 
strategic aim of nonproliferation policy, as George Perkovich (2004) argues, should 
be to acquire comprehensive compliance with the norms of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. As Reus-Smit (1999) argues, states are mostly restrained by 
more than just material factors, such as the balance of power, and therefore, it is 
international norms that set out the meanings and rules for explaining foreign policy 
choices. Nina Tannenwald (1999) distinguishes how norms constrain and how they 
constitute. The analysis highlights the mutual shaping of norms and interests. Norms 
enter into, and change, the cost-benefit calculations of interests (constraining), but 
they also help to constitute those interests, identities, and practices (Tannenwald 
1999). This research aims to understand Iranian leaders’ decisions about the nuclear 
programme by means of interpreting the crucial dimensions of Iranian national 
identity within a socially constructed, ideational framework.  
2.4 National Identity- Definitions and the Chosen Model 
2.4.1 Constructivism, Identity and Nationalism  
In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln emphasised national unity, expressing 
the American nation’s expectations of a democratic government by simply defining it 
as the government of the people, by the people, for the people (Lincoln 1994). From 
his address, one can see the importance of a nation who forms expectations. Hence, 
the underlying question is, how do we define the nation? According to Hans Kohn 
(1961, p. 10), “nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of 
consciousness.” The process of identity formation is accompanied by interaction with 
or against the other (İnaç and Ünal 2013). As Derrida (1978) argues, identities are 
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always being distinguished or identified by others.  
Philip Allott (1992, p. 1363), addresses the matter of identity as a constitutive 
element,  arguing that “human beings still struggle to be persons, full of projects, of 
love, of suffering, of anger, of despair, of hope. Human beings still transform the 
natural world through the application of ideas. Human societies still struggle to 
survive and prosper in the name of ideas.” Allot (ibid. p. 1368) believes that “A 
salute, a religion, a royal palace, an epic poem, a national anthem, a law, a life of self-
sacrifice, a surgical operation, a death in battle, the burning of a witch, a nuclear 
weapon, the genocide of a people, world war, and global warming are all 
actualisations of the human mind.” All these issues need to be defined and thereby 
understood. As Alexander Wendt (1994) defines it, social identities are shaped in 
their relations at the international level with other states, and thus are open to 
redefinition and transformation. Identity has been conceived as ‘normative’, or 
composed of norms of behaviour. These norms are essentially constitutive rules that 
define a nation’s collective identity and lead other nation-states to recognise it; 
identity is thus linked to behaviour through the performance of roles.  
If we consider identity as a social, historical, dynamic, and multidimensional entity, 
then we need to define what affects or influences identity as a social entity. According 
to Smith (1991), two elements form and define identity: the objective and the 
subjective. Objective elements are those shared by groups of people or nations and 
include values, symbols, myths, religion, ethnicity, language, geography, common 
history, traditions, etc. Subjective elements, on the other hand, are depicted as the 
extent to which the internalisation process of objective elements is carried out, as the 
subjective elements are of paramount importance in shaping national identity.  In 
other words, a nation can be defined as a group of people who have a homeland, share 
common myths and historical memories, and have legal rights (Telhami and Barnett 
2002). Thus, national identities are conceptions that individuals have developed over 
time in order to define the collective socio-political values and common will of 
society (Toffolo 2003). This is about the way nations construct themselves and their 
decisions based on their ideas, ideologies, and values. Burger and Luckman (1991) 
likewise view society consisting of both objective and subjective realities. When 
Smith refers to socially constructed webs of objective-subjective meaning, some of 
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his critics, such as Montserrat Guibernau (2004) believe he failed to capture the full 
meaning of nations and national identity in modern societies. Aletta Norval (1996) or 
Umut Özkirimli (2003) also seem to have interpreted the notion ‘socially constructed’ 
exclusively in terms of modern inventions or fabrications, which is contradictory to 
the constructivist account of nationalism. In that way, they neglect the fact that all 
socially constructed realities are not deliberately made up or crafted to serve a 
function for society, but might instead be the unintended consequences of various 
historical processes. Therefore, these critiques’ understanding of the concept of 
socially constructed realities is too narrow. Such an understanding conceives of social 
construction in an abstract way, while the concept of social construction is not limited 
to fabrications.  
My argument is that this criticism is a misinterpretation of Smith’s theory. Social 
constructivism posits that actors interact within their social world and therefore 
influence each other with common knowledge that consists of socially constructed 
and legitimised rules, roles, norms, and beliefs (Martin and Gynnild 2011). Identity is 
the central notion through which to understand action within social contexts. Identity 
can be thought of as a set of relatively stable definitions of self and others, without 
which most social action would either be chaotic or simply impossible (Wendt 1992). 
To understand that social actors depend in part on an understanding of who/what 
social actors are, as Hall (1993) argues, analysts need a ‘we’ before they can know 
what ‘our’ interests are (Bokszański 1995). Alexander Wendt (1994) attempted to 
further analyse state identity into ‘corporate’ and ‘social’ forms. Corporate identity is 
seen as inherent to all states, constructed at the domestic level, and implying basic 
‘survival’ needs such as physical security. Social identities, on the other hand, form in 
states’ relations at the international level and are open to redefinition and 
transformation (Ibid.). 
This thesis’ point of departure regarding the notion of identity is that identity, as well 
as its significations—nationalism and sense of belonging to a nation—are a cultural 
relic (Anderson 2006). This leads to what Benedict Anderson calls imagined 
communities. For Anderson, the question is how community or identity is imagined 
and has got its shape. Hence, Anderson (Ibid.) argues that nationalism and national 
identity have underpinnings in real material environments (Calhoun 2017). William 
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Wallace (1991) argues that nationhood and national identity represent necessary 
myths which underpin foreign policy. They constitute the distinction between a 
national community, which the government represents abroad, and the foreigners with 
whom it deals; more than that, they legitimise the actions of the government in 
defence of the national interest. According to Wallace, states cannot survive without a 
sense of identity; an image of what marks their government and their citizens from 
their neighbours, of what special contribution they have to make to civilisation and 
the international order. Thus, foreign policy partly reflects that search for identity. 
Although the constructivist approach to identity is research-intensive and theoretically 
parsimonious, “once one has uncovered a prevailing discourse of national identity, 
one can expect that discourse to both persist over time and explain a broad range of 
outcomes, regardless of who is making foreign policy in that state” (Hopf and Allan 
2016, p. 11). 
2.4.2 Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Constructivist Standpoint 
In the nuclear realm, constructivists take a particular interest in how states’ shared 
meanings, understandings and expectations of nuclear technology affect their nuclear 
policy (Searle 1995). A Wendtian constructivist approach makes it possible for this 
research to explain how Iran’s identities and interests are interconnected and a central 
focus. Iran’s foreign policy, including its nuclear policy behaviour, cannot be 
adequately understood if it is not contextualised within an ideational structure. One 
crucial dimension of Iranian identity is its strong sense of nationalism. Constructivism 
focuses on the symbolic importance of specific historical events, for example, in the 
case of Iran one can refer to various policies with symbolic importance, such as the 
Constitutional Revolution (1905-1906), the Oil Nationalisation Movement (1951-
1953), the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as well as the peaceful nuclear programme. In 
other words, a country with peaceful nuclear technology sees itself as a 
technologically advanced and independent power that deserves special recognition on 
behalf of the regional and international community. Understanding national identity 
and nationalism requires a consideration of the historical and contemporary 
importance of prestige in the formation of nations, their perceptions and evaluations 
of other nations, that thus shape their behaviour and state policy (Wood 2014). 
Alexander Wendt (1994) considers four basic interests or appetites for social actors: 
first, their need for physical security or survival; second, their need for ontological 
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security or predictability in stable relationships with other actors; third, their need for 
recognition by other actors; and fourth, their need for development and progress. This 
research focuses on the third basic interest of actors, i.e., the need for a distinguished 
actor’s recognition by other actors. This need is beyond the level of survival and 
material interests (Muppidi 2004). Sherrill (2012) also argues that states endeavour to 
attain honour and prestige.  
 
While actors seek recognition by defining themselves, there is no unanimity among 
historians about the definition of nationality. Ethnicity and race are given different 
weights by various scholars (Dahbour 2002); some like Liah Greenfeld (1993) have 
rejected ethnicity as a central determinant of national identity; while Ross Poole 
(1999) has defined nations using Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined community’; and 
Paul Gilbert (2018) sees the connection between national identity and nationalism as a 
political ideology. National identity as a category simultaneously contains historical, 
cultural, social, and political dimensions (Smith 1986). Which one of these 
dimensions is the dominant one at any particular time depends on how much socio-
political pressure is put upon each of them (İnaç and Ünal 2013). The dominance of 
each of these dimensions of identity, therefore, can be manifested in different ways: 
individual, cultural, social, and political (Giroux 1995). “The multicultural and multi-
societal character of the identity requires the necessity of a plurality of people, groups, 
social confrontations, mutual challenges and profound interactions, and finally, a 
strong possession is needed for the gained identities and these identities may be 
redefined in accordance with the conjuncture” (Ibid. p. 224).  In so doing, it can be 
said that one of the most important motivations for Iran to continue being a nuclear 
power are national ideological reasons.  
 
In order to secure its independence, Iran seeks a dominant role in the knowledge and 
technology of nuclear capabilities. This could be an influential response to sanctions 
by the international society; and Iran’s supreme leader believes these economic 
sanctions lead Iran to be self-reliant, never changing its foreign policy regarding its 
nuclear programme as it remains a matter of national pride (Mohammad Nia 2011). 
Iran’s foreign policy represents a logical reaction to the insecurities in the region that 
come from neighbours like Iraq during Saddam Hussein who invaded Iran in the 
aftermath of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the presence of the U.S. in Iraq, 
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Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region and countries with nuclear weapons in the 
Middle East, including Israel, India and Pakistan, as well as the Iranian collective 
identity which has been formed throughout history.  
 
The combination of Iranian cultural elements and Islamic values, coupled with 
Western norms, has produced a complex and multi-dimensional identity for the 
Islamic Republic, which is well reflected in the miscellaneous positions and role 
structures that constitute the basis of Iran’s foreign policy, including its nuclear 
policy. One of the major discursive repertoires it has drawn on to construct such an 
identity of self is Shiite Islamic ideology while indulging in a post-colonial struggle to 
advance the universal cause of ‘oppression’ by outside invaders (Javadi Arjomand 
and Chaboki 2010). The term ‘post-colonial’ is used to describe certain types of states 
and politics. Iran was never formally colonised. However, the evolution of institutions 
similar to other post-colonial states is undeniable in Iran. Despite the fact that Iran has 
never been directly colonised, it has suffered from foreign intervention and numerous 
invasions (Helfont 2015). Foreign intervention sheds light on issues of independence 
and modernity in the foreign policy of modern Iran, especially after the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 that emphasised total independence from the West in general and 
the US in particular. National identity played a major role in this act, with the Islamic 
revolutionary leaders in Iran describing themselves as opponents of the Western 
international order (ALDosari 2015). According to Itty Abraham (1998), another 
aspect of post-colonialism, which helps in our understanding of the nuclear ambitions 
of certain countries, such as Iran and India, is the ‘fetish’. Fetish in this context means 
a country that looks for modernity via scientific and technological advancement, with 
this desired form of modernity bringing about fundamental changes to the countries’ 
national and international status.  
 
A constructivist analysis of Tehran’s insistence on being a nuclear power would 
examine the ideational structures that shape Iran’s subjective identity. Iranian national 
identity, which has been shaped by its historical heritage and idealisation, asserts that 
the Islamic Republic will continue pursuing its nuclear ambitions despite economic 
sanctions and the international society’s rigour. Due to these international 
stringencies, Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear technology in order to be a developed 
economy (Gladstone and Castle 2012) has turned into a symbol of national pride, 
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independence, and resistance. A useful way to understand Iranian leaders’ nuclear 
policies and their way of thinking, is to place it in the context of their views on the 
role of identity and ideology in nuclear policy. The use of a constructivist approach in 
this thesis explains the Iranian identity since the beginning of the Iranian nuclear 
programme and with a focus on the Islamic Revolution and later. On this basis, Iran’s 
nuclear policy and the identity that constitutes it are made meaningful via 
constructivism, as the constructivist approach helps us understand the changes and 
resistances in Iran’s nuclear policy. The fact that Iran wants to be a powerful regional 
actor is deeply rooted in its history and this may be evidence for Iran’s persistence in 
having nuclear technology. Since it has been argued that Iranian national identity 
conceptions play a significant role in nuclear decision-making, it is necessary to 
determine what Iranian national identity conceptions are. We need to ascertain how 
they function with regard to the impact of Iranian elites’ conceptions of national 
identity with regard to decisions affecting Iran's nuclear programme and EU-3+3 
nuclear negotiations. This will be explored in detail in chapter 4, which considers 
national identity formations and the impact of Iranian elites’ conception of national 
identity on nuclear policies. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter mapped the epistemological underpinnings and conceptual outfit of 
identity politics based on social constructivism, discussing the shortcomings of 
applying realist theory to identity politics and the promises of constructivist foreign 
policy analysis. Despite its high analytical potential, the realist approach to IR does 
not address the ideational and normative construction of policies. Social 
constructivism explains foreign policy behaviour and the reshaping of national 
identities by exploring the roles political elites play in their domestic and foreign 
policies. A Wendtian constructivist approach to Iran’s nuclear policy can bring to the 
fore factors that have been ignored or misinterpreted within the realist or rational 
framework such as national identity components. The research methodology and 
techniques can be used to map out the dynamics of national identity formation over 
long periods of time. This could advance IR knowledge in many ways, but the most 
effective theory to explore the impact of national identity conceptions on decision-
making processes would be the constructivist approach. This is since it would enable 
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systematic evaluation of key constructivist teachings on what makes policymakers 
create policies based on symbolic values that unite the nation. 
 
The impact of culture and identity is to a large extent marginal in realism and its 
branches. Yet, despite the disagreement of so many scholars, the two concepts of 
security and identity are deeply intertwined. The dominant neo-realist paradigm 
relinquishes the role of identity in security issues, while neoclassical realism 
considers the role of identity in foreign policy issues. Rather than going along with 
the interests of the international community and following the consensus, a realist 
expectation for Iranian nuclear policy focuses more on how Iran’s interests are 
affected by nuclear policy decisions. To constructivists, social context is remarkably 
important in examining agent and structure behaviour. According to a constructivist 
understanding of Iranian nuclear policy, the perception and influence of national 
identity components can lead to trends in nuclear decision-making. This, of course, 
leaves the central question of the thesis to be answered: Why has the development of 
an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle been portrayed as a unifying symbol of national 
identity in Iran, especially since 2002, following the revelation of clandestine nuclear 
activities? Based on this chapter, the theoretical literature on the normative and 
ideational approaches points out various ways that a conception of national identity 
may affect political elites’ foreign and nuclear policies through a constructivist 
framework. However, this will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, which considers 
national identity formation and the internal determinants of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
In this thesis, I examine the main question of the research with regards to the 
Wendtian constructivist approach, taking an additional focus on the role of identity, 
which helps understand the creation of social meaning. Identities have subjective and 
intersubjective qualities and help us interpret situations and preferred options, which 
are defined against the backdrop of justice and legitimacy. The next chapter will 
discuss the methodological approaches and methods that are being used to address the 







Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This research project analyses areas of importance that have been neglected in 
understanding the nuclear behaviour of Iranian elites. In the previous chapter, I drew a 
general image of the ontological and epistemological platforms of social 
constructivism. It has been argued that it is necessary to draw on normative elements 
to understand and interpret Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Nina Tannenwald (1999), for 
example, argues that it is necessary to use a normative element to explain the reason 
why states have not used nuclear weapons since 1945. According to Tannenwald, the 
investigation into the reasons for non-use of nuclear weapons, which exists in the 
context of deterrence, has some incentives. An important incentive is why non-
nuclear states didn’t attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Realist arguments, which 
say the U.S. nuclear umbrella is sufficient for non-nuclear states, are not justified 
reasons because the U.S. does not assure all these states that they can come under the 
U.S. umbrella. Thus, we feel the need for a normative element that prohibits states 
from using or developing nuclear weapons. It is these normative beliefs that help us 
understand what behaviour is right or wrong. One type of normative effect discussed 
by Tannenwald is the constitutive effect, emphasised by constructivist perspectives, 
which refers to how rules and norms, through actor practices, create or define forms 
of behaviour, roles, and identities (Ibid.).  
In this chapter, I move further towards the practical means of operationalising the 
theoretical frame behind specific research question(s). Based on a variety of 
qualitative evidence, this thesis seeks to explain the main research question, ‘why has 
the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle been portrayed as a unifying 
symbol of national identity in Iran, especially following the revelation of clandestine 
uranium enrichment facilities in 2002? While this research explores the historical 
background of the Iranian nuclear programme, from its inception, during Mohammad 
Reza Shah Pahlavi’s reign, until Iran and world powers signed a nuclear deal in July 
2015, the focus of this thesis is on the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations; in 
the case of Rouhani only until signing the Iran nuclear deal (so, 2013 to 2015). The 
thesis argues that an analysis of Iran’s national identity is crucial to understand the 
motivation for pursuing a nuclear programme. Regardless of the custodians of each 
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historical period, whether Mohammad Reza Shah or leaders of the Islamic Republic, 
the nuclear programme has been a symbol of national and international prestige, 
modernity and state identity for both of them (Amul 2012a). The thesis seeks to 
provide evidence for how relevant the impact of Iranian national identity conceptions 
on nuclear decision-making has become. It does this through an interpretive case 
study. The aim of an interpretive case study is not theory-building, but discovering 
patterns and correlations between social phenomena by means of discourse analysis. 
As Nick Ritchie (2013) argues, they are discourses that shape our understanding of 
nuclear policies and, thereby determine how the policies are made. 
 
Constructivism shares a basic epistemology that according to George Lee Cheu-Jey 
(2012, p. 409) “rejects this view of human knowledge” that says “meaningful reality, 
exists as such apart from the operation of any consciousness.” There is no objective 
truth waiting for us to discover it. This type of epistemology is compatible with the 
qualitative research method. In accordance with the constructivist epistemology, 
Iranian identity has been conceptualised as a process that has been constructed and 
interpreted over time according to the interpretations and interactions of Iranian elites. 
Thus, there is a need to define and develop the notion of national identity as a 
discourse. Discursive approaches share a strong social constructionist epistemology, 
i.e., discourse is of utmost significance in constructing the ideas, social processes, and 
also phenomena that shape our social world (Nikander 2008). Therefore, we can use 
the discourse approach as a framework to analyse national identity (Jørgensen and 
Phillips 2002). This chapter explains the research methodology, which draws on a 
constructivist approach to guide data collection and analysis through interviews and 
primary and secondary documentary sources. An understanding of the notion of 
‘discourse of national identity’ will be developed through this thesis and the 
conceptions of Iranian national identity will be described. The reasons for a discourse 
approach will be established and through a discussion of the existing scholarship on 
discourse, an argument presented whereby discourse is the means by which ideology 
can be seen to be transferred, articulated or communicated. It is argued that the way a 
nation’s identity is constructed reflects a particular ideology or ideologies. The final 
section of the chapter discusses the methods used in the research. This includes an 
explanation of the sources. The section concludes with an overview of ethical 
considerations relevant to the current study. 
 61 
This study needs to develop source material about non-traditional approaches towards 
security in the context of Iran’s national identity. This section covers two major areas. 
Firstly, it provides an overview of the discourse approach in order to conceptualise 
the methods chosen for this study. To explore the interconnectedness of discursive 
practices, socio-cultural structures, and political (here, nuclear) decisions, this 
research uses an interdisciplinary approach combining socio-cultural, political, and 
historical perspectives. Secondly, it looks at the research approaches or methods that 
are best suited to this research. 
3.2 Concept of Identity 
For the purposes of this research, I conceptualise Iranian national identity conceptions 
as a sequence of categories that define the ideas and beliefs of the Iranian nation. I 
then argue that conceptions of national identity that are constituted by societal 
discourses took their shape by the common knowledge among nations. Scholars like 
Alexander Wendt (1994) look at social identities as the sets of shared meanings in 
which these identities can be attributed to one’s self as well as to the perspective of 
others. In this research, I use the concept of identity that has been proposed through 
the social constructivism of Wendt, and which focuses on states as the main units of 
analysis. The construction of national identity expands by emphasising both a shared 
history and a collective memory. Maurice Halbwachs’ (1992) notion of ‘collective 
memory’, which is the selective recollection of important events from the past, makes 
it possible for us to identify a connection between theoretical discourses on national 
identity and the myths, symbols, traditions, culture, and rituals of everyday life (De 
Cillia et al. 1999). As Hall proposes: 
 
“A national culture is a discourse, a way of constructing meanings, which 
influences and organises both our actions and our conceptions of ourselves. 
National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about ‘the 
nation’ with which we can identify; these are contained in stories which are 
told about it, memories which connect its present with its past and imaginings 
which are constructed of it” (Hall 1996, p. 613). 
 
I conceptualise the national identity conceptions of a country as discursive formations 
such as the ideas, norms, ideologies, and values that shape perceptions of the national 
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identity. While a state’s foreign policy interprets, shapes, and protects national 
identity, and therefore presents itself as an intertwining link between individuals, 
society, and the international community, the national identity contains shared 
meanings that influence the framing of political action (Vertzberger 1990). 
3.3 Qualitative Study 
The research design for this study is a descriptive and interpretive case study that is 
analysed through the use of qualitative methods. The qualitative research process 
reflects a constructivist epistemology, which claims that social reality is a process that 
we construct and reconstruct over time with our understandings, interpretations and 
acts. To conduct qualitative data analysis, this research uses different methods such 
as:  
a) Case study method or design: This is often conducted to learn more about a 
specific case and we cannot generalise the results obtained to all other cases with 
similar issues.  In this study, the question is about the role and influence of national 
identity and its different aspects of foreign policy decision-making in general and on 
developing a nuclear programme in particular. I have chosen Iran or the Iranian 
nuclear programme as a case study for my research. Therefore, the research seeks to 
demonstrate that Iranian national identity (with all its Persian, Islamic and Modern 
aspects) contributes to Iranian leaders’ insistence on developing Iran’s nuclear 
programme.    
b) Interpretation: The fundamental philosophical assumptions of the current research 
originate from the interpretive tradition. This entails a subjective epistemology and 
the ontological belief that reality is socially constructed. Interpretation involves 
contextualising historical events reconstructed from data that find their place and 
significance within broader historical and political narratives (Riessman 2008). 
This research examines the extent to which the foreign policy of a country is 
influenced by national identity. In so doing, the national identity of each country 
shapes its foreign policy. In addition to the objective issues such as geopolitical 
position, economy, etc., the subjective factors, which give direction to states’ political 
choices, influence foreign policy formation (Prizel 1998). In the next chapter, I will 
first describe and clarify the components of Iranian national identity. Then, using 
discourse analysis, I will examine the interaction between national identity and 
foreign policy in the case of Iran’s nuclear programme. The factors that have played a 
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major role in the formation of Iran’s nuclear policies and expectations demonstrate 
the triumph of intersubjective issues over mere objective policies. Given the blend of 
culture and politics in Iran, the country’s foreign policy has always reflected 
ideational goals that are beyond the defined national interest, such as economic 
prosperity (Ghattas 2015). Regardless of the importance or dominance of Iran's 
cultural and religious identities, mostly in relation to the pre-Islamic and pre-Islamic 
Revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary regime, now stepping out into the world stage, 
is desirous of showing how its national identity, rising from the country’s rich culture, 
is able to shape its foreign policy within the region and the world. 
3.4 Discourse Analysis 
At this point, the chapter will explain how the discourse approach could be effectively 
used to analyse discourses about nations and national identities. Due to the 
importance of the concept of the nation as ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006), it 
is of crucial importance to find a way to construct national identities in discourse. 
According to De Cillia et al. (1999), there is a logical relationship between particular 
discursive situations and the social structures in which they are embedded: on the one 
hand, they argue that situational and social contexts shape and affect discourses; and 
on the other, that discourses influence social narratives and political reality (Shenhav 
2006). For the purpose of this research, I use discourse analysis, which is a method to 
analyse written and oral data beyond mere sentences. These data can be symbolic-
interpretive constructs which people use to make their social reality meaningful. Such 
constructs include beliefs, images or symbols shared by the people in their society. 
Discourse analysis offers an intersubjective method for reifying national identity 
conceptions built over time. The general aim of discourse analysis is thus to 
specifically analyse how social reality is constructed for different social operations 
(Suoninen and Jokinen 2005). According to Bentley Allan (2014, p. 14) “Discourse 
analysis is the interpretive study of texts to uncover the intersubjective background 
that forms the basis of social order.” Discourse analysis is an effective way to reveal 
the shared social knowledge that individuals use to create meanings and beliefs based 
on it. Discourses do not exist in research data as such, but rather they are the readings 
or interpretations of social reality which are concerned with the production of cultures 
and collective identities (Willig 2014). 
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A discourse analysis approach to the study of national identity is of value because it 
allows for an analysis of how ideologies are embedded in the construction of national 
identity (Li 2009). Therefore, it is in terms of national identity discourses that an 
explanation of how Iranian national identity is constructed can be ascertained. Same 
as Iran that has been invaded throughout history, Indian leaders from the early 
decades of the nineteenth century started to question the reason why their country had 
repeatedly been targeted by foreign invaders. In Parekh’s (1994) words, all 
developing countries including India [and Iran] want to modernise themselves, while 
retaining much of their culture and their traditions. In this research on the relationship 
between Iranian national identity and nuclear policies, there is a need to apply the 
characteristics offered by a qualitative research method to conduct the research 
project. National identity has been articulated as a discourse, and this allows us to 
better explain the relations between the different discourses and conceptions of 
national identity with regard to different policies (Ibid.). Hence, identifying and 
analysing the discourse of national identity enables us to interpret and decode the 
ideologies (Gal and Irvine 1995) embedded in the construction of Iranian national 
identity, as well as to explore how these different conceptions of national identity 
relate to each other and to policy-makers and policy issues over time.  
 
It is necessary to define the concept of national identity, Iranians’ perspectives of their 
national identity, and the role of Iranian national identity in their nuclear policies. The 
argument of this thesis is that it is advantageous to recover and analyse the notion of 
national identity by means of discourse analysis because it demonstrates how we can 
introduce national identity in ideational rather than material terms. In other words, the 
Iranian national identity must be examined in order to understand Iranian nuclear 
decisions. In the context of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as the 
decisions made by the politicians and the implications of politicians’ invoking ideas 
of national identity, the distinction of ideas as discourse can be set out. Identities 
matter and we recover identities through discourse analysis, integrate that analysis 
with the political history of the nuclear programme, and develop an argument about 
how and why identity has shaped, or not shaped, nuclear choices. With regard to 
Iranian national identity, as will be illustrated throughout the thesis, a discourse 
approach is a beneficial means for analysing the way in which Iranian national 
identity is constructed. For example, the historical and intellectual analysis of Iranian 
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national identity addressed in chapter four is also based on the secondary sources that 
have addressed these issues. In light of this, there has been an attempt to deconstruct 
the discourses of national identity. Likewise, as will be demonstrated in chapters six, 
seven and eight, a deconstruction of how Iranian national identity is articulated at the 
state/elite level shows the diversity that exists in political identity (Holliday 2013).  
 
As mentioned above, this research adopted two different methods, including the case 
study method and discourse analysis. Based on the research questions and by means 
of discourse analysis of the case study that relates to Iranian national identity and 
Iranian nuclear politics, I conducted interviews with elites. Accordingly, this research 
focuses on the cultural and religious aspects of identity and their role in the decision-
making process of the state. Therefore, in addition to using literature in both English 
and Persian languages, I analysed chosen speeches of Iranian leaders. The focus of 
my thesis is on how the political elite/leaders challenge the process of nuclear 
decision-making by recognising and supporting Iranian national identity conceptions 
and take risks to develop their nuclear policies based on identity conceptions. These 
authentic resources are intended to enrich the research and therefore enhance the 
identity-related values and attitudes of the states based on an ideational and 
intersubjective approach.  
3.5 Methods 
The research has analysed a number of primary and secondary sources, by 
determining how discourse emerges from them. This study will depend on the 
interpretation and analysis of collected secondary and primary data from different 
sources. These sources include speeches and articles on Iranian identity in general and 
its relation to the state’s nuclear ambitions in particular. Firstly, the research is reliant 
on primary sources such as official documents consisting of interview transcripts, 
declarations and media broadcasts by Iranian officials. These official documents 
offered the opportunity to observe elite perspectives as well as gain critical access 
points into the ways in which the Iranian leadership and individual officials 
understand and interpret particular situations or challenges, presenting their decisions 
to domestic constituents and/or external observers in the language of national identity. 
They showed the existence of particular intersubjective understandings (structures of 
meanings) and their effects on logics of action. In addition to these, informal 
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discussions with academics and policy-makers have contributed to a deeper 
understanding of issues surrounding the construction of Iranian national identity 
conceptions and how they affect nuclear decision-making. The discourses of Shia 
Islamic identity and Revolutionary ideology are primarily based on the speeches of 
Khamenei, Rouhani, Ahmadinejad and Khatami. The discourses of Persian identity 
and modernity are based on a number of sources.  
 
Secondly, the research has relied on the examination of an extensive selection of 
secondary sources, such as various published research articles and books, newspapers, 
working papers, briefings, IAEA reports and UNSC Resolutions, blog posts, and 
academic works on Iranian national identity. With regards to academic articles, it is 
often the case that Iranian national identity is discussed in terms of the perception of 
Iranian national identity, rather than a discussion of various approaches to national 
identity. Policy papers and blog posts, mostly on how the conceptions of Iranian 
national identity shape the making of foreign policy in general and nuclear policy in 
particular, were consulted. I also chose a limited number of reformist and 
conservative newspapers with the highest national circulation figures containing 
speeches by national political elites regarding the nuclear programme and its 
normative conceptions. This abundance of material offered critical insights into Iran’s 
intersubjective identities and the structures of its relations with other actors. This was 
particularly important since the Wendtian-constructivist approach requires a great 
amount of contextualisation: to understand ‘what was there’ before President 
Ahmadinejad came to power and after President Rouhani took office, and also how 
and why these administrations may have shifted or reproduced existing logic of 
representation and interaction.  
 
Thirdly, I carried out twenty-one semi-structured elite interviews with individuals in 
their official or academic capacity. The elite interviews targeted those who are or 
were directly involved in the process of policy-making. Interviewing these people 
allowed for an in-depth exploration of policies, considering their insights and 
knowledge of the subject. The resulting information thus offered more reliable and 
valid data, giving us a richer understanding and interpretation of the research subject 
(Beamer 2002). My participants were selected with regard to their involvement in the 
institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and their knowledge of Iran’s foreign 
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policy and decision-making. My interview participants fell into the following 
categories: 
• Diplomats and politicians of various nationalities (Iranian, American, 
European) involved in negotiations surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme. 
• Experts and analysts of the Iranian nuclear programme and security issues, 
including academics, policy researchers, and journalists. 
Interviews were completely voluntary, and no financial reward was offered for 
participating in the research. Most of the interviews took place face-to-face and a few 
of them via Skype. In so doing, I asked open-ended questions to let the interviewees 
lead; meaning that while the focus was on keeping track of our interview topic, some 
room is allowed for the respondent to lead the interview and thus give more 
information (Bernard 2011). The purpose of these interviews has been to understand 
the perspectives of various actors involved in Iran’s nuclear negotiations. The 
different opinions I gathered from respondents helped in constructing an evidence-
based analytical narrative to develop my argument. I chose my interview respondents 
based on their experience and participation in different stages of Iran’s nuclear 
negotiations. The sample of respondents is not representative but was selected based 
on their experience of being engaged with Iranian nuclear policies, or in some cases, 
working in Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs in the U.S. or European 
countries. Although all EU-3+3 members (U.S., UK, France, Germany, Russia and 
China) share the same goal of preventing Iran’s nuclear development, the U.S. has 
been the most dynamic actor in the negotiations. The arrangements have kept the U.S. 
Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Defense alongside the national 
laboratories, members of Congress, research organisations and scholarly circles 
included in the process for a considerable length of time (Tabatabai 2015a). My 
reason for carrying out interviews with non-Iranian officials as well as the Iranian 
elites has been to clarify how non-Iranian elites interpret Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  
3.6 Data Collection Strategy and Data Analysis 
When we are certain about our research questions, then it is the time to focus on how 
to collect the data, including primary and secondary data sources in order to answer 
the research questions according to the type of information needed. The purpose of 
data collection is to obtain relevant information, keep records, and make decisions 
about important issues. In accordance with the analytical requirements of the study 
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and the selected theory, I utilised a flexible design to include a package of qualitative 
methods, both descriptive and interpretive, plus documentary, archival and historical 
analysis, as well as discourse analysis and elite interviews. In order to conduct the 
research, or more exactly, to answer the research puzzle and address its problems, it is 
necessary to gather a wide range of materials including primary, secondary and 
tertiary data. In reconstructing and interpreting the case of Iran’s nuclear policy, I 
have endeavoured to rely as much as possible on primary source material such as 
Persian language books, articles and interviews. Thus, this research is mainly based 
on primary and secondary data, such as qualitative interviews, research papers, 
documents, journals articles, newspapers, declarations of leaders, internet resources 
and surveying and archival retrieval of diaries on Iranian national identity and its 
impact on the Iranian nuclear programme.  
 
To obtain underlying information and to establish the context and meaning of this 
research, data collection strategy is used as interpretative discourse analysis 
(Wetherell and Potter 1988). The initial step of this process for this study has been to 
focus on reading primary and secondary sources on the history of the Iranian nuclear 
programme, and the definition of identity and Iranian national identity in both the 
Persian and English language. I also attempted to collect Iranian and international 
journal articles regarding the Iranian nuclear programme and Iranian leaders’ 
speeches in this regard, for analysis in the next stage. Speeches are important sources 
of data as they provide us with the framework that leaders use to present their policies 
(Grove 2015).  This research aims to recover collective national identity conceptions 
to see whether they are constitutive of interests and actions or whether they are used 
instrumentally by elites to justify policy actions taken for other, non-ideational, 
reasons. To situate social constructivism’s ontology within the debates of current 
political (nuclear) affairs, it is necessary to know that the concept of discourse cannot 
be used as an alternative to ideas. Instead of prioritising material and ideational 
factors over each other, discourse analysis strategy aims to integrate them (Hansen 
2013). For the purpose of my research, I have thus worked on contemporary nuclear 
policies and the way Iranian national identity conception has shaped and interpreted 
nuclear policies and decision-making. Considering the constructivist, political/social 
science orientation of my original research, I decided to approach the constitution of 
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identity by means of discourses via a thorough overview of Iranian national identity 
components and conceptions of national identity held by Iranian elites.  
3.7 Case Study Selection 
Armed with the ideational mechanisms and research methods outlined above, this 
research undertakes to explore the impact of Iranian national identity conceptions on 
nuclear policies. In this section I review workings of some scholars, including 
Homeira Moshirzadeh, Michael Williams, Shahram Chubin, Volker Perthes, Nina 
Tannenwald, and Ruth Hanau Santini. Some of these scholarly works form the basis 
of my research and provide useful supplementary information for my research into the 
role of identity in Iran’s nuclear ambitions; more generally, these articles have 
provided me with practices of identity through their discussion of policy-makers’ 
behaviour and decisions. Homeira Moshirzadeh (2007) declares that the three 
elements of independence, justice, and resistance, which have constituted the identity, 
interests, and priorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, are the main discourses that 
are understandable using the constructivist approach. This context is able to explain 
the legitimacy of a state’s resistance to a particular policy and also its elites’ decisions 
towards a policy since elites are the main actors in the policy system. Without taking 
domestic issues into consideration, however, one cannot condense an effective foreign 
policy analysis (Moshirzadeh 2007). There are three main elements, which form the 
discourse of independence: Iran’s glorious past, historical victimisation by invaders, 
and the (semi)-colonial/imperial encounters that led to Iran’s dependence and 
underdevelopment. These three elements that originate from historical experiences of 
Iranians form the basis of the discourse of independence, which can be identified as a 
part of Iran’s national identity. There is also the discourse of hyper-independence, 
which has two aspects: one of these has a negative dimension that is reliant on 
confronting foreign dominance, the influence of hegemonic powers, and cultural, 
political, and economic dependence; while the other, which has a positive dimension, 
seeks to realise self-definition, self-reliance, self-control, more generally (Ibid.). If 
dependence originates from and reproduces weakness, becoming independent requires 
power. Therefore, an independent country has to be powerful. According to the 
document known as ‘Iran’s Strategic 20-Year Vision Document’ ([1384] 2005), in the 
year 2025, ‘Iran is a developed country ranking the first in the region economically, 
scientifically, and technologically’. It is within this discourse and in the context of 
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these rules and norms that the nation’s nuclear policy has been formed and is 
represented as a step towards actualising Iran’s potential as a prominent regional 
actor.  
There is an analogy between Iran’s nuclear policy and the Oil Nationalisation 
Movement of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Oil Nationalisation Movement was 
a successful step towards the nationalisation of the oil industry in Iran. The nuclear 
issue is another nationalist matter, which demands national support and sacrifice. On 
the other hand, there is an analogy between any withdrawal from the country’s 
nuclear programme and the Treaty of Turkmanchāy (1828), the most notorious 
example of withdrawal by Iran from its sovereign rights in the country’s modern 
history, and one that affected Iran’s sovereignty and independence. Such analogies 
help us to delegitimise any efforts aimed at compromise. Thus, according to the 
discourse of independence, following the nuclear programme gives legitimacy to 
Iran’s ambitions, making it a part of Iran’s national identity (Golshani and Jadidi 
2014). Iranians’ aspirations for justice also have their roots in historical nationalist 
narratives and religious discourses. According to some scholars, justice-seeking is 
considered as one of the components of Iranian national identity and thus, the 
embracement of Shiism in Iran has been due to the justice-seeking Iranian spirit 
(Ehteshami and Molavi 2012). One can see this reflected in the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic, which constitutes another aspect of Iran’s identity.  
Countries such as Israel, India, and Pakistan, that have ‘nuclearised’ against all 
international norms, and have become more or less accepted as nuclear powers, now 
condemn Iran for its nuclear programme. Therefore, on the basis of the discourse of 
justice, the nuclear policy is considered as a justice-seeking effort. One can argue that 
these elements were formed in the course of Iran’s modern history, and particularly in 
the constitution of the identity of the Islamic Revolution and latterly, the Islamic 
Republic. Nuclear discourse has also been articulated within these main discourses. 
Therefore, Iran’s nuclear policy has become a matter of identity. These discourses can 
explain how the nuclear issue has been proposed in Iran’s foreign relations, and how 
it has become popular inside Iran. Furthermore, they can explain the variances in 
Iran’s nuclear policy over different periods.  
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According to Reisigl and Wodak (2009), discourse is viewed as a cluster of context-
dependent semiotic units of social and communicative behaviour linked to 
argumentation about normative validity, such as the legitimation of social action – in 
this research, the legitimation of the Iranian nuclear programme in elite discourse. 
The behaviour of the states towards each other and their fears and ambitions 
effectively impact on their decisions. Although the states want to survive and deter 
each other from being more powerful and hegemonic, they also attempt to develop 
some level of cooperation. This means that any change in actors’ behaviour is always 
possible and that idea of the self is shaped by the idea of the other. The political elites 
in Iran are those influential people who make strategic decisions and shape the 
country’s political norms and values. That is the Iranian leaders’ acts and speeches 
that determine their will in order to be a major regional power and the amount of trust 
they will give to the international community. Thus, it is within the political elites’ 
capacity to elevate a particular problem to a level of general legitimacy (Perthes 
2010).  
 
In another debate on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Shahram Chubin (2010) discusses the 
U.S.-Iran relationship and the U.S.-West’s fear of a nuclear Iran in the Middle East, as 
well as the inefficiency of threats, punishments and inducements, mostly following 
the June 12, 2009, presidential elections in Iran. Chubin argues about ambitions, 
regime identity and the function of threats, punishments and inducements. He 
expresses the efforts of the Iranian regime since the June 12, 2009 elections to 
legitimate its nuclear ambitions and to express itself as a regional power. Another 
priori coding for this research relates to the role of civilisation, respect and leadership 
in Iran’s pre- and post-Islamic era. Iranians perceive themselves to be part of a nation 
with an ancient civilisation and expect to be respected as such. As a regional power, 
Iran’s aspirations are to be respected, honoured and treated as a leading player in the 
region and the Islamic world. This claim for being honoured is supported by both the 
nation and the elites in Iran (Guldimann 2007). As Itty Abraham (1998) argues, it is 
extremely important for post-colonial decision makers/leaders not to be seen to lose 
autonomy over their nuclear programmes, for amongst all the other meanings 
signified by the development of a nuclear energy capability, universal modernity is 
one of the main reasons for bringing about prestige and respect (Haferkamp and 
Smelser 1992).  
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Another important aspect of this research lies in priori codes of distrust, victimisation, 
and rights of the nation. The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic has used two 
approaches. One was to consider the interests of the Islamic nations all over the 
world, and the other to consider the interests of the Iranian nation. There have always 
been fluctuations in the government’s preferred foreign policy behaviour. The nuclear 
policies of Iran have also been challenging for the international community and a 
source of distrust. Unlike the different nuclear policies of compromise embedded in 
Khatami and Ahmadinejad’s more radical nuclear behaviour, Iranian elites have not 
appeased the West’s demand to halt their country’s nuclear programme (Soltani and 
Amiri 2010). 
3.8 Bias 
There are two types of bias particularly relevant to this research: respondent bias and 
researcher bias. Forms of respondent bias amongst interview respondents for the 
research may “range from uncooperative behaviour and withholding information (for 
instance, because the respondent views the research as a threat or [as irrelevant]) to 
‘good bunny syndrome’ in which interview respondents try to say what they feel the 
researcher wants to hear” (Tryfonos 2014, p. 79). Another bias comes from the 
researcher’s perceptions, assumptions, or partiality, which may in some way affect 
how they behave in a research setting (Robson 2002). This can undermine the study’s 
internal validity. From a theoretical perspective, an interpretive approach is not only 
useful in analysing the research data but also considers the position of the researcher 
and how these experiences affect the research process. In this research, my own status 
as an Iranian who was born during the Iran-Iraq war and felt the effects of war on the 
country, and also lived in Iran during most of the nuclear negotiations between Iran 
and the world powers, meant that I was touched by the impact of nuclear policies on 
the Iranian nation, something that has consequently affected the process of research.  
 
The purpose of the interpretivist approach is to interpret the ideas and meanings of 
research participants or case studies in order to develop a hypothesis. However, as the 
constructivist approach is interpretative, the research hypothesis will be mostly 
dependent on the researcher’s analysis. Therefore, both the researcher, the research 
case study and participants’ viewpoints and understandings are influential in the 
research context (Charmaz 2006). However, research does not always involve 
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collecting data from participants. There are huge amounts of data that can be collected 
through secondary sources. While secondary data saves lots of time, money and other 
resources, there are certain ethical issues pertaining to secondary data analysis, which 
should be taken care of before handling them (Tripathy 2013). One of the issues 
concerning bias in secondary data analysis is whether the data is appropriately coded 
and whether the researcher has access to those codes. It is not possible to specify a 
specific procedure, which if followed will systematically eliminate bias. We need, 
therefore, to use social processes in a way that can keep research honest and fair and 
also enhance its quality (Norris 1997, p. 174). I used a number of different tactics to 
prevent the potential of serious bias. Firstly, I read through the data thoroughly to 
identify areas of overlap and difference, considering issues such as motivation, 
ambition, barriers, incentives and so on; this helped me to code my data, especially 
the elite speeches and the elite interviews. Secondly, I tried to verify the analysis by 
finding other sources of data in support of my interpretations in order to have more 
confidence in their legitimacy. My postgraduate training in research methods, and 
most importantly, my supervisors’ unconditional support helped me to combine 
prolonged involvement in the research setting with an ongoing commitment to critical 
reflexivity. In particular, I acknowledged my own views on the subject matter, as a 
participant in the final round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (EU-
3+3), and a researcher in identity politics and nuclear non-proliferation.  
3.9 Limitations of the Study 
A limitation of the study lies in the use of primary and secondary data. For example, 
newspaper articles and speeches for the previous governments were not all online and 
neither did the majority of them exist in hard copy anymore. A further limitation was 
methodological: how the data was collected. Initially, the aim was to carry out far 
more interviews than the ones that were actually done, especially with more 
government officials. Over the time I conducted interviews—July 2014 to April 
2016—discussions of national identity, while still very sensitive, were more flexible 
among Iranian officials. This was during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, following 
the signing of the interim nuclear agreement and the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action), known as the Iran deal, between Iran and world powers. As the thesis 
will reveal, how national identity is dealt with in Iran has varied during different 
administrations, illustrating that it is a highly sensitive and politicised issue. 
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Nevertheless, the experience of face-to-face discussions on the issue of Iranian 
national identity with Iranian authors/scholars such as Hassan Makaremi,3 Mehrzad 
Boroujerdi,4 and Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh5 provided excellent insights. My cultural and 
language abilities enabled me to conduct such research more than adequately as I am 
a native researcher and familiar with the cultural and historical backgrounds of 
Iranian society. It is worth noting that these are limitations identified by the 
researcher; nevertheless, the researcher does not claim that they are the only 
limitations. 
3.10 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics are the principles that help researchers find out what is morally justifiable. 
Ethics in research involves what is right or what is wrong, and then doing the right 
thing. Some scholars claim that good quality research is always an ethical piece of 
research (Spencer et al. 2003). According to Pera and Van Tonder (2005) ethics can 
be defined as “a code of behaviour considered correct”. It is significant for all 
researchers to be aware of research ethics. They are related to two groups of people; 
the researchers and the participants (Pera and Van Tonder 2005), whilst working with 
human participants, ethical requirements such as consent, confidentiality and trust 
arise (Speziale et al. 2011). Therefore, in order to address this issue, the research 
needs to be conducted with fairness and justice. Throughout my research, I always 
respected my participants and kept them informed of the results and findings of the 
study. I also reassured them that the obtained data would be kept in a safe place in 
order to maintain confidentiality, while the data might be used for further studies 
(Cohen et al. 2007). I received ethical approval for the research interviews from the 
University and all the interviews were conducted with informed consent. 
3.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have set out the methodology and methods I am going to use across 
the research and have argued that the most valid way to make use of discourses of 
national identity is to use discourse analysis for texts and speeches by political elites 
                                                
3 Dr. Hassan Makaremi is a psychoanalyst, human rights activist, artist, calligrapher and author of 
“Sarzamin-e- Farhangi-e- Iran” [Iranian Cultural Land].  
4 Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi is a Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University and author of 
“Tarāshidam, Parastidam, Shekastam” [I Carved, Worshiped and Shattered: Essays on Iranian Politics 
and Identity]. 
5 Dr. Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh is a prominent Iranologist, geopolitics researcher, historian and political 
scientist, as well as the author of “Democrācy va Hoviyyat-e Irāni” [Democracy and Iranian Identity]. 
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and scholars. My approach to examining national identity conceptions in the case of 
nuclear behaviours consists of applying a theory of intersubjective identity through 
discourse analysis for texts, speeches and elite interviews. As a geopolitical issue, the 
Iranian nuclear programme has attracted a great deal of attention in domestic and 
international news media outlets. It has also been examined from a realist perspective; 
however, it has garnered very little attention in the way of academic studies focusing 
on the identity politics of the Iranian nuclear issue. Hence, discourse analysis 
addressing the impact of Iranian elites’ conception of national identity and its 
influence on nuclear negotiations, will be of paramount importance in shedding some 
light on the constructivist approach taken towards nuclear behaviour in Iran. 
 
In addressing identity politics, I have chosen to blend historical and political 
discourses in order to provide a clearer picture of the process of nuclear decision-
making in Iran. Identity politics place greater importance on the role of culture, 
ideology and norms of Iranian nuclear behaviours than the other prevailing rational 
approaches. In order to conduct a discourse analysis of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, I 
analysed elites’ interviews, Iranian news media outlets, and elite speeches. The use of 
interpretive discourse for analysing identity politics enabled me to extract and 
interpret the data I needed to better understand the case and answer my research 
questions. The next chapter discusses various elements of Iranian national identity. 
The main discourses that have been identified for discussion include Persian identity, 
Shia Islamic identity, Revolutionary ideology, and modernity and technological 
advancement. The chapter goes on to examine Iran’s nuclear narrative in the context 












Chapter 4. Historical Background of Iran’s Nuclear Programme 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided the methodological framework for demonstrating some 
valid ways of making use of discourses of national identity to explain Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions. It did so by establishing that the discourse of national identity determines 
the ideological aspects used in constructing national identity components. This 
chapter examines the historical roots of Iranian national identity discourses in 
different entities within the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear 
power has an inherent paradox: it has unspeakably devastating power, and 
simultaneously, can lift countries into modernity. This generates a combination of fear 
and pride, which can be deeply held in the conceptions of a nation’s identity; Hymans 
(2006) refers to it as a particularly explosive psychological cocktail. In this chapter, 
the ideational constitution of the nuclear policy of Iran throughout history is discussed 
in relation to its role within the norms and narratives of Iranian political elites. This 
chapter develops a history of Iran’s nuclear policies from its outset – including 
nuclear negotiations and economic sanctions - and examines the process of nuclear 
policy-making in the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations. It thus shows the 
changing nature of nuclear policies based on different administrations’ discourses of 
national identity and demonstrates their effect on nuclear negotiations. 
 
At the beginning of the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the new government announced in a 
radio broadcast, “This is the voice of Tehran, the voice of the true Iran, the voice of 
the revolution” (Abrahamian 1982, p. 529). This indicated the new elements of the 
identity the new regime defined as the Islamic Republic of Iran, including elements of 
being Iranian, being Muslim and being revolutionary, which will be examined in the 
next chapter. The controversy over Iran’s nuclear policies began challenging the West 
as soon as the Islamic Republic of Iran resumed its nuclear activities. The 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran halted all nuclear activities in Iran including research and 
development (R&D) and nuclear construction activities, then during the Iran-Iraq war 
in the 1980s, Iran decided to resume its nuclear programme. The Iranian nuclear 
programme that had been supported and supplied mostly by the U.S. during the reign 
of the Shah no longer had a supporter. At this point, the U.S. blocked all other 
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countries’ efforts to supply nuclear fuel cycles technology to Iran, including France, 
Germany, Argentina, Spain and Brazil.  Therefore, Iran turned to China and Russia to 
aid its nuclear activities such as providing research reactors to the Isfahan Nuclear 
Technology Centre and completing the construction of the Bushehr power plant 
(Heinonen 2014).  
 
This thesis argues that national identity conceptions have an important effect on Iran’s 
nuclear decisions. Therefore, in order to understand the relationship between national 
identity conceptions and the nuclear choices made by Iranian policy-makers, it is 
necessary to examine the opaque structure and determinants of nuclear decision 
making, including the way backbreaking sanctions and UN resolutions have 
influenced Iran’s nuclear policies. It is also important to pry open the process of 
nuclear negotiations from 2002 to 2015. The triad of identity, ideology, and 
interaction is central when explaining and analysing nuclear policies in Iran. Thus, the 
core purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the longevity of Iran’s nuclear 
programme and to identify key periods or decisions where identity conception was a 
necessary part of the explanation. This will then be the main focus of the discourse 
analysis chapters.   
 
This chapter firstly outlines the history of Iran’s nuclear activities that go back to the 
Shah’s reign from 1957 when for the first time Iran started building nuclear reactors 
with the help of the U.S. However, the main focus of the chapter will be on the 
nuclear activities of Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979. The first part of the 
chapter describes the hierarchy of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political structure. It 
also explains which entities are influential in nuclear policies. It is important to fully 
understand the political structure of Iran in order to see how it contributes to the 
national and ideational nature of nuclear decision-making. The second part of the 
chapter elucidates the early history of Iran’s nuclear programme that took place 
during the Pahlavi regime. Finally, the third part of the chapter focuses on a 
comprehensive history of Iran’s nuclear programme following the Islamic revolution 
of 1979 until 2015 (when Iran and the P5+1 reached a nuclear agreement referred to 
as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14th July 2015). The chapter 
also covers the different dynamics of Iran’s nuclear policies and its development 
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under various administrations, particularly the administrations of Presidents 
Ahmadinejad and Rouhani. 
4.2 The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Political Structure 
As it is shown in the title, Iran is a republic. However, there are some differences 
between the Republic of Iran and other republics. The difference originates in the 
word ‘Islamic’ in the title. In order to know the key figures and institutions in the 
Iranian political system following the 1979 Islamic revolution, it is necessary to 
understand Iran’s power structure. The Iranian political system is composed of its 
leadership, government and other key institutions. Guardianship of the Jurist is a 
theory in the Shiite political system that is legitimate in the absence of the twelfth 
Shiite Imam. The Islamic Republic of Iran was established on the basis of this theory 
(Feyrahi 2012). The Supreme Leader is the final arbiter and the backbone of the 
political system in Iran. He serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and 
declares the conditions of war and peace (Iran Project 2013). The Supreme Leader of 
Iran is also responsible for devising policies and supervising all three branches of the 
government. All major decisions that are related to the nuclear programme such as the 
signing of the IAEA Additional Protocol6, suspending uranium enrichment activities 
or suspending and keeping up with negotiations, require his approval (Tağma and 
Uzun 2012). Iran’s government works according to the constitution and to Islam. In 
other words, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran expresses cultural, social, 
political and economic institutions of Iranian society based on Islamic principles that 
reflect the desires of an Islamic nation (IPRC 1997).  
 
Iran’s government functions via three branches: the legislative, judiciary and 
executive powers. Iran’s president is the second highest authority after the Supreme 
Leader, being the head of executive power. There are two governmental bodies that 
have legislative power: the Iranian parliament (Majlis) and the Guardian Council. All 
legislation must first be approved by the Majlis and then be ratified by the Guardian 
Council. The Guardian Council is a council within the Iranian constitution, which has 
the authority to interpret the constitution and determine if the laws passed by the 
parliament comply with the Iranian Constitution and conform to Islam. Iran’s 
                                                
6 The IAEA Additional Protocol is the protocol to a safeguarding agreement that provides additional 
tools for verification. In particular, it significantly increases the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful 
use of all nuclear material in states with comprehensive safeguarding agreements (IAEA 1997). 
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judiciary is an independent branch within the government. The Supreme Leader 
appoints the head of Iran’s judiciary for a period of five years. He, in turn, appoints 
the head of the Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutor. The Assembly of 
Experts within the Iranian political structure presides over supervising, dismissing and 
electing the Supreme Leader, according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. The Expediency Discernment Council of the System is an establishment that was 
formed in 1998 as a consulting and resolving entity of Iran’s government. It serves as 
a consultative body to the Supreme Leader and also helps to resolve differences or 
conflicts between the parliament and the Guardian Council. The Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was founded after the 1979 revolution to protect 
the regime against external and internal threats. The IRGC is the country’s premier 
security institution and is distinct from the military. The military defends the 
country’s borders, while the IRGC protects the Islamic regime (Hamshahri 
Newspaper 2009). The Supreme National Security Council of Iran was formed to 
safeguard Iranian national interests, preserve the Islamic Revolution of Iran, along 
with the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the country. The Iranian 
president is in charge of the Supreme National Security Council. The Supreme 
National Security Council formulates the country's nuclear policy. Nuclear policies 
formulated by the council become effective after the Supreme Leader’s confirmation. 
The secretary of the Supreme Council was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator until 5th of 
September 2013. Then President Rouhani shifted responsibility for nuclear talks to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sharafedin 2013). 
4.3 History of Iran’s Nuclear Activities 
4.3.1 Pre-Revolution Period: 1953-1979  
Iran’s ambition for a nuclear programme is not a recent one. In fact, the desire to 
obtain nuclear power began in 1957, during the Shah’s reign, when the United States 
provided Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with nuclear technology and Iran started 
developing a civil nuclear infrastructure. In general, Iran’s main nuclear activities 
happened across two eras: the first being before the Islamic Revolution and the 
second after the Islamic Revolution, especially following the end of the eight-year 
war with Iraq. Iranian political rhetoric during the reign of the Shah gave Iran a mixed 
feeling about its relationship with history; a combination of pride in its [so called 
glorious] past and shame at its subjugations (the most recent one was just before 
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Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became the Shah of Iran, when Iran was occupied by 
Soviets and British during World War II) (Patrikarakos 2012). For Mohammad Reza 
Shah, the 1950s were a time of change, a time to turn Iran into a modern society. He 
wanted a more educated population, a more urbanised country and technological 
advancement. His dream at that time was a modern and technologically advanced Iran 
with nuclear-generated electricity. Modernity as a central component of Iranian 
identity has always been directly connected to its nuclear programme. The 
development of nuclear technology has made Iran a more advanced country in the 
region, and a greater power (Barzegar 2008a).  By 1957, the U.S. found Iran to be 
stable enough to be trusted with nuclear technology. Under Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for 
Peace’ programme, Iran and the U.S. signed a bilateral agreement to cooperate in the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology (Ibid.). The equipment, provided by the U.S., 
included a five-megawatt (MW) light-water research reactor and laboratory 
equipment; all of which were installed at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center 
(TNRC) at Tehran University (Shirazi 2015). This civil nuclear programme was 
established under the 1953 U.S. Atoms for Peace programme and the intention that 
the basic five-megawatt reactor was to be used for research so that the Iranian nuclear 
scientists could advance their knowledge and create a more elaborate nuclear 
infrastructure in the future.  
 
In 1968, Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ratified it in 1970 to 
make Iran’s nuclear programme subject to IAEA safeguards. In 1974 the Shah 
established the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) and along with Iran’s 
scientists became more experienced. He announced he intended to free up Iran’s oil 
and gas export, announcing a goal to produce a target of 23,000 megawatts of 
electrical power from a series of nuclear power stations within twenty years (World 
Nuclear Association 2016). In the meantime, the Shah started negotiating with other 
countries to build nuclear reactors in Iran. In addition to signing nuclear fuel contracts 
with the U.S., France and Germany, in 1975, the Shah also purchased Sweden's 10% 
share in Eurodif, a nuclear power plant that was being built in France as part of a joint 
French, Belgian, Spanish and Italian consortium. In April 1974, the U.S. State 
Department announced the United States’ intention to cooperate with Iran in the field 
of nuclear energy, arguing that alternative means for energy production was a suitable 
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area for joint collaboration. However, the U.S. was supposed to build the majority of 
the reactors (Jahanpour 2006).  
 
President Gerald Ford's administration supported Iranian plans to build a massive 
nuclear energy industry but also worked hard to complete a multibillion-dollar deal 
that would have given Tehran control of large quantities of plutonium and enriched 
uranium – the fissile materials used in nuclear weapons. In 1976, President Ford 
signed a contract with Tehran, which gave Iran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-
built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from spent nuclear reactor fuel. 
The deal was for a complete ‘nuclear fuel cycle’ with reactors powered by and 
regenerating fissile materials on a self-sustaining basis (Linzer 2005). By the end of 
1978, Iran had acquired the knowledge and basis of civil nuclear technology, which 
was then developed in two centres in Bushehr; its result was the lessening of Iran’s 
dependence on oil (Patrikarakos 2012). In ‘Mission for My Country,’ the Shah said 
that atomic weapons were not in Iran’s interest or good for Iran’s peace and 
prosperity, he only wanted to master civilian nuclear technology (Pahlavi 1961). By 
the 1970s, France and Germany also joined the United States and provided assistance 
to the Iranian nuclear programme. This was so the Shah could explore alternative 
forms of power production. France's Framatome and Germany's Kraftwerk Union 
were the Western firms that by the mid-1970s had signed contracts with Iran to 
construct nuclear plants and supply nuclear fuel (Bruno 2010). In addition to the U.S., 
France and Germany, Iran also signed contracts with Canada, India and the UK in 
order to expand its nuclear energy (Rouhani 2012).  
4.3.2 Post-Revolutionary Period 
Iranian national identity has encountered great cultural challenges as it moved through 
its main social and cultural interpretations, namely Persian, Islamic and modern. As a 
result of these challenges, different social movements have occurred, the last one 
being the Islamic revolution of 1979 (Zahed 2005). The reinterpretation of national 
identity conceptions has led to the clash of cultural values and norms in both a 
domestic and global context. The context of Iran’s nuclear ambitions after the Islamic 
revolution changed: with the confrontation between Iran and the United States, and 
war between Iran and Iraq a year after the revolution. Iran’s anti-Western ideology 
toughened the confrontation between Iran and the West over Iran’s nuclear 
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programme. Two of the rallying mottos of Khomeini's 1979 revolution were Āzādi 
(Liberty), Esteghlāl (Independence) and Velāyat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist). 
And it became important to be free and independent from the U.S. and its Western 
allies (Cohen 2006). This has been a very significant part of the Islamic Revolution’s 
identity, as discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, ideology became central to the 
new Islamic Republic. Iran’s anti-colonial and anti-Western sentiments, such as 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran and Iran’s anti-Western aspirations were used to 
legitimise the Islamic revolutionary ideologies (Milani 2009). These sentiments have 
had a special place in Iran’s policymaking for its civilian nuclear discourses, which as 
well are based on historical discursive and material changes. 
4.3.3 The Period 1979-2002 
As the next chapter will outline, Iranian national identity conceptions went through a 
huge transition, moving from an emphasis on Persian nationalism during the reign of 
the Shah to an emphasis on Shia Islamic identity with the advent of the Islamic 
Revolution, posited by the clerics of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Revolution 
leaders’ point of view had a tremendous effect on political, economic, social, and 
cultural aspects of Iran’s foreign policy decision-making. The Shah’s efforts to 
modernise and secularise Iran were met with opposition from Shia clerics who 
condemned the Shah for his inclination towards U.S. imperialism (Hoveyda 2003). 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, framed Islam as the 
oppressed and the Shah and the U.S. as the oppressors, thus creating the ground for 
the Islamic Revolution (Maloney 2002). The notion of independence as an important 
means of resisting imperialism was central to the Islamic Revolution. The February 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran halted the nuclear programme for several years 
because its position towards the principles of the new regime was not clarified. Also, 
it bound Iran to the West from an economic and industrial perspective. At some point, 
political independence or independence from external interference became an 
aspirational way of realising Iranian manifest destiny as a great regional power. The 
acquisition of nuclear power was framed as one way to achieve it. The acquisition of 
nuclear power in Iran was historically not just about national security but tied to a 
sense of sovereignty and Iranian national identity conceptions, which have deep roots 
in Iranian history. Hence, Iran’s president at the time, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who 
was initially opposed to the nuclear programme, came to the realisation that now that 
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the country had come so far, it was worth mastering the technology, despite its cost 
(Patrikarakos 2012). Whilst Iranians were discussing restarting the nuclear 
programme, Saddam Hussein declared war on Iran. The Iran-Iraq war, which began 
on 22 September 1980, caused significant damage to Iran’s existing nuclear facilities 
at that time, with Iraq bombing Iran’s under construction power reactors in Bushehr 
(Zargar 2001).  
 
By the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, the world witnessed Iran’s increasing 
isolation from the international community following the hostage crisis of 1980 and 
the West’s support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, Iran’s quest for 
autonomy and independence appeared in a framework of victimisation7 (Patrikarakos 
2012). In 1981, Iranian officials decided that Iran’s nuclear development should 
continue. Iran’s nuclear programme was revived during the presidency of Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani in the late 1980s when he signed an agreement with Russia on 
the peaceful utilisation of nuclear materials and related equipment. This contract was 
signed in July 1989 and ratified in April 1993 by the Iranian Parliament (Jahanpour 
2006). According to Hassan Rouhani (2012), Iran’s adherence to the NPT continued 
after the Islamic Revolution; however, the West suspended the implementation of 
their agreements and contracts, for example, building Bushehr power plant. Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, who served as Iran’s President from August 1989 to August 
1997 and the chairman of the Expediency Council, up until January 2017, was an 
influential driver of nuclear policy in Iran (Perkovich 2003). Rafsanjani, who was the 
chairman of Parliament in 1986, sent private messages to Iranian nuclear scientists 
who left the country during the revolution and asked them to come back to Iran and 
serve their country. He repeated his message again in 1988. At this point, nuclear 
energy had become a national and political matter for Iran. As Rafsanjani claimed, it 
was a matter of national service. He believed that Iran could only trust Iranians and 
they should cut their independence on foreign contractors. At this stage, Iran’s nuclear 
programme turned into a patriotic goal where Iranians could show their strength to 
their adversaries. According to Jalal Āl-e Ahmad, in his book ‘Gharbzadegi’ 
[Westoxification], it was necessary for Iranians to advocate for their own values and 
                                                
7 For more information on this issue, refer to chapter 5, page 116 on Shia Islamic Identity. 
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culture and negotiate their rights to modernisation based on their own national and 
religious terms (Āl-e Ahmad 1962). 
 
Iran decided to have its own indigenous nuclear programme, and identified Abdul 
Qadeer (AQ) Khan, a Pakistani nuclear physicist and metallurgical engineer, and the 
founder of the uranium enrichment programme for Pakistan's atomic bomb project 
(Smith and Warrick 2010). At this point, the Iranian leadership decided to buy all the 
required facilities on the black market, which was impossible without the help of AQ 
Khan’s network (Montgomery 2005). From 1985, China also became involved in 
Iran’s civil nuclear programme to train Iranian nuclear technicians (Patrikarakos 
2012). In its search for technological advancement, Iran received depleted uranium 
from China in 1977. Laboratory and research work were undertaken to master 
uranium conversion at both the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre and the Isfahan 
Nuclear Technology Centre. Contrary to the provisions of its INFCIRC/153 
comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Iran did not declare its activities 
to the Agency until 1993, then Iran halted its research and development (Amano 
2004). In 1992 Iran invited IAEA inspectors to visit Iran’s nuclear facilities and the 
IAEA report demonstrated that all activities observed were consistent with the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy under its safeguarding obligations (Wise 1992). Later, 
in September 1993, China reached an agreement to sell two 300MW Qinshan reactors 
under a project named ‘Esteqlāl’ to the facility of Darkhovin, located south of the city 
of Ahvaz. Thus China provided Iran with an HT-6B Tokamak fusion reactor that is 
now installed at the Plasma Physics Research Centre of Azad University (Toukan and 
Cordesman 2010).  
 
Iran also asked Russia for help in developing heavy water reactors (Jahanpour 2006). 
It is worth mentioning that from the beginning of the 1990s, Russia had formed a joint 
research organisation with Iran called ‘Persepolis’ which equipped Iran with Russian 
nuclear experts and technical information (Lunev 1998). The United States cut off 
Iran’s supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) following the 1979 Revolution, but 
Argentina signed an agreement with Iran in 1987-88 to convert the Tehran Nuclear 
Research Center from producing highly enriched uranium to producing low-enriched 
uranium, and also to supply low-enriched uranium to Iran. They delivered the 
uranium to Iran in 1993 (Barletta and Ellington 1998). But later in a report released in 
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2006, Argentina claimed that despite the pressure from the U.S., to terminate any 
nuclear cooperation with Iran, from 1992 to 1994, they entered into negotiations to re-
establish their 1987-88 agreements (Porter 2006). After Germany refused to resume 
the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Russia confirmed they would 
help Iran to build the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. In August 1992, Iranian and 
Russian governments signed an agreement to build a two-unit nuclear power plant. 
This agreement covered both the construction and operation of the plant. The Atomic 
Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) insisted that all the structures and facilities that 
were already in the Bushehr plant should be used in the project. Therefore, in 1994, 
Russia's Minatom agreed with AEOI to complete unit 1 of the Bushehr nuclear power 
plant with a VVER-1000 unit, mostly using the existing infrastructure (World Nuclear 
Association 2016). 
 
Despite Iran’s desperate need to cooperate with suitable countries and revive its 
nuclear programme, there were two determinant conditions: the countries should have 
sufficient nuclear know-how and they should be able and want to stand against the 
U.S. (Patrikarakos 2012). As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, for 
Iran, the policy of resistance is a significant trope, popular among both politicians and 
people (Holliday 2013). It is important for Iranian officials and the majority of the 
population to have a civil nuclear programme (Hadian and Hormozi 2010). The policy 
of more sanctions, intimidation, and pressure is considered counterproductive, for it 
would not stop Iran from developing its civilian nuclear technology (Abdo 2012). 
When Iran’s civil nuclear programme found new partners and got back on track 
following the Rafsanjani presidency, the international community suspected that Iran 
might be seeking to develop nuclear weapons (Patrikarakos 2012). In the aftermath of 
the Iran-Iraq war, Rafsanjani stated that war taught us that international laws are only 
scraps of paper. Opposing President Khatami’s policy of détente, the commander of 
the Revolutionary Guards, Yahya Rahim Safavi, asserted that Iran was unable to 
withstand the threats and domineering attitude of the U.S. in the region with a policy 
of détente. At that point, diplomatic confrontation over the Iranian nuclear program 
began (Simbar et al. 2017). In August 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a member of the 
exiled opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, reported the 
existence of two nuclear sites under construction: a uranium enrichment facility at 
Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak (Kerr 2005). According to Article IV of the 
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nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), these activities are legal and part of the 
inalienable rights of all state parties to the treaty. However, Iran had signed a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1974 obliging them to report 
the planned development of uranium enrichment and heavy water production 
facilities. Therefore, the revealing of these two covert nuclear sites had not been 
reported to the IAEA (though Iran argues they only needed to be reported shortly 
before they would become operational) by Jafarzadeh intensified the confrontation 
over Tehran’s nuclear intentions and a major crisis thus began (Patrikarakos 2012).  
 
4.3.4 The Period 2003 to 2015 
(i) History of Negotiations and UNSC Resolutions regarding Iran’s Nuclear 
Programme 
In May 2003, shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the government of Mohammad 
Khatami confidentially offered an IAEA inspection of Iran's nuclear programme. 
Tehran offered the inspection in exchange for security assurances from the United 
States and normalisation of diplomatic relations. State Department counterterrorism 
expert Flynt Leverett called the proposal a respectable effort to start negotiations with 
the U.S. But the U.S. rejected the proposal without even responding to the Iranians or 
discussing the proposal’s possible merits. Larry Wilkerson, Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell’s chief of staff, referred to the proposal as a significant offer for starting 
‘meaningful talks’ between the U.S. and Iran. However, Vice President, Dick Cheney, 
who had a strong influence on President Bush did not see it as a starter for 
normalising relations, claiming that ‘We don’t talk to evil’ in the post-9/11 context 
(Leverett et al. 2007). Immediately after the revelation of the two hidden sites in 
Natanz and Arak, the IAEA asked for access to them. IAEA inspectors visited these 
sites in February 2003 and June 2003, the IAEA report declaring that Tehran had 
failed to comply with the IAEA safeguarding agreement to report nuclear material, 
facilities, and activities as required by the safeguarding obligations required under the 
NPT. This is to ensure that NPT member states do not seek to divert civilian nuclear 
programmes into weapons programmes (Kerr 2003).  
 
The story of the secrecy about the two nuclear sites was that as part of the 
safeguarding agreement, it was not obligatory for the agency to be notified about the 
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existence of the Natanz facility until 180 days prior to introducing nuclear material 
into it. At that stage, Iran was still far from introducing nuclear material to the Natanz 
facility, but the story told by the MEK and the West portrayed Iran’s intentions for 
Natanz as evidence that nuclear weapons were being produced clandestinely (Porter 
2014a). Still, for many, the question remains that if Iran did not intend to build 
nuclear weapons, then why did it choose to keep the Natanz facility secret? As Gareth 
Porter (Ibid.) has argued, the reason for Iran’s secrecy was linked to firstly, U.S. 
political and diplomatic interventions to stop Iran from having an indigenous and 
peaceful uranium enrichment programme, and secondly, the 1990s threats from Israel 
to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. All parties to the conflict agreed to work through 
the IAEA, however, the U.S, UK, France, and Germany focused on Iran’s decision to 
enrich uranium or suspend it. In spite of differences of opinion, the IAEA Board of 
Governors agreed to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
(Mazzucelli 2007). Negotiations with the EU-3 (the UK, Germany and France) 
regarding Iran's nuclear programme commenced in early 2003, shortly after the two 
nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak were revealed to the public (Singh 2013). Thus, 
several proposals and diplomatic initiatives were developed in order to resolve 
concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme and build mutual confidence between Iran 
and the international community (Davenport 2014).  
 
Since 2003, one can observe two levels of negotiations taking place regarding Iran’s 
nuclear programme – with IAEA inspectors at the IAEA Board of Governors in 
Vienna, as well as with the EU-3 Foreign Ministers and EU High Representative. 
Iran-EU-3's first meeting, which has been held at the Sa'dabad Palace, Iran, on 21 
October 2003, was a meeting including EU-3 ministers and Iran's top negotiator, 
Hassan Rouhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council at the time. Iran 
told the EU-3 that they would suspend all their nuclear enrichment activities 
(Kharrazi et al. 2003). Thus, the Tehran Agreement was reached as a result of talks 
between France, Germany and the UK with the support of the EU High 
Representative and Iran, concerning the Iranian nuclear issue. Then, the government 
of Iran and EU-3 decided to move beyond the Tehran Agreement and rapidly work 
towards a solid long-term agreement with the support of the EU High Representative 
(Solana 2004). Because of the tense relations between Iran and the U.S. following the 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Tehran and Washington had never had any direct 
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talks over sensitive issues. Thus, when Iran’s nuclear programme, specifically its 
uranium enrichment programme, became an issue of utmost concern, the EU-3 
(including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) started negotiations with Iran 
(Ingram 2005).  The EU-3’s concern arose from the possibility of Iran’s uranium 
enrichment programme could have dual-uses, for both the production of low-enriched 
uranium for nuclear fuel for civilian energy generation and the production of 
weapons-grade highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear warheads. In October 
2003, during the three EU ministers’ trip to Iran to negotiate with Iran, Tehran 
announced to the EU-3 that they would suspend their uranium enrichment activities in 
what is referred to as the Tehran Agreement. In December 2003, Iran signed an 
agreement to allow IAEA unannounced inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities 
(Jahanpour 2006). This was a sensitive period for Iran: whilst Iran was not ready for a 
confrontation with the international community, they also didn’t want to give up all 
their efforts and advantages of the nuclear programme. In order to turn the threats into 
opportunities, Tehran only accepted suspending its uranium enrichment activities 
temporarily and voluntarily for the negotiations and to build mutual trust. This was a 
victory for Iran in preserving its national pride (Patrikarakos 2012). The Tehran 
Agreement although was only the start, but it contributed to national pride and 
prestige and brought about a common ground for all political factions in Iran (Posch 
2005).  
 
Despite the development of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities and the U.S. pressure 
calling for military action and potentially regime-change, the EU continued 
negotiations with Iran. On 14 November 2004, the EU-3/EU and Iran representatives 
had a meeting in Paris referred to as the ‘Paris Agreement’; here, Iran notified the 
IAEA of ceasing uranium-enrichment activities during the EU-Iran negotiations and 
strongly reaffirmed that they were not seeking to build nuclear weapons and would 
show transparency in their dealings with the IAEA. In exchange, the EU-3 agreed to 
go ahead with the negotiations to reach a long-term agreement on Iran’s enrichment 
programme (Sinha 2005). The negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 were ongoing 
and in 2004 they tried to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment activities 
permanently in exchange for some economic and technological incentives. However, 
Iranians were not satisfied with this offer. Even in the seventh Majlis on 28 
September 2005, the conservatives who were the majority passed a bill to resume 
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enrichment activities (Vahedi Raad 2013). On 17 January 2005, Iran offered a 
proposal to the EU-3, consisting of a commitment not to produce weapons of mass 
destruction, and to cooperate in anti-terrorism activities. In March and April 2005, 
Iran attended to some negotiations regarding the January proposal and concentrated 
more on short-term confidence-building measures. But in August 2005, the EU-3 
presented a comprehensive proposal focused on a long-term agreement. This proposal 
consisted of the following items: 
 
• An assured supply of low enriched uranium for light water reactors built in 
Iran; 
• Iran’s legal commitment not to withdraw from the NPT; 
• Iran to return spent nuclear fuel to supplier countries; 
• Iran to be a long-term source of fossil fuel energy for the EU; 
• The mutual cooperation of Iran and the EU in different security areas such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, and drug trafficking. 
But Iran rejected this proposal and claimed the proposal did not recognise Iran’s right 
to enrichment (Davenport 2014). In February 2005, the Iranian President at the time, 
Mohammad Khatami, announced that no Iranian government would give up its 
nuclear technology programmes (Amanpour 2013). In several negotiations in Paris, 
London and Geneva in 2005, Iranians proposed to resume uranium enrichment and in 
exchange, let the IAEA inspectors conduct additional safeguarding inspections 
(Langenbach 2005). The EU-3 did not accept the offer. Meanwhile, on 30 May 2005, 
Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State, talked to John Bolton, Washington’s 
UN Ambassador at that time, indicating that the U.S. was ready to participate in 
negotiations and talk to Iran directly. However, their condition for negotiations was 
that Iran suspended its uranium enrichment programme. Additionally, as it was very 
close to Iran’s 2005 presidential elections, the U.S. and EU-3 preferred to continue 
negotiations after these had taken place (Patrikarakos 2012).  
(ii) Ahmadinejad’s Rise to Power 
In June 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran’s mayor, won the presidential election. 
His populist election campaign was based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. As 
Patrikarakos (2012) stated, Ahmadinejad, unlike Rafsanjani and Khatami, his 
predecessors, showed his opposition to the restoration of Iran-U.S. relations. He also 
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defended the nuclear programme as an inalienable right of the Iranian nation and 
declared that arrogant powers were seeking to keep Iran from technological 
advancement. According to Anoushiravan Ehteshami (2010), Ahmadinejad’s first 
presidential term started with a nuclear crisis. In his last executive act in July 2005, 
the reformist president Mohammad Khatami ended Iran’s voluntary suspension of 
uranium enrichment activities. Ahmadinejad rejected any compromise with the IAEA, 
which in September 2005 issued a resolution of noncompliance on Iran, with the 
Ahmadinejad administration calling the resolution illegal and illogical (Dombey and 
Smyth 2005). In his address to the UN General Assembly on 17 September 2005, 
Ahmadinejad stated “How can one talk about human rights and at the same time 
blatantly deny many the inalienable right to have access to science and technology 
with applications in medicine, industry and energy and through force and intimidation 
hinder their progress and development” (Ahmadinejad 2005a p. 5)? Thus, after the 
June 2005 elections and the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran put an end to 
the suspension of uranium enrichment and asked the IAEA to remove the seals on its 
uranium enrichment equipment in Isfahan, saying it had resumed uranium conversion 
at this plant (Traynor 2005).  
 
In September 2005, Mohamed El Baradei, who was then the IAEA Director General 
confirmed the existence of this uranium conversion at the Isfahan Plant (Jahanpour 
2006). The EU-3 and Iran’s negotiations led to confidence building and Iran was 
supposed to suspend its enrichment activities temporarily. But this rapprochement did 
not last long and Ahmadinejad called it an insult to the Iranian nation (Payvand News 
2005). In September 2005, the new Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
declared in a speech to the United Nations that Iran was prepared to transfer its 
nuclear know-how to other Muslim countries and also suggested that an international 
consortium could manage Iran’s uranium enrichment, with Iran sharing ownership 
with other countries. But the EU and the United States rejected this offer immediately 
(Oborne 2013). Despite the IAEA’s report on Iran’s failure to meet its obligations 
with the NPT during its negotiations with EU-3, Iran was obliged to let the IAEA 
know about all Iran’s enrichment activities and permit them to inspect the nuclear 
sites (Sinha 2005). But Iran denied its promise to allow the IAEA to carry out 
inspections and resumed its uranium enrichment activities in October 2005 (Haeri 
2005). In January 2006, Iran announced they had developed the necessary machinery 
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to separate uranium from its ore. Later that month, it was reported that Iran removed 
the IAEA seals at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant and resumed their research on 
nuclear fuel under IAEA supervision.  
 
The West was not satisfied with Iran’s renewed uranium enrichment research and 
activities on the basis that it could endanger all efforts to reach a compromise 
(Jahanpour, 2006). On 12 January 2006, the EU-3 foreign ministers held a meeting in 
Berlin and stated their concerns about the resumption of uranium enrichment by Iran. 
They claimed it was time for the Iranian nuclear dossier to be referred to the UN 
Security Council. In their response, Iran stated that their nuclear research activities 
were based on Article III of the Statute of the IAEA, Article IV of the NPT and its 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Thus, what was resumed after 
two years of a voluntary suspension was an integral part of the inalienable rights of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran as an NPT member. Iran stated that stopping negotiations 
with Iran and holding a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and any 
other threatening method would not help resolve the issue, but instead undermine 
diplomatic processes that should be based on mutual understanding and cooperation 
(Gharib Abadi 2008). On 4 February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to 
report the Iran case to the UNSC, and Iran stopped implementing the Additional 
Protocol, which it had by then signed and implemented. Tehran’s reaction caused an 
enormous downgrade in the inspection and verification capability of the IAEA 
(Kubbig 2006). In March 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors called on Iran’s 
understanding that there was a lack of confidence in Tehran’s intentions to develop a 
fissile material production capability, and asked Iran to reconsider its position in 
relation to confidence-building measures, which were voluntary and non-legally 
binding, in order to adopt a constructive approach with regard to negotiations. The 
IAEA Board of Governors asked the Director General to continue with his efforts to 
implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran and also implement the 
Additional Protocol to that Agreement in pursuit of additional transparency measures. 
When Iran did not accept the suspension of its enrichment activities, on 4 February 
2006, EU-3 and the U.S. held a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and 
voted to report Iran to the UN Security Council (IAEA 2006).  
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Announcing the United States National Security Strategy on 16 March 2006, 
President George W. Bush referred to the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the 
greatest threat to U.S. national security (Bush 2006). Following President Bush’s 
speech, on 17 April 2006, journalist Seymour Hersh (2006) stated that the United 
States was planning a military attack on Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities. On 
11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared in a large, carefully 
staged and nationally televised celebration in Mashhad, that Iran had successfully 
enriched uranium to 3.5%. He officially announced that Iran had joined the world’s 
nuclear nations. Later in April 2006, ElBaradei asserted in his report that there was no 
sign of military use in Iran’s nuclear activities as the IAEA inspectors investigated the 
nuclear facilities, however, Iran should cooperate more with the IAEA and be 
committed to greater transparency (Jahanpour 2006). Later that year, when the report 
on Iran’s non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council (UNSC), 
with Russia and China opposing sanctions to the UNSC, the United States agreed to 
join the other four permanent members of the Security Council and negotiations from 
the EU-3 level shifted to P5+1 (or EU-3+3: including three European members, UK, 
France and Germany plus the U.S., Russia and China, all as five permanent members 
of the UNSC plus Germany) (Squassoni 2006). Despite the option of a military attack 
on Iran’s nuclear enrichment and centrifuge plant facilities, on 3 May 2006, while 
President Bush and German Chancellor Angela Merkel discussed Iran's nuclear 
programme in Washington, Angela Merkel stressed that settling Iran's nuclear issue 
required patient and step-by-step diplomacy (Amuzegar 2006). On 2 May 2006, the 
representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany 
(P5+1) had a negotiation in Paris to discuss Iran's nuclear programme but did not 
reach an agreement. This was because Russia and China rejected a draft resolution 
prepared by the United States, Britain and France to force Iran to suspend all uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing activities. 
 
The nuclear quagmire with Iran exemplified resistance as well as religious 
fundamentalism. Resistance to the American threat motivated Iranians to continue 
their nuclear programme (Sinha 2005). Beyond the concepts of independence, self-
reliance and social justice, resistance to the American intervention has become a very 
important reason for Iran to seek modernising technology following the birth of the 
Islamic Republic. Continuing the nuclear programme has reflected this basic purpose. 
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The presence of American military power in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, 
particularly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, has been a threat to Iran since the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. When Iran’s negotiations with Britain, France and Germany (EU-
3) proved unproductive and developed into mutual suspicion, President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad was supported by the Supreme Leader to resume the enriching of 
uranium (Chubin 2010b). On 6 June 2006, the EU High Representative Javier Solana 
went to Tehran to talk about the P5+1 incentive package and convince Iran to cease 
all its nuclear enrichment activities. The alleged package involved both carrots and 
sticks for Iran regarding what specific decision Iranians should make (Jahanpour 
2006). At that time Iran, which was prepared to suspend its uranium enrichment 
activities in exchange for the non-referral of Iran’s case to the Security Council, was 
not happy with the results. Hassan Rouhani, the chief nuclear negotiator and National 
Security Advisor to the former President Khatami sent a report to the president in 
mid-June, arguing for Iran’s nuclear programme as an indigenous project coming 
from its people and belonging to the people. And because it of this national link, no 
power could take it away from the Iranian nation (Rouhani 2005).  
 
In June 2006, the U.S. offered direct, bilateral talks with Iranians for the first time 
after the Islamic Revolution. But they had a precondition for talks and it was for Iran 
to suspend its uranium enrichment. Iranians were ready to accept direct talks with 
America, however, this precondition was not accepted (Ghassemi 2016). It was 
during Ali Larijani’s responsibility as a chief nuclear negotiator that the IAEA 
determined that Iran’s failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its 
IAEA Safeguards Agreement constituted an instance of noncompliance. In September 
2005, the Agency enacted a resolution against Iran, emphasising that Iran’s actions 
have given rise to questions within the competence of the UN Security Council 
(IAEA 2005). Then in a meeting in Paris, ahead of the Group of Eight summits in St. 
Petersburg on 12 July 2006, Foreign Ministers of the P5+1 agreed to refer Iran's file 
back to the Security Council. This led to Resolution 1696, under Article 40 of Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations by the UN Security Council on 31 July 2006, 
and a demand that Iran suspends all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities 
(UNSC 2006a).  
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President Ahmadinejad appointed Ali Larijani as Secretary of the Supreme National 
Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, replacing Rouhani. According to the 
International Crisis Group (2005), Rouhani’s nuclear-negotiating team were 
concerned with the nuclear fuel cycle as well as preventing Iran’s nuclear dossier’s 
referral to the UN Security Council, while Larijani’s team were only concerned with 
the fuel cycle. In his first UN General Assembly speech, Ahmadinejad blamed 
Western powers for not recognising the inalienable rights of countries to enrich 
uranium for peaceful purposes and not allowing developing countries who are NPT 
member states to develop their nuclear technology for medical, pharmaceutical, 
agricultural and energy purposes, instead tasking them with the false excuse of 
pursuing nuclear weapons (Ahmadinejad 2005b). Two months of tough negotiation 
on the suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities took place, then Iran 
announced that it was ready to discuss suspension though it would not accept it as a 
precondition. On 23 December 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved 
resolution 1737. By imposing new sanctions, this resolution attempted to convince 
Iran to cease its uranium enrichment, resume negotiations and clarify the purpose of 
its nuclear enrichment activities. According to this resolution, no country is permitted 
to supply nuclear-related material and technology to Iran. It also froze the assets of 10 
key Iranian companies and 12 individuals related to uranium enrichment activities 
(UNSC 2006b). Iran's UN Ambassador at that time, Javad Zarif, denounced the UN 
Security Council for imposing sanctions on Iran, while they stayed silent about Israel 
who had been confirmed as a nuclear power. Therefore, Iran's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs announced that this resolution was illegal and unjustifiable and stressed that 
Iran would continue its uranium enrichment programme under the supervision of the 
IAEA (Jahanpour 2006). In order to impose further and stricter sanctions on Iran, on 
24 March 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1747. 
According to this resolution, the UN Security Council prohibited Iran from exporting 
weapons and froze the assets of 15 additional individuals and 13 organisations 
involved in Iran's nuclear programme and connected to the Revolutionary Guards. 
The IAEA was also obliged to report the suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment 
activities within 60 days. The Iranian Foreign Minister at the time, Manouchehr 
Mottaki, called the sanctions invalid and ineffective, emphasising that pressure and 
intimidation will not change Iranian policy (Shanker 2007).  
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In April 2007 and for the anniversary of the nuclear enrichment, President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad announced that Iran was able to enrich uranium on an industrial scale 
and for peaceful purposes. In August 2007 and following talks between Iran and the 
UN nuclear agency, they stated their satisfaction of the progress in talks and later in 
August, the IAEA announced Iran was proving cooperative and transparent in their 
enrichment activities. In November 2007, the P5+1 held a meeting in London to 
discuss reinforcing sanctions on Iran, but could not reach an agreement. On 15 
November 2007, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, circulated his report 
on Iran, announcing the country was cooperative and there had been developments in 
their inspection processes; however, he acknowledged the difficulty of making a 
definite conclusion on their nuclear activities all being peaceful and not for military 
purposes. In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report on 
Iran's nuclear capabilities stated the following: “We judge with high confidence that 
in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme; we also assess with 
moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to 
develop nuclear weapons.” “We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, 
Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear 
weapons.” “We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran 
would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, 
but that this is very unlikely.” “We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably 
would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime 
during the 2010-2015 time frame.” (INR judged Iran unlikely to achieve this 
capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) 
“All agencies recognise the possibility that this capability may not be attained until 
after 2015” (NIE 2007, pp. 6, 7).  
 
Iran's new chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili and Javier Solana, the European 
Union's foreign policy chief, met in London on 30 November 2007. While Solana 
expressed disappointment regarding the talks, Jalili claimed the talks were positive. 
On 1 December 2007, the members of P5+1 met in Paris to discuss a more punitive 
UNSC resolution against Iran but were not successful in reaching an agreement. 
There were concerns that Iran might get some advantage from the doubts expressed in 
the November 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate, which judged with high 
confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program but was 
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keeping open the option of resuming that programme. The National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) analysis supported EU-3’s perspective on Iran’s nuclear programme 
that Tehran was not imminently pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. However, 
there was a fear among European countries and the U.S. that the report could 
undermine their efforts to gain UN Security Council approval for the third round of 
sanctions in late 2007. EU-3 members, especially France, argued that the NIE report 
would not affect the P5+1 decision for further sanctions on Iran, because Iran 
remained in non-compliance with Security Council demands. As it turned out, the UN 
Security Council approved Resolution 1803 and the third round of sanctions was 
implemented against Iran (Meier 2013). In March 2008, P5+1 agreed to make some 
changes in the package offered in June 2006 to show the advantages of this proposal 
to Iran. This agreement coincided with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 
1803, the third UN sanctions resolution on Iran which extended previous sanctions to 
additional persons and entities (UNSC 2008). Before official submission of the 
package to Iran, Iranians proposed their own issues in order for more comprehensive 
and cooperative negotiations, but their proposal lacked sufficient requirements to 
remove concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Iran 2008). The P5+1 group, except the U.S., met the Iranian delegation in June 2008 
in Tehran and talked about their package. Then the Iranian delegation and the P5+1 
including the U.S. had a meeting in Geneva in July 2008. Iran expressed its proposal 
for the negotiation process and asserted that discussions should be based on Iran and 
the P5+1 proposal package. 
 
In 2008, Senator Barack Obama from Illinois won the U.S. presidential election. His 
approach towards Iran was very different from President Bush. He preferred to 
change American Iran policy from conflict to engagement (Abdi 2011). Following the 
2008 U.S. presidential election, President Barack Obama began looking to take milder 
measures towards Iran, while P5+1 sought to resume their negotiations with Iran 
(Dehghani Firoozabadi 2011). Obama sought to abandon the previous U.S. policy that 
had a precondition for negotiations. The precondition required Iran to fulfil UN 
Security Council demands to suspend its nuclear fuel cycle activities. As it turned out, 
P5+1 issued a statement in June 2008 which welcomed the new direction of U.S. 
policy towards Iran and formally invited Iran to negotiations with no conditions this 
time (Davenport 2014). It is worth mentioning a brief comparison of Donald Trump’s 
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policy towards Iran’s nuclear programme comparing how both Presidents George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama dealt with the same issue. Despite George W. Bush and 
Barack Obama’s differences in dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme, under both the 
Presidents, the U.S. worked closely with its allies like the UK and France as well as 
other world powers. They aimed at increasing pressure on Tehran to get it to come to 
the negotiating table (Mousavian and Mousavian 2018). In contrast, President Donald 
Trump and the majority of his Republican supporters criticised the Iran Deal and 
described it as the worst deal ever. Later on 8 May 2018, Trump withdrew from Iran 
Deal and on 5 November 2018, the U.S. reimposed severe economic sanctions on Iran 
that the U.S. administration referred to them as ‘the toughest sanctions regime ever 
imposed’ on Tehran (Landler 2018). 
 
Referring back to the P5+1’s formal invitation for Iran to partake in nuclear 
negotiations, Iran provided a new proposal in August 2008, but like the previous one, 
the new proposal did not contain a specific section regarding Iran’s nuclear 
programme and uranium enrichment process, which was a matter of concern for the 
international community (Kerr 2012). The Iranian nuclear programme played an 
important role in the traditional debate in the 2009 Iran presidential elections. On 12 
June 2009, Ahmadinejad won the election for a second term. His victory in the 
election was accompanied by vast protests in Iran, with people saying the election 
results were not true and accusing the government of cheating in the elections. The 
Iranian regime contained the protesters, while also offering a new package to P5+1; 
this included global nuclear disarmament, but nothing specific about Iran’s nuclear 
case (Patrikarakos 2012). In June 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that they wanted to 
refuel the Tehran (five-megawatt) Research Reactor (TRR) for the purpose of 
producing medical isotopes and they needed assistance. On 21 September 2009, Iran 
informed the IAEA about the construction of a second enrichment facility at Fordow, 
twenty-six miles north of Qom (IAEA 2009). In October 2009, Hugo Chávez 
admitted that Iran and Russia were helping Venezuela with its uranium exploration 
(Padgett 2009). On 1 October 2009, the P5+1 talks with Iran happened in Geneva and 
the world powers offered a package of economic benefits to Iran in exchange for a 
temporary full suspension of its uranium enrichment. Here for the first time, a 
bilateral talk occurred between the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, and 
the U.S. Under Secretary of State, William Burns (Parsi and Rydqvist 2011). This was 
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a great opportunity for Ahmadinejad to ease the tensions that had carried on after the 
elections and reach a deal with the ‘Great Satan’. However, internal politics in Iran 
did not allow him to do so. Even some of his critics who were supporting a deal 
(including Rafsanjani, Rezaei and Mousavi), started to accuse him of being a Western 
puppet (EA World View 2009).   
 
Later in 2009, Iranian nuclear scientists who were working at Natanz realised that the 
centrifuges were spinning too fast and had started destroying themselves. This 
happened while their operation was shown as normal in the monitoring systems. This 
was as a result of putting a computer malware virus into the Natanz computer system, 
the AEOI head, Ali Akbar Salehi, confirmed on 23 November 2010. The virus called 
‘Stuxnet’ had been programmed to destroy the centrifuges at Natanz. Stuxnet couldn’t 
destroy all of the centrifuges, but it did cause a delay in Iran’s enrichment process 
(Broad et al. 2011). The Stuxnet crisis couldn’t stop Ahmadinejad’s defiance policy 
and Iran continued its enrichment activities and moved onwards the enrichment of 
uranium of up to 20 per cent (Broad and Sanger 2010). In the spring of 2010, Brazil 
and Turkey carried out a diplomatic initiative to supply the Tehran Research Reactor 
(TRR) with fuel (Davenport 2014). This initiative led to the 17 May 2010 Tehran 
Declaration between Presidents Lula da Silva, Erdogan, and Ahmadinejad who agreed 
on several issues including their commitment to the NPT and the supplying of fuel for 
TPR. They also mentioned that this nuclear fuel exchange was a positive method for 
confidence-building and would lead to further cooperation among nations (Borger 
2010a). 
 
On 11 February 2010, the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, President 
Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully produced 20 per cent enriched 
uranium. This was Iran’s response to the stalemate in delivering enriched uranium for 
Tehran’s research reactor due to produce medical isotopes (Oelrich and Barzashka 
2010).  France, Russia, and the United States rejected the Tehran Declaration that was 
to reaffirm Iran’s commitment to the NPT (Borger 2010a), as they had objections 
regarding lack of mentioning its 20 per cent uranium enrichment. Thus, they sent a 
letter on June 9 to the new IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano (Erdbrink and 
Kessler 2010). On 23 August 2010, Ettelāāt newspaper, which is a hardline media 
outlet in Iran, published an article and informed the Iranian nation on behalf of its 
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leaders about injecting uranium to Bushehr power plant. The article quoted “the heart 
of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant entered the refuelling session. We all know that 
it would be possible to succeed, and Iranians are a nation that can spell the verb every 
day to embark on the flourishing beliefs of a nation that refuses to accept any despots 
(Ettelāāt Newspaper 2010).” Also, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy 
Organisation said: “the Bushehr power plant is a symbol of patience, resistance and 
stability of the Iranian nation to achieve their aspirations (Ibid.).” From 2010 to 2012, 
four Iranian nuclear scientists, Masoud Alimohammadi, Majid Shahriari, Darioush 
Rezaeinejad and Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, were killed (Hasan 2012) and Tehran 
accused Israel of assassinating them. Although Israel did not comment on this case 
publicly, Moshe Ya'alon, the Israeli Defence Minister, claimed that Israel would not 
tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran and as an act of self-defence would act in any way to 
stop Iran from building a nuclear bomb (Cowell and Gladstone 2012).   
 
During a speech in Washington on 12 July 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov proposed a solution to implement the P5+1’s proposed incentives package. 
The package included four steps: 1) Iran limits its uranium enrichment to the Natanz 
plant and does not install more centrifuges, 2) Iran agrees to provide the IAEA with 
early design information, 3) Iran implements the Additional Protocol and instead, 
P5+1 suspends UN sanctions gradually, and 4) in the final stage, Iran suspends its 
uranium enrichment activities for three months and P5+1 lifts sanctions on Iran’s 
nuclear programme (Davenport 2014). In April 2012, P5+1 and Iran resumed 
diplomatic negotiations in Istanbul. There were two more rounds of negotiations on 
May 23-24 2012 in Baghdad, and June 18-19 in Moscow. In the Istanbul negotiations, 
the parties decided to consider the mutual benefits and adopt a step-by-step process 
(Kerr 2012). These talks did not have a significant practical influence on resolving 
Iran’s nuclear issue, however, the fact that they resumed at all was very important 
(Moran and Hobbs 2012). On 26 February 2013, Iran and P5+1 renewed their 
negotiations in Almaty, Kazakhstan, with P5+1 offering an updated proposal, which 
was mostly based on the 2012 package. The second round of negotiations between 
Iran and P5+1 was held again in Almaty on 5-6 April 2013.  
 
From Ahmadinejad’s perspective, his strategy in rejecting the IAEA resolution and 
declaring it illegal and illogical proved successful, however, the Iranian regime and 
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society had to pay a high price for his decision (Ehteshami 2010). Ahmadinejad 
referred to the U.S. and UNSC sanctions against Iran as a great opportunity, allowing 
Tehran to present its nuclear programme to the Iranian people, the region and the 
international community as a legitimate symbol of national scientific and 
technological progress. He emphasised not only the ineffective nature of the 
sanctions, but the fact of them increasing Iran’s regional power, leading Iranians to 
pursue regional leadership ambitions and showing tough resistance toward Western 
arrogance (Borszik 2014). Vulgarly, Ahmadinejad said that Iran ‘does not give a 
damn’ about UNSC resolutions, calling them ‘pieces of torn paper’ (Ahmadinejad  
2005). When the IAEA reported Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC in February 2006, 
Ahmadinejad invented a new phrase ‘scientific and nuclear apartheid’ to address the 
West’s hostility towards Iran (Ahmadinejad 2006a). Ahmadinejad condemned the 
IAEA for being influenced by countries already possessing nuclear weapons. The 
IAEA could not find any sign of an atomic bomb programme in their investigations of 
the nuclear facilities in Iran. However, the U.S. still tried to prevent Iran from a 
peaceful nuclear programme and in so doing, as Nikoo and Sovailami (2017) put it, 
blemished Iranian national pride.    
(iii) Changing of the Guard: Rouhani’s Presidency 
Hassan Rouhani won the Islamic republic's presidential election on 15 June 2013 after 
campaigning using the slogan ‘hope and prudence’ (Bozorgmehr and Martinez 2013). 
Rouhani stated that his victory was the victory of wisdom, moderation, growth and 
awareness, a victory of commitment and religiosity over extremism and ill-temper 
(Rouhani 2013a). Domestic politics played a prominent role in Iran’s decision making 
and its drive to cooperate with the international community. Rouhani’s election in 
2013, which was an indication of the empowerment of moderates in Iran, was a sign 
of this. One of the issues of the moderates’ campaign was endorsing an agreement 
with P5+1 over Iran’s nuclear programme (Stein 2015). In September 2013, Foreign 
Ministers of P5+1 and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif met on the margins of the 
United Nations General Assembly. Negotiation delegates of P5+1 countries and Iran 
met in Geneva on 15–16 October 2013 to discuss possible measures and dimensions 
for resolving Iran’s nuclear programme. On 30-31 October 2013, experts from P5+1 
and Iran met in Vienna to exchange detailed information on the so-called measures.  
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The lead negotiation representatives met again on 7-8 November 2013 for further 
negotiations but failed to reach an agreement so decided to meet again on November 
20, 2013. The European Union and other countries imposed separate sanctions against 
Iran in order to force the nation to halt its uranium enrichment activities. The United 
States, China, Canada, Australia, Japan, India, Israel, and South Korea were the 
countries that imposed separate sanctions on Iran. These sanctions included bans on 
transactions with some Iranian banks, investments with the Iranian energy sector, an 
arms ban and an almost total economic embargo, as well as financial sanctions and 
travel bans on individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear activities (Jacobson 
2008). According to the U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Wendy Sherman, 
the Iranian presidential election focused on the economy and how to engage with the 
international community on the nuclear file as President Rouhani, a former nuclear 
negotiator himself ran against candidates including the then-current negotiator Saeed 
Jalili. Rouhani clarified that failure to reach an agreement on Iran's nuclear 
programme would devastate the economy (Sherman 2013). 
 
On 11 November 2013, the Director General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, and the 
Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, met in Tehran and 
signed a joint agreement on a Framework for Cooperation. According to the 
agreement, Iran committed to starting the main measures in the agreement within 
three months. These measures included giving permission to the IAEA to inspect the 
Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak and the Gchine uranium mine in Bandar Abbas 
(IAEA 2013). On 20-24 November 2013, Iran and P5+1 met again in Geneva to 
resume negotiations. On 23 November, the Foreign Ministers from P5+1 joined the 
negotiations. On 24 November, the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and 
Catherine Ashton, leader of the P5+1 negotiation team, signed an agreement called 
the Joint Plan of Action. The first phase of the agreement contained specific measures 
for each side to undertake in a six-month period, and an extensive framework for the 
negotiations, thus ensuring it would result in a comprehensive solution. The first 
phase of agreements included the IAEA monitoring and access to Iran’s nuclear sites, 
with a limited reduction to sanctions on Iran. They also made a commitment not to 
impose new sanctions on Iran during the agreement. According to the agreement, a 
Joint Commission was to be established to monitor the commitments of the agreement 
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by both sides. On 8 December 2013, the IAEA visited the Arak Heavy Water 
Production Plant under the terms of the Framework for Cooperation Agreement.  
 
Then on 9-12 December 2013, the P5+1 and Iran met again in Geneva, this time 
discussing at the technical level, with a commitment to begin negotiations and to 
implement the November 24ths Joint Plan of Action. On 11 December 2013, Iran and 
the IAEA met again in Vienna to discuss Iran’s progress in implementing its 
commitments regarding the Framework for a Cooperation agreement. They also 
planned to meet again on 2 January 2014 to finalise their measures, although Iran 
requested to postpone the meeting to 8 February 2014. On 9-10 January 2014, Iran 
and P5+1 met for the third time in Geneva to discuss implementing the agreement. On 
12 January 2014, Iran and P5+1 announced that implementation of the Joint Plan of 
Action would begin on 20 January 2014. As announced before, implementation of the 
Joint Plan of Action began on 20 January 2014, with the IAEA supposed to issue a 
report on Iran's compliance with the deal. This agreement included suspending 
uranium enrichment to 20 per cent, reducing half the stockpile of 20 per cent enriched 
uranium to 3.5 per cent, and halting work on the Arak Heavy Water Reactor.  
 
The IAEA was also supposed to do more in-depth and frequent inspections. The 
IAEA Board of Governors met on Friday, 24 January 2014 for a special session to 
consider a report on monitoring the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action in Iran 
(Amano 2014). To punish Iran over its non-compliance with the IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement, the United States led an international effort to financially isolate Tehran 
by blocking its oil exports. This was done in order to raise the cost of developing a 
potential nuclear-weapons programme and as a result, bring the Iranian government to 
the negotiating table (Laub 2015). The United States and the European Union asserted 
that they would take necessary actions to release the specific sanctions outlined in the 
November 24, 2013 deal and set a schedule in order to pay Iran oil money held by 
other countries (Davenport 2015). When Iran and P5+1 extended their nuclear talks, 
the Iranian newspapers reported different reactions to the extension. The Kayhān 
newspaper’s headline was ‘the result of years of negotiations with the P5+1 was that 
the village chief was not reliable and sanctions were extended.’ The Javān, a 
newspaper close to the IRGC, referred to the extension as ‘seven months of artificial 
respiration to the nuclear diplomacy.’ However, the Shargh newspaper’s headline was 
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different from those in hardliners, exclaiming ‘Progress, extension and hope, 
diplomacy does not fail, it continues’ (Tabnak 2014). 
 
Negotiations between Iran and P5+1 on the comprehensive agreement began in 
Vienna between 17 to 20 February 2014. In these talks, the parties agreed on an 
agenda and framework to guide the negotiations. The first deadline to reach the final 
agreement was on 19 July 2014. However, Iran and the world powers missed the 
deadline, subsequently agreeing to resume talks on August 24, with November 2014 
set as another deadline; this was extended again to 30th of June 2015. However, they 
did make progress on difficult issues. The talks were extended for the last time and 
Iran and P5+1 reached a comprehensive deal referred to as the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015 (Davenport 2015). The main elements of the 
JCPOA included converting the Arak heavy water research reactor to a lower power 
20 MW heavy water research reactor and using low-enriched fuel instead of natural 
uranium, as well as committing to ship all spent fuel from Arak out of Iran for the 
lifetime of the reactor. Another commitment was for Iran not to build any additional 
heavy water research reactors for 15 years. Thus for 10 to 15 years, Iran became 
required to remove two-thirds of its installed centrifuges (a total of about 19,500), and 
only keep about 5,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges at 
Fordow. The Fordow enrichment facility would be converted to a research and 
development operation site and not enrich uranium for a period of 15 years. The 
JCPOA also limited Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. In this regard, for 15 years, 
Iran cannot maintain a total stockpile of more than 300 kilograms of low enriched 
uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride. Between year 11 and year 15 of 
implementing the JCPOA, Iran is allowed to start replacing the 5,000 IR-1 centrifuges 
with more advanced centrifuges (Saymore 2015).  
 
There were concerns that Iran might construct covert nuclear enrichment sites such as 
those at Natanz and Fordow. In order to address these concerns, the JCPOA allowed 
for inspections of the entire fuel cycle by the IAEA, that is for up to 25 years at some 
facilities, with the agreement allowing IAEA inspectors to inventory and inspect 
Iran's uranium supplies from the mining stage through its waste disposal processes 
plus monitor all centrifuge production facilities and R&D capacities (JCPOA 2015). It 
has been argued that the sanctions have not been very successful in their strategic goal 
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of changing Iran’s nuclear policy. However, they could limit Iran’s ability to 
assemble nuclear weapons in a short period of time (Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 2011). 
In exchange for an outright lifting of draconian economic sanctions, Iran agreed to 
restrain its nuclear activities and signed a nuclear deal with the six world powers. 
Both Iran and the U.S. have constantly asserted that the deal is just over the nuclear 
programme. However, every time when it came to regional issues and to relations 
between Tehran and Washington, the impact of the nuclear deal became very obvious. 
Although Iran’s Supreme Leader emphasised the anti-American policies of the 
Iranian regime, his tone became milder and the economy increasingly opened to 
everyone, including the U.S. (Ghattas 2015). On 16 January 2016, the Director 
General of the IAEA issued a statement declaring Iran to be in compliance with all its 
obligations under the JCPOA necessary to declare Implementation Day (Amano 
2016). This cleared the way for comprehensive sanctions relief for Iran while 
allowing IAEA inspectors continued, unprecedented access to Iranian nuclear 
facilities. For the negotiations to succeed, it was necessary for both parties to perceive 
the final result as a win-win solution (Goldschmidt 2012).  
4.4 Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s Nuclear Programme  
In addition to the nuclear programme, Iran is developing and producing ballistic 
missile capabilities and also has a genuine and ambitious space launch programme. 
Tehran’s nuclear, ballistic missile and space programmes have been a matter of 
concern for the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 because they challenge U.S. 
interests in the Middle East. Shortly following the 2002 revelations of Iran's covert 
nuclear activities, the IAEA mentioned in its safeguarding reports that some elements 
of Iran's nuclear programme might be used for military purposes. In its November 
2011 report, the IAEA presented an extensive analysis of evidence for Iran's possible 
weaponisation activities. According to the IAEA, Iran’s possible military activities 
took place before they were halted in 2003. These activities included indications of 
activities related to the development of a nuclear explosive device that continued after 
2003. Iran’s PMD dossier indicated that organisations affiliated with the IRGC played 
a significant role in Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, manufacturing of nuclear-
related equipment, and design of a missile re-entry vehicle (Gerami 2014). The 
Islamic Republic's alleged weaponisation attempts were consolidated under the 
‘ĀMĀD initiative’ headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a senior IRGC officer and 
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nuclear scientist (Ahmari 2014). The ĀMĀD Plan’s mission was to procure dual-use 
technologies, develop nuclear detonators and conduct high-explosive experiments. 
According to an IAEA assessment, the ĀMĀD Plan was stopped in late 2003, 
following growing concerns in Tehran about the U.S.-led military campaign in Iraq 
and because of fear of a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities by Israel and the 
U.S. Thus, Khamenei appointed Hassan Rouhani, then secretary of the Supreme 
National Security Council, as chief nuclear negotiator to manage the diplomatic 
fallout (Heinonen 2013).  
 
In August 2007, Iran agreed to cooperate on its PMD activities as part of a work plan 
with the IAEA, but the discussions ultimately broke down in September 2008 after 
senior Iranian officials cancelled meetings and visits. This issue remains unresolved. 
On 3 June 2013, the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano expressed his concerns 
regarding lack of progress in clarifying Iran’s possible military dimensions at the 
quarterly meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors (Amano 2012). Iran and the IAEA 
also announced a schedule for the agency’s investigation into possible military 
dimensions (PMD) to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran agreed to ratify the Additional 
Protocol, in addition to its comprehensive safeguarding agreement, and enact 
inspection measures to allow IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear facilities at 
unprecedented levels. In addition, Iran also signed a "Roadmap for Clarification of 
Past and Present Outstanding Issues" agreement with the IAEA to resolve any 
questions concerning the possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear 
programme. On 15 December 2015, Mr. Yukia Amano (2015) addressed the IAEA’s 
Board of Governors and closed Iran’s PMD dossier.  
 
Although the PMD issue did not appear to be a barrier to implementing a nuclear 
deal, the Supreme Leader asked the IAEA to close Iran’s PMD dossier and declare 
Iran’s goodwill on its peaceful nuclear intentions; with the Supreme Leader 
emphasising mutual respect and trust on behalf of the international community and 
recognition of Iran’s inalienable rights according to international law (Johnson 2016). 
Analysing Iran’s nuclear intentions is impossible without delving into the broader 
political strategic context that shapes and reinterprets the state’s identity and ideology 
(Bowen et al. 2016). Nuclear activities caused major damage to Iran’s economy. 
However, these crippling economic sanctions did not prove to be completely 
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successful. According to Farideh Farhi (2012), they created a sense of fortification 
inside Iran, with the nation looking to itself to guard against outside hostilities. In my 
opinion, even if economic sanctions did bring Iran to the negotiating table, in the case 
of Iran and the world powers not reaching an agreement, Iran was still committed to 
continuing its nuclear activities regardless of economic pressures.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Iran's desire to develop nuclear technology dates back to the 1950s, when the Shah of 
Iran received technical assistance towards a peaceful nuclear programme from the 
United States under the President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Programme, and it 
didn't vanish with his overthrow. America’s assistance ended with the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, but new Iranian leaders also showed an interest in pursuing a 
nuclear technology programme. They thus developed an extensive nuclear fuel cycle, 
including enrichment capabilities that became the subject of intense international 
negotiations and sanctions from 2002 to 2015. Like the Shah, the Islamic Republic’s 
leaders also emphasised the same nationalism that included Iran's inalienable right to 
develop peaceful nuclear technology under the NPT. Despite the clash between the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the West, Iran’s nuclear programme appeared to be a 
national need. Iran becoming determined that it must confront the West from a 
position of strength, which was framed as including a self-sufficient nuclear fuel 
cycle.  
 
The way in which Iranian elites think and act is partly a reflection of these deep-
seated cultural and social characteristics. The common belief is that all strategic 
decisions in Iran, including nuclear decisions, are either made or approved by the 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  However, this belief would constrain the 
pattern of decision making in Iran. As Nader Entessar (2009) puts it, this argument 
does not demonstrate the countervailing factors of decision making and the key 
decision makers that affect the final outcome of such a course of action. Iran’s history 
of violating IAEA safeguards and possible military links to Iran’s nuclear programme, 
especially until 2003, was of concern to Western countries. This caused them to 
demand Iran halt its uranium enrichment. However, for Iranians, the right to enrich 
uranium was not just understood as technological advancement, but also framed as a 
national concern (Fitzpatrick 2011). Iran has long argued that its nuclear programme 
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is peaceful, legal and authorised by its membership as a non-nuclear weapon state in 
the nuclear NPT. Tehran has always claimed that NPT membership guarantees its 
inalienable right to develop a peaceful nuclear energy programme. However, the 
United States is distrustful of Iran and emphasised that it does not need nuclear 
energy because of its vast oil and gas resources and that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 
energy has been for weaponisation. The U.S. Presidents Bush and Obama always 
stated that the U.S. and its allies could never allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Negotiations between P5+1 and Iran led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) on 14 July 2015, a comprehensive 25-year nuclear agreement that restricts 
Iran's nuclear capacity in exchange for sanctions relief. On 16 January 2016, all 
nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were lifted as its progress was deemed to meet key 
parameters of the nuclear deal. 
 
Regardless of the devastating effect of sanctions on Iran and the political pressure, 
Iran has continued to seek a nuclear programme. Since the imposition of the first 
United Nations Security Council sanctions asking Iran to suspend its uranium 
enrichment activities until signing an interim nuclear deal in November 2013 with 
EU-3+3, Iran was advancing its uranium enrichment capabilities. Iranian officials 
such as the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
Hassan Rouhani and Yahya Al-e Eshagh, among others have always emphasised that 
in spite of sanctions on the country’s economy, the country has survived and that by 
adopting appropriate policies, sanctions won’t have any effects (Khamenei 2018). 
Hence, the ability to tell their audiences both inside and outside the country that 
Tehran has overcome the obstacles set by the great powers, as well as the conspiracies 
that were designed to stop its progress in the nuclear energy industry, has become a 
key endeavour for Tehran. While Iran has limited its indigenous uranium enrichment 
activities a few times in order to come to an agreement with the West, Tehran has 
never accepted their demand to halt its enrichment activities. The emphasis on 
indigenous enrichment has become the symbol of Iran’s perseverance and described 
as the regime’s redline (Araghchi 2013). Indigenous uranium enrichment has been 
described as the key achievement of the Iranian nation, during the reign of the Shah 
and after the Islamic Revolution, both technologically and politically (Kibaroglu 
2006). Iran’s nuclear programme continues to be portrayed in nationalistic terms 
which emphasise the Iranian nation’s resistance to the West (Dehghani et al. 2009), 
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highlighting its technological and scientific progress and successful indigenous 
uranium enrichment programme (Bowen and Moran 2014). Understanding the 
historical background to Iran's quest for nuclear energy is necessary in order to 
understand and contextualise Tehran’s intentions, and as the final round of talks 
demonstrated, it pushed negotiations forward to better positions and finally towards 
success. A closer look at different policy camps in Iran, the political elites’ response 
to sanctions, and the negotiation process itself are key to deconstructing Iranian 
































“A nation is not defined by its borders or the boundaries of its land mass. Rather, a 
nation is defined by adverse people who have been unified by a cause and a value 
system and who are committed to a vision for the type of society they wish to live in 
and give to the future generations to come (Durotoye 2017).”  
 
― Fela Durotoye 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter was a policy analysis of Iran’s nuclear programme from its 
outset. It described Iran’s political structure and the government bodies that are a part 
of or have influenced the country’s nuclear decision making. Chapter 4 demonstrated 
the technological and scientific history of Tehran’s nuclear programme. It is now 
necessary to apply the notion of the discourse of national identity to how national 
identity in Iran has been constructed.  While the aim of this thesis is to consider the 
constructions of Iranian national identity in the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani periods, in 
terms of discourses of national identity, the aim of this chapter is to provide the 
historical context and intellectual background for the construction of Iranian national 
identity in general. In order to conceptualise the discourses of national identity in Iran 
during the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani periods, as well as demonstrating the 
complexity of the issue of Iranian national identity in general, it is of paramount 
importance to introduce various components of Iranian national identity using a 
historical approach. The aim of this chapter is to present the various concurrent 
components of Iranian nationalism, as discourses of national identity that competed 
with each other for the legitimisation of nuclear policies during the Ahmadinejad and 
Rouhani periods. This will be done, on the one hand, by illustrating the ideologies 
embedded in the construction of Iranian national identity conceptions; and, on the 
other, by highlighting the relationship between different discourses of Iranian national 
identity and their impact on nuclear decision making. 
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This chapter contains a description and identification of the core components of 
Iranian national identity constructed in contemporary narratives. This is necessary for 
the following chapters consisting of a detailed examination of the role of Iranian 
elites’ conceptions of national identity and their impact on nuclear policies and the 
nuclear negotiation process. In other words, the ways in which Iran’s cultural and 
political identity comes to define how Tehran’s nuclear decisions are shaped. This is 
with a view to the proposition of the thesis that Iran’s nuclear ambitions cannot be 
fully explained by materialistic approaches in IR theory. Thus, this chapter examines 
the historical identity of Iran’s foundations in order to demonstrate how these 
contested conceptions of identity are channelled into Iran’s nuclear narratives. It is 
contended that one of the recurring ideologies embedded in the construction of 
Iranian national identity is ‘Persian nationalism’, which is what gives Iranians a sense 
of independence and recognition. The notion of Persian nationalism and being Persian 
originates from opposition to an Arab and European other. The Aryan tradition is 
constitutive of a certain vision of superiority, which narrates the Iranian nation via an 
identity story, carried out by the Oil Nationalisation Movement, a 2500-year 
celebration of the Persian Empire, and the nuclear programme. According to Natalie 
Bormann (2013), identity narratives should not just be seen as some stories that 
happened in the past and used by actors to justify a set of values in contemporary 
politics. Bormann asserts that these national identity narratives offer a framework that 
interprets and reinterprets the arguments of the past and the present (Ibid.).  
 
An analysis of Iran’s national identity is thus crucial for understanding the motivation 
to pursue a nuclear programme because apart from the balance of power, the nuclear 
programme is regarded as a symbol of national and international prestige, as well as 
modernity and identity of the state (Amul 2012b). However, it must be noted that the 
priori codes of prestige and modernity are often contested. Furthermore, as will be 
illustrated,  ‘national culture’, ‘historic territory’ and ‘territorial power’ are both 
constructed and contested. National elites’ portrayal of the nuclear programme as a 
unifying symbol of identity can be described as a ‘civil religion’ (Rezaei 2014) that 
can be further defined as a cohesive force, with a shared set of values that strengthens 
social, cultural, and religious integration (Cristi 2006). For Iranian scholars, Fathali 
Akhundzadeh and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, pre-Islamic Iran was regarded as a 
golden age, with Islam characterized as an alien religion, and Arabs described as 
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inexorable others. Akhundzadeh and Kermani’s proto‐nationalism, which responded 
to the traumas of nineteenth-century Qajar elites by positing deep historical ties to 
Europe and a mythological Aryan race, would later become an integral part of Pahlavi 
ideology (1925–1979). This ideology has shaped the historical narratives, culture, 
domestic and foreign policy, nation, and race for generations of Iranians and 
influenced Iranians’ identity and self-perception (Zia-Ebrahimi 2016). In addition to 
Persian nationalism, Shia Islamic identity and Revolutionary ideology are further sets 
of values or ideologies that give Iranians a sense of independence and cultural 
authenticity. The normative and revolutionary dimensions of Iran’s foreign policy 
behaviour make it complicated and thus difficult to understand. Using a discourse 
approach, this thesis demonstrates that the construction of Iranian national identity 
after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, in general, and during the Ahmadinejad and 
Rouhani periods, in particular, is to a great extent a discourse of resistance, at both 
international and regional levels. This resistance can be seen in the meanings attached 
to the Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity (Holliday 2010). Iranian leaders 
consider both Persian nationalism and Shia Islamic identity as integral and authentic 
to Iranian national identity (Keyman and Yilmaz 2006). These issues are of particular 
interest because of their relevance to the discourses of national identity in the 
Ahmadinejad and Rouhani periods, which are under discussion in this thesis. 
Considering the impact of Iranian elites’ conception of national identity, this chapter 
explores the way actors acquire their identities, and how these so-called identities 
shape their decisions affecting Iran’s nuclear programme. In so doing, to examine 
whether conceptions of the Iranian national identity do indeed play a role in the elite’s 
nuclear policy objectives, this chapter will examine the symbolic importance of Iran’s 
nuclear programme for political elites through analysing the policies they design and 
decide upon. The focus of this chapter is elaborating on a wider discourse of national 
identity discourses around Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  
5.2 Components of Iranian National Identity 
What and how you define yourself in relation to others is a feature of identity, which 
is significant in both social and intersubjective understandings. According to Maryam 
Sanie Ejlal (2005), national identity is the process of a nation’s conscious 
accountability in answering questions about itself, the past, quality of life, time, 
belonging, origins, civilisation, and the importance of its political, economic, and 
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cultural values of importance. In other words, national identity is a set of positive 
attitudes and tendencies that bring together a country’s elements, identities and 
patterns as a political unit (Ibid.). Developments, events and long-term historical 
processes are effective in shaping a deep sense of attachment and belonging in a 
country. Memories, events, personalities and historical narratives as well as myths are 
very effective in shaping national identity (Castro 2006). The historical dimension of 
national identity is the common awareness of people in society regarding their 
historical past and attachment to it, and sense of historical identity, as well as the 
conceptual history linking different generations to one another, thus preventing the 
separation of a generation from their history (Mowlaei 2008).  
 
Iran is a country where the question of national identity has dominated the public 
agenda for a long time (KhosraviNik 2007). Nuclear policy in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has become a complicated issue in terms of the symbolic and ideological 
dimensions of the programme. The common attitude towards external realities 
depends on the angle from which one looks at them, the values and also the specific 
result and goal. Thus, one needs to have an ideational view of the issues such as the 
role of culture or cultural identities, national unity and patriotism, and beliefs 
(Makaremi 2015). It is also of paramount importance to try to understand the main 
characteristics of Iranian national identity through the theoretical framework assigned 
to analyse this research. More precisely, as regards the impact of Iranian national 
identity conceptions on nuclear policies, national identity matters since it provides a 
context of shared meanings and norms (Cerutti and Lucarelli 2008) within which we 
can identify the symbolic value of the nuclear programme for political elites in Iran.      
5.2.1 Persian National Identity 
According to Hamid Ahmadi (2003), the historical concept of Iranian identity has 
experienced transitions throughout history. The notion of Iranian identity, Ahmadi 
argues, was constructed during the Sassanid Empire, and then transformed during the 
Islamic era. Its change to ‘Iranian national identity’ happened during the Safavid era 
and in modern times. Gherardo Gnoli (1989) argues that ‘the idea of Iran’ came into 
being in the first half of the third century, during the Sassanid Empire, however, 
religious and ethnic conceptions of Iranian identity existed earlier (Frye 1993). As 
William Hanaway (1993) puts it, during the medieval period, you could see social, 
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economic, ethnic, regional, and linguistic differences among the Iranian population. 
He argues that the medieval Iranian past is the basis of Iranians' sense of identity 
today, as the majority of the Iranian population spoke Persian, wrote an arabicised 
form of Persian language, were well educated in the Islamic sciences, and controlled 
most of the power in medieval Persia. Now remembering and controlling the memory 
of the past helps Iranians shape the national hierarchy of power. Moreover, images of 
the past can help Iranians create, legitimise, and maintain their social order (Elling 
2013). 
 
Iranian national identity has developed as a result of a long history mixed with 
religious beliefs. The Zoroastrian civilisation that is the Ancient Persian religion 
requires humankind to move towards the light in the eternal battle of light and 
darkness, and pursue his/her never-ending quest to overcome darkness and perdition 
and reach some glorious victory in battle. Similarly, in the Iranian Islam (or Shia 
Islam) tradition, there is an emphasis on the battle between right and wrong. In other 
words, this Iranian Islam requires humankind to fight with the perdition of the world 
in order to live honourably and victoriously (Mojtahedzadeh 2007). One indicator of 
Iranian identity is the spirit of pride and endurance. The ways to measure this 
indicator include the extent to which a nation is proud of their country and nationality, 
the importance of religion in people’s lives, and whether they think there is a clear 
boundary between right and wrong (Maleki 2013). 
 
Yarshater (1993) argues that national identity is based on various elements such as 
geography, language, religion and shared history, etc. However, challenging or 
endangering any of these elements can cause a crisis of identity (Ibid.). All elements 
of Iranian identity have been exposed to a variety of dangers and threats, such as the 
peril of extinction, many times throughout history. Persian/Iranian geographical 
territory has been repeatedly invaded and conquered by foreign populations, primarily 
Greeks, Arabs, and Turks. The national religion has also been forced out and even the 
language threatened, following the Arab invasion. There have been two compulsory 
religious changes in Iranian history: one from the pre-Islamic religions 
(Zoroastrianism) to Islam, and the other from Sunni to Shia. These changes, along 
with historical invasions, caused a kind of historical traumatism for Iranians. As 
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Mehdi Bazargan8 says, a main feature of Iranians in this regard refers to ‘Iranian 
compatibility’. This means using our intelligence to absorb the invaders to our culture 
and make them similar to ourselves (Makaremi 2015). Iran under the Shah was 
seeking a secular national identity to keep the long history of the Persian Empire alive 
and thus legitimise his modernisation projects (Ashraf 1993). Parekh (2000, p. 254)  
claims that “national identity can neither be preserved like an antique piece of 
furniture nor discarded like an old piece of clothing”. It needs to be constantly 
reassessed, adapted to changing circumstances and brought into harmony with our 
deeper self-understanding and ideals. Rice (1953) refers to the ancient and deep-
rooted Iranian cultural identity and explains that in the cultural field the Arabs’ 
victory over Iran was short-lived because it was not possible to eliminate Iran’s 
ancient culture. Iranian arts, ideas, culture, all remained and flourished and prospered 
in a new way with regards to Islam (Ibid.). 
 
The quiddity of identity is one of the main concerns of modern Iran. Concerning 
Iran’s specific cultural conditions, the notions of ‘nation and national identity’ have 
always been important to the country’s historical past. Regarding the custodians of 
each historical era, one can witness changes in the concept of national identity (Prizel 
1998). Factors such as membership of a national community and socialisation 
processes, historical continuity and shared memory, the effect of nationalistic ideas 
from the West, the role of political power in the production and restoration of national 
identity, natural and geographical areas and backgrounds, and the role of intellectuals 
and elites are all important components in shaping Iranian national identity (Smith 
1986). Hajiani (2010) describes different, multidimensional components of Iranian 
identity according to scholars. Davoud Hermidas Bavand (Ibid.) explains that 
rationalism, humanism and freethinking, integration, socio-cultural coexistence and 
tolerance among peoples and nations, ‘Iranianised’ (made Iranian) rivals and 
migrants. This was especially the case for Greeks in the pre-Islam era, Arabs in the 
period following the arrival of Islam to Iran, as well as in the Mughal period, with 
Shiism one of the most important characteristics of Iranian national identity. 
Mojtahedzadeh describes equality and justice along with religious principles as the 
                                                
8 Mehdi Bazargan was a prominent Iranian scholar, academic, long-time pro-democracy activist and 
head of Iran's interim government, making him Iran's first prime minister following the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979. 
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main factors of Iranian national identity. With his philosophical vision, Elahi 
Ghomsheii identifies divine light and dealing with the darkness, Unitarianism, divine 
identity, worshipping the light and loving the arts as the main pillars of Iranian 
identity. Akhoundzadeh emphasises “all the good characteristics of Iranian nature” 
before the Arab invasion, including the otherness of the Arab, and the importance of 
Zoroastrianism, as the significant components of Iranian identity in the golden age of 
antiquity. Mirza Agha Khan Kermani demonstrates the praising of Zoroastrianism, 
along with the Aryans and the Persian language as components of Iranian ancient 
national identity. Mirza Malkom Khan stresses modernisation of the government in 
Iran; while Kazemzadeh adds praising the King, intelligence and talent in industry, 
free-thinking and nature-loving, religious spirit, religious sanctity and talent to the 
main elements of the Iranian national spirit (Ibid.). As Stephen Poulson (2005) puts it, 
the demise of Sassanid dynasty and the rise of Islam gave Iranians a cultural shock 
and a crisis of identity occurred to them; therefore, the Iranians began to reconstruct 
the Persian cultural heritage within the Islamic society.  
 
Persian identity was regarded as taboo for several years in Iran following the Islamic 
revolution. Referring to Scott Sagan’s work, Karsten Frey states that most countries 
oppose the possession of nuclear weapons because of the negative attitude towards 
nuclear weapons, which is referred to as the ‘nuclear taboo’. This nuclear taboo is 
accepted among nuclear policy analysts as meaning revulsion over nuclear weapons. 
The taboo is the normative belief about the behaviour of nuclear non-use, which 
means this behaviour is right or wrong (Tannenwald 1999). The opposite of the 
‘nuclear taboo’, which is the ‘nuclear myth’, describes the symbolic conceptions 
attached to states’ intentions such as their identity and desired international prestige 
(Frey 2006). The nuclear myth demonstrates the reasons why countries over-
emphasise a need to preserve their national security (Lavoy 1993). The main theme of 
Iran’s mythic personality lies in its sense of cultural, moral and spiritual supremacy; 
however, Ziemke (2000) argues that Iranians think that the world has almost failed to 
appreciate Iran’s historical grandeur. This approach prioritises identity narratives as 
the explanatory variable behind policy outcomes (Hadfield 2007) suggesting that 
Iran’s nuclear policy decisions are negotiated in an environment where the tension 
between Iran and policymaking in the West is due to the critical absence of a 
discernable understanding of Iran’s historical identity (Parsi and Rydqvist 2011). 
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Understanding the different ways that the various elements of identity are formed and 
adopted may help us to identify why state actors conduct different forms of foreign 
policy (Ghahremanpour 2011). The (historical) constitution of identity narratives is an 
explanatory factor explaining a state’s foreign policy behaviour (Zehfuss 2001). In 
light of this and in deliberating on Iranian national identity, one can think about its 
multidimensionality and multiculturalism. It can be said that Iranians have a specific 
collective identity. Farhang Rajaee (2007) argues that Iranians are modern, traditional, 
Muslim and Persian simultaneously. Thus, there are four sources of Iranian identity: 
1) Iranian or Persian identity, 2) Religion (now Islam, before that, Zoroastrianism), 3) 
Tradition and 4) Modernism (Rajaee 2007). In spite of Rajaee’s standpoint on the 
existence of four sources for the Iranian identity, I believe it is possible to merge Iran 
and tradition together as it is all about being Iranian, Persian culture heritage, Iranian 
history and all its components.  
 
Although shared values and cultures are an important part of a society’s identity, they 
are also based largely on religious beliefs. In Iran’s long history, identity and religious 
beliefs have always had a close connection. While encountering Western culture and 
modernity in the mid-19th century, Iran started the process of modernisation, which 
created a connection between identity, legitimacy and power through the politicisation 
of identity, along with the Iranian-Islamic convergence (Hunter 2014). Contrary to the 
Shah’s regime, the Islamic government in Iran tried to wipe out signs of secularism 
and replace these with a pure Islamic identity for Iranians. Thus, since the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, the Islamic regime in Iran has tried to legitimise its policies with 
a Shia identity applying Islamic principles. The religious government in Iran 
endeavours to combine Shia values with Iranian values, however, over time there has 
been some confrontation between these two values and identities (Saleh 2012). A 
reason for this confrontation between Iranian and Shia values is due to the secular 
nature of the Shah’s regime, which had no intention of employing religious ideology 
in Iran’s foreign policy (Barzegar 2008b).   
5.2.2 Shia Islamic Identity and Revolutionary Ideology 
According to H. A. R. Gibb (2013), Iranians have always been inspired by various 
elements of their pre-Islamic heritage, referred to as Persian cultural heritage. Thus, 
this sense of national pride at being Iranian or Persian along with such a long history 
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is a fundamental element of Iranian national identity in current Iranian culture. The 
Shia tradition is in the centre of Iranian political culture. The event of Karbalā in 
modern Iraq in 680 CE has become a major event for Shia identity; this was when 
Imam Hussein, the third Imam of Shia Muslims, was killed or martyred fighting 
against superior forces. In this regard, the Iranian cultural identity views “suffering, 
injustice and being a victim of illegitimate power as a fundamental motif” 
(Guldimann 2007, p. 172). Based on powerful identity construction, there is an 
understanding among some Iranians that the West does not recognise their legitimacy 
or their national rights (Afary and Anderson 2010). Farzin Vahdat (2015) argues that 
the (black and white) perception of the West and the great powers about Iran, in 
general, has birthed a strong desire for self-reliance, independence, and resistance, 
particularly following the 1979 Islamic revolution. In describing ancient civilisations 
such as Iran and their peoples’ inclination towards the past, Ryszard Kapuscinski 
(2002, p. 105) says: 
 
“In historical societies, everything has been decided in the past. All their 
energies, their feelings, their passions are directed toward the past, dedicated 
to the discussion of history, to the meaning of history. They live in the realm 
of legends and founding lineages. They are unable to speak about the future 
because the future doesn’t arouse the same passion in them as their history. 
They are all historical people, born and living in the history of great fights, 
divisions and conflicts.” 
 
Along with other components of Iranian national identity, such as language, history, 
nationalism, and religion, there is another newer component called Islamic 
Revolutionary ideology. The Islamic Revolution has its own identity and cultural 
effects. It is a kind of cultural-religious identity. It’s life and the hereafter ideas 
brought a new identity to the Iranians at the outset of the revolution (Nekoo Rooh 
1999). According to McInnis (2015), Tehran’s revolutionary ideology is the 
underlying foundation for regime legitimacy and a core basis of its nuclear policies. 
Common amongst all Iranian elites is that the international community’s humiliation 
of Iran has not been the right way to deal with an honourable nation and revolutionary 
power. Iran has responded to the humiliation, particularly by the United States, with 
resistance (Rivera 2016). Despite its irreversible damage to the country’s economy, 
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Mahmood Sariolghalam (2003) argues that the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
emboldened the Islamic foundations of Iranian national identity. In other words, the 
political Islam that emerged from the Revolution demonstrated a degree of relevance 
for the broader elements of Iranian identity (Ibid.). In Iran, the Islamic Revolution of 
1979 has been interpreted as a movement that originated from national awareness of a 
history bursting with durability, longevity and grandeur.  A noticeable feature of the 
Revolution is that the movement turned rapidly to a narrative of Iranian history when 
within a decade it had been defined as an Iranian Islamic Revolution. Khomeini, of 
course, was totally aware that in order to frame the revolutionary narrative, it was 
necessary to classify it as an inspiring one (Ansari 2012).    
 
In order to understand Iran’s foreign policy in general and Iran’s nuclear behaviour in 
particular, it is necessary to be aware of the Iranian regime’s revolutionary ideology, 
as Iran’s foreign policy originates from its revolutionary missions. In addition to the 
similarities, there has always been some contrast and competition among the various 
elements of Iranian identity. The politicisation of Islam in the twentieth century came 
about in response to the pressures and threats of Western modernisation. Shia 
nationalism has thus been a combination of support for the local economy and culture 
as well as national independence in response to the expansion of political influence by 
the West (Bashirieh 2001). With the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the 
discourse of the Revolutionary ideology supported social discipline, unity and cultural 
equality in the form of overall identity with an attempt to revive the Islamic identity 
and Shia traditions against national and non-religious identities (Sarmadi 2017). The 
discourse of Revolutionary ideology attempted to define and reshape society based on 
religious values (Moaddel 1992). Hence the anti-West approach that emerged from 
the post-colonial approach is necessary for continuing the identity that was built on 
the ideology of the Islamic Revolution (Helfont 2015).  
 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 changed Iran’s nationalist perspectives to a great 
extent. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Homeira Moshirzadeh (2007) 
discusses three main discourses – independence, justice, and resistance – that form the 
identity of the Islamic Republic. The discourse of independence has long been a very 
important discourse in constituting Iran’s identity as an independent state. Iranians’ 
aspirations for justice also have their roots in historical nationalist narratives and 
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religious discourses. In the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, one of the most important 
elements in Iran’s confrontation with the West has been the necessity of resisting any 
of the foreign forces that might jeopardize Iran’s sovereignty and independence. 
Different elements shape Iran’s nationalism, which in turn shape Iran’s foreign policy 
decisions.  The first element can be identified as Iran’s fear of external manipulation. 
Although Iran has never been colonised, it has experienced great and powerful 
interventions in its internal affairs. This has shaped a politics of resistance against the 
despots or the interfering powers. Ambassador Wendy Sherman (2018) also refers to 
the culture of resistance as a crucial factor while negotiating the nuclear deal with 
Iran. She says Iranians have been told by the colonial powers throughout the history 
what kind of weapons they can have, and the West also organised a coup against their 
leaders. Thus, for the Iranian negotiators, “nearly everyone at the opposing table 
represented the first-world corruption that their revolution stood against (Ibid. p. 40).  
The second factor is Iran’s lack of any strategic allies in the region. Iran’s nuclear 
programme is a symbol of its great power status in the region and has thus become 
part of Iran's identity. Resisting the West's efforts to limit Iran’s endeavour to be a 
nuclear power has turned into a matter of national pride and respect (Miller 2014).  
 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Islam as a 
religion and form of governance became more dominant than nationalism as a 
component of Iranian identity. The reason for prioritising Islamic or religious identity 
lies in the theological debate dominating the revolutionary ideology of Iranian 
leaders, who have looked to modernise Islam by promising to establish a democratic 
Islamic republic (Bruno 2008). Although religion has redeemed the Iranian nation 
twice, once at the end of the Iran-Iraq war and later when Mohammad Khatami 
became President in 1997, with his inclusion of nationalistic themes in his campaign, 
the idea of being Iranian and Persian became as important s being Muslim and thus 
reemerged as the dominant narrative (Ansari 2012). The argument here is about 
Islam, which can access society through the experience of shared cultural values 
(Makaremi 2015). Iran’s political elites construct national identity in different ways 
and this has also entered into the social and political discourse. In Iran, because of its 
long history, debates on national identity raise both national-cultural and religious 
issues. Because of regime change in Iran, its social and political life underwent 
profound changes following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Smith 1991).  
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Drawing upon the theoretical framework of social constructivism and the relationship 
between identities, interests and actions, this section puts theory into practice. 
Ideational factors, such as identity and norms, can shape and transform state interests, 
which in turn can transform the norms, rules, and institutions of the international 
system (Ishiyama and Breuning 2010). Iran’s foreign and security policy is a product 
of Iranian national interest and the ideology of the Islamic revolution (Katzman   
2017). Iran’s foreign and security policy cannot be comprehended without being 
separated from its Persian and Shia/Islamic identity or the Revolutionary ideology 
that shaped inter-subjective conceptions of national identity; these have, in turn, 
shaped conceptions of the country’s national interest (Salimi 2007). Given the Iranian 
Supreme Leader’s decision, these two will be able to surpass each other over time, 
depending on the nature of the conflict. Looking at Iran’s resistance network of 
proxies and partners, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi Shia militias, one can 
see the employment of both hard and soft power in Iran’s foreign policies. Hence, 
Iran’s behaviour can be interpreted via the politicians’ perception of threats to their 
national interests that are informed by core ideological principles (McInnis 2015).  
 
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has focused on the religious 
dimension of Iranian national identity in order to demonstrate his support of the 
nuclear programme and the economic situation of Iran. In the wake of the difficult 
economic climate in Iran and the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s president in 
2013, Khamenei allowed the nuclear-negotiating team to engage directly with the US. 
Khamenei explained his strategy of negotiating with the U.S. as an example of ‘heroic 
flexibility’, addressing Imam Hassan’s peace treaty9  (Mahdavi 2014). Ayatollah 
Khamenei believes in the superiority of Islamic civilisation, calling Western 
civilisation materialistic and one-dimensional. According to Khamenei, for Western 
civilisation, progress is mostly composed of wealth, along with scientific, military, 
and technological advancement. In contrast, the Islamic rationale considers progress 
to involve the various dimensions of science, justice, public welfare, economics, 
                                                
9 Based on Shia tradition, the blood of martyrs lay in the ink of history (previous seven words make no 
sense); however, on many occasions, the greater Jihad has lain along the path of peace, rather than war. 
For instance, Imam Hassan, second Shia Imam realised that in order to confront Mu'awiya, he needed a 
peace treaty rather than war and bloodshed. He believed the premature death of faithful Muslims in the 
battle against Mu'awiya would not bring about victory. Hence, Imam Hassan’s victory required a peace 
agreement to keep the light of the original Islam from being extinguished. 
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international grandeur and status, as well as independence, aspects which are non-
material (Ganji 2013).  
5.2.3 Modernity and Technological Advancement 
As Itty Abraham (1998) argues, there is a major relationship between nuclear power 
and questions of power, culture, and national identity. That is, in the form of defining 
indigenous mastery over modern science and technology as a country’s national 
interest. Abraham states that “nuclear power has been an intimate element of India 
and Pakistan’s political, socio-cultural, and technological histories long enough to 
claim an important place in the shaping of postcolonial South Asian modernity” (Ibid. 
p.2).  
 
Another important aspect of Iranian nuclear intentions is that for Iranian leaders, 
producing electricity alone is not the goal; rather, the goal is to lead the country 
towards modernity. When the nuclear programme was started under the Shah, 
technological advancement and modernity in the shape of Westernisation had been 
very important for him (Patrikarakos 2012). In the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah of Iran 
launched a modernisation plan promoting both state-owned and private firms. Among 
his plans was land reform, profit-sharing in industry, and, increasing oil and gas 
exports (Solingen 2009). Before this and in the 1950s, the Shah of Iran received 
technical assistance under the U.S. ‘Atoms for Peace programme’, and his interest in 
nuclear technology made Iran’s nuclear programme an essential ingredient in his 
modernising drive for Iran (Patrikarakos 2012). Yet, under the Islamic Republic, 
Westernisation was opposed and the Islamic Revolution’s leaders emphasised 
modernity and technological advancement. This was strongly based within narratives 
of the country’s independence and its ability to develop a peaceful nuclear technology 
on Iranian soil by Iranian scientists; Iranian leaders compared the nuclear programme 
to landing on the moon and referred to it as the nation’s inalienable right, a symbol of 
modernity and technological advancement (Vaez and Sadjadpour 2013). As Farhad 
Rezaei (2017) states, for the Iranian elites, nuclear technology has become a symbol 
of progress, modernity and independence, as it also has for other countries.  
 
Iran’s former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, linked the nuclear programme with 
the technological advancement of the country and for him, any lack of knowledge and 
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expertise in this field reflected the country’s underdevelopment and backwardness 
(Ahmadinejad 2013). In 2012, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for 
example, told a group of nuclear scientists that self-respect and dignity were 
significant results they could gain as a result of their achievements in developing an 
indigenous nuclear technology (Bowen et al. 2016). Khamenei also believes that 
Iran’s nuclear advancement can bring glory, progress, and greatness to the nation and 
the country (Khamenei 2008a). According to Adam Tarock (2006), Ahmadinejad 
surprised the world in mid- April 2006 by announcing that Iran had joined the world’s 
nuclear technology club and from now on, Iran could acquire the necessary 
technology to produce nuclear energy and thus decrease its dependence on oil. Iran’s 
portrayal of reaching to the level of states able to master nuclear technology gives the 
country greater weight and prestige internationally. Science, technology, and power 
are interlinked, and peaceful nuclear technology is said to give Iran entry into an 
exclusive ‘nuclear club’ (Rouhani 2004). 
As reported in the Iranian press: 
 
The last step in the completion of Iran's nuclear cycle which confirms Iran has 
joined the world nuclear club cannot be considered a small victory and must 
be properly admired... The Majlis [parliament] should declare an 'Iranian 
national nuclear technology day' to register this day in Iran's history (Resālat 
Newspaper 2006). 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has historically and intellectually illustrated the components of Iranian 
national identity. It has been shown historically, that Iranian national identity in its 
various forms is in continuous flux in terms of the construction and reconstruction of 
these identity elements, at both the state and non-state levels. The influence of identity 
components and their relationship with politics is of significance. Its importance 
comes from the point whereby identity also has a political dimension and thus, there 
is a hint of identity in every individual and social action that affects the political 
behaviour and foreign policy of states (Afzali and Mousavi 2017). The culture and 
identity of every nation influence their political behaviour on the world’s political 
stage. Due to the geographic location of Iran, Iranian identity has been affected by 
three areas of civilisation: Iranian, Islamic, and Western (Zahed 2006). Religious 
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ideology has been a prominent element of Iranian identity since the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 and shaped Iranian foreign policy. Simultaneously, the Islamic 
Revolution brought about a sense of identity and unity amongst Iranian people. 
Consequently, the Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued a policy of ideological 
confrontation with its perceived enemies in order to shift its policies towards a more 
pragmatic and interest-driven approach, as well as maintaining its internal cohesion 
and resistance towards external threats and challenges. Those Iranian elites who want 
Iran to achieve prominent status in the international community define their opinions 
on national policy as based on their shared values, history, cultural perception and, 
generally, on how they wish to be seen in the world. While a country’s desire for 
prestige, respect and dignity influences decisions made at the governmental level, one 
cannot ignore the effect geopolitics has on strategic interests. The effectiveness of 
Iranian nuclear negotiations has been a controversial topic for more than a decade. 
Central to this is the fact that when we look into the negotiation process, we mostly 
encounter the names of countries, organisations or institutions. The focus is less on 
the impact of elites’ ideologies and perceptions. But this focus would improve the 
negotiators’ mutual understanding of one another. As we have observed in the history 
of Iranian nuclear negotiations, individuals have an equal and crucial role to play 
either in making peace or provoking conflict (Rifkind and Picco 2013). Indeed, 
national pride, technological advancement and international prestige have all played a 
crucial role in shaping Iran’s nuclear policies. Government officials often use 
identities in a strategic way, where they can adapt to a variety of situations and 
effectively construct and support their defined concepts (Eminov 2007). Iran’s 
longevity and resilience (Persian Empire) as a great nation and civilisation elucidate 
Iranian national consciousness. Iran’s nuclear decision-making is a complicated issue 
because Iranian identity has consisted of so many interconnected elements throughout 
history, including Persian, Shia, and Islamic Revolutionary identities and ideologies, 
all determining the mix of internal and external policies (as noted above) (McInnis 
2015).  
 
Today, the political system in Iran is rooted in religious beliefs and ideals and since 
the political system is a manifestation of the will of society, religious identity is 
considered one of the main components of national identity (Zahed 2006). However, 
in a country with such a deep-rooted civilisation, prioritising religion in favour of 
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nationalism is not durable. According to Abulof (2014), for instance, Iran’s nuclear 
narrative s fueled by various reasons, including Iranians’ patriotic pride in their deep-
rooted Persian civilisation, the promise of Islam in the form of Shia Islam, and 
Iranians’ ambition to become technologically modern. Despite the importance of 
religion (Shiism) as a component of Iranian national identity, Persianism or to be a 
Persian is still the central core of Iran’s national identity. As Shireen Hunter (2014) 
states “the strength of the Persian identity and culture was such that it exercised a 
significant attraction for the invading groups,10 most of whom became culturally 
persianised” (Hunter 2014, p. 20). 
 
Some countries acquire nuclear weapons mostly for defensive and military purposes, 
for example, Israel, but some other countries like India and Pakistan acquire nuclear 
weapons not only for defensive purposes but also as a symbol of prestige and their 
own national identity and modernity. There are other countries that acquire peaceful 
nuclear technology as a symbol of modernism and prestige. Whether a state’s 
incentive is to build nuclear weapons or to develop a peaceful nuclear energy 
programme, history has shown that national identity is part of the rationale behind 
many countries’ nuclear programmes. As Jo-Ansie Van Wyk et al. (2007, p. 23) 
outline, 
 
“In constructivist terminology, the continued prevalence of nuclear weapons 
and a state’s dominance in the nuclear arena constitutes social facts. These 
weapons illustrate, among other things, a state’s commitment to their 
constructed social purpose, namely maintaining power and prestige (i.e. 
identity), and dominance (i.e. identity and interests) – despite the possibility of 
non-state actors’ access and application of nuclear technology and weapons.” 
 
Iran’s nuclear programme has also contributed to a sense of ‘status’. Currently, the 
nuclear issue is perceived as a matter of technological advancement as well as for 
reinforcing Iranian identity and status in the region and in the world (Barzegar 
2009a). It is, therefore, necessary to acknowledge the importance of national identity 
                                                
10 History has seen Iran invaded by Muslims, which led to the end of the Sasanian Empire in 651 and 
the eventual decline of the Zoroastrian religion in Iran. This was the Muslim conquest of Persia, also 
known as the Arab conquest of Iran. 
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conceptions for understanding the nuclear behaviour of Iran. In so doing, elements of 
Iranian national identity and how they relate to the making of symbolic norms need to 
be examined. That is, with respect to the way those norms contribute to the process of 
nuclear policy decision-making in Iran. This chapter has argued that national identity 
operates discursively to represent both agents and structures if identity narratives are 
treated as independent variables that precede and thus predispose actions. Hence these 
predisposed actions can constitute the formation of interests, the construction of 
policy decisions and types of actor behaviour, all of which have an ideational and 
historical foundation and are enacted strategically. 
 
This historical and intellectual contextualisation has demonstrated several factors 
crucial to an understanding of Iranian national identity. First of all, the issue of 
resistance is a common theme. An important aspect in the construction of Iranian 
national identity throughout history has been resistance to colonial and imperial 
powers. There is also an emphasis on the issue of victimisation of Shia Muslims that 
emerged from a history made up of suffering, injustice and being a victim of 
illegitimate powers. The goal of the Iranian nation has thus been to achieve 
independence and self-reliance. Another common theme is the issue of civilisation, 
which is of paramount importance for both (secular) nationalists and Islamists, citing 
the superiority of the ancient civilisation over Islamic civilisation. These have brought 
about the themes of modernity, prestige, respect and justice among others. The 
toughening of American economic sanctions since 1979, along with the threat of an 
Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, intensified Iranian’s sense of victimisation 
and increased their level of resistance. Iran’s motivations to develop its nuclear 
programme were therefore driven by strategic modernity and national pride. Nuclear 
energy, as a symbol of strength and power, is giving Iran a sense of identity (Farhamy 
2008). 
 
The final and concluding point is that many of the themes articulated in Iran’s 
discourses of national identity have also been reflected in the discourses of national 
identity during the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani periods. As mentioned before, three 
main discourses have been identified for discussion: the Persian identity, the Shia 
identity and Revolutionary ideology, and finally a discourse on modernity and 
technological advancement. Civilisation, modernity and resistance continue to be 
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major issues in the construction of Iranian national identity across all discourses of 
Iranian national identity. The next chapter explores a detailed history of the Iranian 
nuclear programme, featuring the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
along with the people and institutions that play a key role in its nuclear policies.  
 
The next three chapters provide a detailed analysis of nuclear discourse under the 
Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations in order to evidence and explain the 
relationship between particular discourses of Iranian national identity and the 
trajectory of the nuclear programme outlined in this chapter. The analysis is based on 
analysis of Ahmadinejad’s speeches from various media outlets and interview results 
related to the subject matter. The following chapters, thus, show the changing nature 
of Iran’s nuclear ambitions based on different administrations’ conceptions of 





















Chapter 6. Ahmadinejad’s Nuclear Discourse: A Fiery Rhetoric (2005-2013) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis now turns to the first of three chapters that focus on the case study. The 
previous chapter contextualised various discourses of Iranian national identity. This 
was done by highlighting the relationship between different discourses of Iranian 
national identity and their impact on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It argued that national 
identity operates discursively to represent both agents and structures if identity 
narratives are treated as independent variables that precede and thus predispose 
actions. In order to understand the impact of national identity conceptions on Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions during the time frame covered in this research, the previous chapter 
examined the historical roots of such identity in different entities within the political 
structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
This chapter takes a different approach, moving from policy analysis to discourse 
analysis, and therefore, builds on the theoretical framework of the first five chapters 
and turns to the more concrete methodological issues involved in selecting research 
questions and building research design. In so doing, this chapter places the 
development of Iran’s nuclear programme in the context of the Iranian elite’s nuclear 
decision-making with regards to the impact of discourses of Iranian national identity. 
The aim of this chapter, as well as the following chapters, is to show how conceptions 
of national identity are the basis of decision making in Iran. This chapter, in 
particular, examines the impact of Iranian national identity conceptions on the nuclear 
decisions made by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But before entering into any detailed 
arguments on Ahmadinejad’s nuclear ambitions, this chapter starts with an overview 
of Mohammad Khatami’s nuclear decisions, and how these were influenced by the 
discourses of Iranian national identity. 
 
The first and main step in analysing Iran’s nuclear policy during Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency is to analyse his nuclear ambitions and identify his perception of the 
nuclear programme based on the conceptions of Iranian identity. It is therefore of 
paramount importance to discursively examine the speeches and actions of the 
President, the Supreme Leader, the top clerics, and the general political elites who 
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were involved in nuclear decision making during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, that is, 
in terms of their national nuclear identity conceptions. As explained in chapter 5, 
according to the ideals of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the national government is 
defined through a framework of Islamic-Shia ideology and worldview. As Timothy 
Fitzgerald (2003) argues, ‘religion’ is an ideologically motivated social construction. 
For Fitzgerald, the conceptual boundaries of religion are intertwined with the 
boundaries of non-religious notions that distinguish the country’s modern culture and 
identity (Schilbrack 2012). The Islamic Republic and its ideals, principles and values 
determine one of the fundamentals of Iranian national identity. Thus, the identity of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran contains elements of Shia Islamic identity, Revolutionary 
ideology, and Persian nationalism. According to Mohammad Rahim Eyvazi (2008), 
all new political figures and administrative officials in the world change their foreign 
policy behaviour in the format of their country’s cultural and historical framework. 
Based on a fundamentalist discourse, geographical borders are to be replaced by 
ideological borders. As Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader points out, the 
principles of the Islamic Republic are inseparable from the identity and interests of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (Dehghani Firoozabadi and Radfar 2009). According to 
Ali Asghar Soltanieh (2015) in the interview for this thesis, Iran’s former Ambassador 
to the IAEA, during war imposed by Saddam Hussein, the important issue was to 
protect the nation’s international borders, in fact, to protect the sovereignty and 
integrity of the state. But in the case of its nuclear programme, Iran began showing 
some resistance and having a hard time, whilst Tehran worked hard not to make any 
compromises to its principles, “since they considered these are the borders of identity 
and dignity of Iran”. As argued by Ali Asghar Soltanieh11 (2015) in an interview for 
this research, this was a matter of ‘inalienable sovereign right for peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy’.   
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the hardline, fundamentalist president of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran from August 3, 2005, to August 3, 2013. Prior to his presidency, he 
served as the mayor of Tehran. His campaign focus was to outreach poor people by 
the motto ‘religious duty’ (Ahmadinejad 2005c). One important policy Ahmadinejad 
                                                




focused on while taking office was Iran’s nuclear policy. He pointed out that the 
‘arrogant powers’ (referring to P5+1 members), who dominated the United Nations 
Security Council were trying to put more pressure on Iran by imposing draconian 
sanctions; however, Tehran would just ignore these sanctions and for Iran, the dispute 
over the nuclear programme was now over, Ahmadinejad stating that there is no limit 
to research on nuclear technology in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
Additional Protocol (Alexander and Hoenig 2008).  
 
For the first time after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and post-Iran-Iraq war, Iran was 
experiencing growing political and diplomatic rapprochement with the West due to 
president Mohammad Khatami’s efforts. This was based on Khatami’s theory of 
‘Dialogue Among Civilisations’, which was presented to the United Nations General 
Assembly in 2001, known as the year of dialogue among cultures and civilisations 
(Khatami 2001). Khatami’s strategy was to reassure the West using diplomatic means 
that Iran’s nuclear programme was just for peaceful purposes and for that reason 
Tehran should act with patience and tolerance to eliminate the fears and concerns of 
those worrying about the risks of proliferation on behalf of Iran (Shoamanesh 2009). 
In February 2005, Khatami announced that no Iranian government would give up its 
nuclear technology activities. After the June 2005 elections and the election of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the stance of nuclear negotiations in the summer of 2005 
became more rigid. At this point, Iran removed the seals from its uranium enrichment 
equipment in Isfahan and said it had resumed uranium conversion at this plant, while 
in September 2005, Mohamed ElBaradei (2005), then the Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), confirmed the existence of uranium 
conversion at the Isfahan Plant. 
 
When Ahmadinejad entered office as Iran’s president, it soon became clear that his 
nuclear policy was going to be very different from his predecessor. Ahmadinejad 
chose the nuclear programme as one of his main policies and made it clear to the 
world that he was not going to step back and suspend any of the country’s uranium 
enrichment activities. He addressed president Khatami’s nuclear-negotiating team as 
traitors to the rights of the Iranian nation and puppets of the West for their leniency 
towards the West in nuclear talks (Rivera 2016). This was humiliating for Khatami’s 
team as their national and revolutionary values were ignored. Ahmadinejad made it 
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clear to the international community that indigenous uranium enrichment was an 
inalienable right of the Iranian nation. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
supported Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric on the nuclear programme because of its defiance 
to the West, a key component of Iran’s nuclear identity discourse (Khamenei 2016).   
The discourse of the Ahmadinejad administration on nuclear policy can be explained 
in terms of its confrontational legacy. In this pattern, changes happen mostly based on 
political actors’ interpretations and conceptions of the issues at hand. In 
Ahmadinejad’s case, these beliefs originated from the ideals of the Islamic Republic 
and led to resistance against Western powers (Salamati 2014). Ahmadinejad 
combined various themes and discourses of Iranian identity to explain his decisions, 
based on an anti-hegemonic approach that was combined with Shia identity and a 
sense of Iranian-ness (Persian identity) while asking for respect and recognition as an 
equal. 
 
Iranian leaders’ appetite for regaining regional power has grown, and they believe that 
the world powers, particularly the U.S. are unable to accept Iran’s rise (Choksy 2011). 
According to Choksy (2011). Not only memories of the victories experienced by the 
Persian Empire, but also Iran’s active engagement and interaction with its past 
through historical, political, social and religious references, make the Iranian nation a 
patriotic one. Like every Iranian leader, Ahmadinejad also had the vision of making 
Iran the dominant regional power. Mohammad Reza Shah went even further, with the 
ambition of raising Iran to the level of great world power, because for him being 
merely a regional power was not enough. However, the Shah was quite satisfied with 
the 1971 celebrations of Iran’s 2500 years of monarchy and did not aim to revive the 
glory of pre-Islamic Iran (Amuzegar 1991). Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei, has always held the vision of Iran as the hegemonic regional power, 
and able to compete with the great world powers (Friedman 2015). For Khamenei, 
Iran’s hegemony over the region is natural, and since his ruling over the country, he 
has always tried to further Iran’s regional influence, focusing on the shared interests 
and common enemies of Iran and the Muslim world while projecting Iran’s successes 
as achievements that bring honour and credit to all regional countries and the Muslim 
world (Sadjadpour 2008).  
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Iran’s response to the international community’s concern over its nuclear activities 
was based on the importance of technology for the country and the nation. The 
nuclear programme has long been a symbol of Iran’s self-sufficiency and 
independence from the West. As Itty Abraham (2006) puts it, while states are still 
dependent on others to modernise their technology, especially in the post-colonial era, 
a state’s true independence requires self-reliance and indigeneity. As Maaike Warnaar 
(2013, p. 92) discusses, “the self-reliant nature of Iran after the [1979] Revolution 
means it can defend its rights and dignity and resist outsiders.” Throughout the history 
of Iran’s nuclear programme, the country has been trying to master its nuclear 
enrichment capabilities based on developing an indigenous form of modern science 
and technology (Bowen and Moran 2014). Thus, nuclear engineering choices must be 
recognised as part of Iran’s struggle towards modernity. When nuclear technology 
becomes iconic or symbolic, it becomes a matter of national identity (Reardon 2012). 
 
Ahmadinejad escalated Iran’s nuclear activities and often inveighed against the West 
(Gladstone 2013). However, his argumentative approach towards the West aroused 
world opinion against Iran’s nuclear programme. The West, and especially the U.S. 
and its allies, came to believe that Tehran had secret military nuclear purposes given 
Ahmadinejad’s aggressive policy towards Israel and its resumption of uranium 
enrichment. Based on reports in the international media, Iran’s nuclear issue came to 
be associated with issues such as the coalition against international terrorism, 
neoconservatives in the George W. Bush administration (who were at the height of 
power in Washington) who launched a war with Iraq (Lind 2003), weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and peace in the Middle East. In such a serious situation, Iran's 
diplomatic apparatus entered one of the most critical periods in its history (Fallahi 
2007).  
 
The main argument of the thesis is about how the particular conceptions of Iranian 
identity were constructed in relation to the nuclear programme and how they affected 
that programme. Delving into the meaning of the words and expressions used by the 
Iranian elites demonstrates that they almost share similar views on the intentions of 
the nuclear programme – whether they are reformists or fundamentalists. However, 
according to Jason Jones (2011), Ahmadinejad’s vulgar and unthoughtful words 
enabled the international media and leaders to use his language against Iran. Before 
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delving into Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policy, it is necessary to look at the nuclear 
policies of Mohammad Khatami’s administration as these greatly impacted on 
Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies. 
6.2 Diplomacy and Reform: Khatami’s Nuclear Discourse 
Mohammad Khatami’s administration was responsible for the nuclear dossier in its 
initial stages. In this period, the administration aimed at advancing peaceful nuclear 
technology. On its way to advance its nuclear technology, Khatami’s administration 
faced several obstacles, especially the U.S.’s warfare strategy in Iraq (Zibakalam and 
Zamani 2017). To effectively deal with U.S. strategy and the possibility of an attack, 
Iran decided to suspend its nuclear activities for two years (Ibid). During the 
presidency of reformist, Mohammad Khatami, the Iranian-Islamic discourse of 
national identity was very well presented and welcomed. However, the rather harsh 
tone taken by the nuclear negotiators with their European counterparts led to a failure 
of negotiations with three European countries (EU-3), the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany (Farhi 2010). The failure of these negotiations led to more international 
sanctions being placed on Iran.  
 
Mohammad Khatami’s political strategy focused on ‘political deterrence’, and 
therefore, he presented his strategy by means of confidence-building and dialogue 
aimed at building up and improving Iranian identity (Mortazavian et al. 2013). In so 
doing, he emphasised the three elements of ‘Ezzat’ (dignity), ‘Hekmat’ (wisdom), and 
‘Maslahat’ (expediency) (Sadeghian and Mousavi 2017). Given the failure of 
negotiations with EU-3 to build confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear 
programme and avoid confrontation with the West, the Maslahat (expediency) 
argument on the temporary suspension of uranium enrichment began to seem 
unnecessary, even before the end of the Khatami administration (Sedā-ye Edālat 
Publication 2002). Conservative newspapers such as Kayhān, Resālat, and Jomhouri-e 
Eslāmi presented the indigenous nuclear programme as a national project, and while 
uranium enrichment-related activities were suspended in 2004, these papers called the 
suspension a heroic sacrifice (Farhi 2010). Like conservative newspapers, reformist 
papers such as Shargh and Iran also emphasised the nationalistic nature of the nuclear 
programme and blamed Europeans for not respecting Iran’s sovereign national rights 
(Ibid.). Scientific victories feature in nationalist beliefs. For example, once, 
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Gholamreza Aghazadeh, manager of AEOI, mentioned nobody believed Iran could 
develop an indigenous nuclear technology (Ibid.). The emergence of Mohammad 
Khatami in the political environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran came about 
because, as Eric Hooglund (1999, p. 59) puts it: 
 
“[The] Iranian government is one in which the political elite holds varying 
views on the cultural, economic, political, security, and social issues that have 
confronted Iran since the revolution.” 
 
This chapter and the next examine how decisions on the nuclear programme were 
impacted by the Iranian elite’s perception of Iranian national identity, in particular 
Khatami, Ahmadinejad and Rouhani. One can contend that for the Khatami 
administration, the determination to stand up for one’s independence in the face of the 
external other - [the West]- is a fundamental aspect of how Khatami came to perceive 
the nation (Holliday 2010). However, unlike the Islamic discourse that can be 
identified as an integral part of this understanding, Khatami championed the 
‘Dialogue among Civilisations’. In his ‘Dialogue Among Civilisations’, he captured 
international attention and directed it towards Iran with the aim of introducing the 
Iranian-Islamic identity of the nation (Khatami 2008a). In so doing, he also marked 
the peaceful nuclear programme of Iran as a core of this identity (Rezaei 2014). 
Khatami’s idea of Mardomsālāri, or democracy is within the framework of religious 
discourse or what he referred to as ‘religious democracy’ (Khatami 2008b). The 
perception of democracy or Mardomsālāri, like other perceptions of Iranian identity, 
is linked to Iran’s resistance to the West12. Hence, the concept of ‘Dialogue among 
Civilisations illustrates that the Iranian nation is perceived in terms of its civilisation - 
whether that is Iranian or Islamic (Holliday 2010). Islamic Shia history that also 
reinforces a deep sense of victimisation by Sunnis has a special place in Iranian 
officials’ beliefs. In a speech in 2004, Mohammad Khatami stressed Iran’s legitimate 
right to nuclear technology and called on Iranians to remember Imam Hossein (the 
third Shia Imam martyred in the 7th century CE) who taught Shia Muslims to 
safeguard their dignity and their freedom (Baktiari 2010). The role of Islam in this 
matter is that of a religion that immerses human beings with dignity and courage and 
                                                
12 Khatami, Mohammad. Speech at the Saint Joseph University of Beirut. 14 May 2003. 
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as a result, guides them on the path to scientific and technological advancement 
(IDHC 2010). Ayatollah Khamenei (2006a) claims that the scientific and 
technological progress in the Islamic Republic of Iran achieved under severe 
economic sanctions is attributed to Islam.   
 
As Farhad Rezaei (2014) puts it, capturing the interest of the international community 
with his ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’, the reformist Mohammad Khatami made it 
clear that the nuclear programme is a core marker in Islamic-Iranian discourses of 
identity. According to various government officials, for the Iranian government, 
developing a nuclear programme has never been a solution to the country’s security 
needs. Mohsen Aminzadeh, the deputy foreign minister during Khatami’s presidency, 
said if Iran wanted to build a nuclear bomb, then there was no need to sign any 
additional protocol, with all the transparency (Shana 2003). Iranian officials pitched 
the idea of the civilian use of nuclear energy on the basis of the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution’s mottos of independence and freedom, as this also embodies the idea of 
energy self-sufficiency (Farhi 2010).  
 
6.3 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Foreign Policy and Nuclear Diplomacy 
Iran’s official discourse on the nuclear issue under Ahmadinejad was inherently 
consistent among the government officials. Their narrative was that the Iranian 
regime is pursuing peaceful nuclear energy, which it is entitled to under the NPT. The 
same narrative asserted that the West was deliberately undermining Iran’s peaceful 
nuclear progress. However, the Iranian officials, particularly, President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad believed Iran could succeed in becoming a self-sufficient nuclear 
energy power, with or without help from other powers. The notion of national rights 
was at the centre of Ahmadinejad’s election campaign and a persistent theme in the 
media outlets and interviews that took place during the presidency of Iran’s former 
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad’s significant goal, thus, was to 
make the international community recognise Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to enrich 
uranium indigenously (Ahmadinejad 2010a). He discussed justice and the 
fundamental values of the Islamic Revolution, as well as strengthening the culture of 
religious management (Sabeti 2005). Ahmadinejad (2006b) also sent a letter to 
George W. Bush on 8 May 2006 and invited him to choose justice, which is common 
 135 
to all divine prophets. Hence, it is to Ahmadinejad’s speeches and policy actions that 
we turn in order to identify and evidence the relational systems of meaning that 
constructed his discourse of Iranian nuclear technology. Maintaining nuclear 
enrichment activities and the voluntary enforcement of the additional protocol, along 
with the temporary suspension of nuclear activities has been of paramount importance 
for Iran in its negotiations with EU-3. Iran’s aim was to show good faith to EU-3 
members so that they would recognise Iran’s national right to enrich uranium for 
peaceful purposes. But following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in June 2005, 
Tehran became convinced that the European powers and the U.S. did not agree with a 
temporary suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities and that they wanted Iran to stop all 
its nuclear enrichment activities permanently (Haji-Yousefi 2010). Hence, Tehran 
decided to change its nuclear policy orientation and resume its enrichment activities.  
6.3.1 National Rights and National Support 
For President Ahmadinejad’s government, the nuclear issue was the biggest challenge 
it inherited, a challenge that was very popular among the Iranian people and had 
broad support. Ahmadinejad’s administration kept encouraging the society to support 
the government and its defence of the country’s inalienable right to acquire nuclear 
technology. To gain the support of religious groups and clerics in Iran, as well as the 
support of certain sections of society often including influential bazaaris, the Iranian 
government adopted an Islamic policy and emphasised how this policy empowered 
Muslims (Bakhash 1989). In an interview I conducted with Mohammad Marandi13 
during the final talks for Iran’s nuclear deal in July 2015, he said, “even so, many 
Iranians opposed to the Islamic regime now support the development of a peaceful 
nuclear programme, seeing it as a symbol of pride and honour for Iran and Iranians all 
across the world (Marandi 2015).” Analysing Ahmadinejad’s speeches, one can see 
the impact of various discourses of Iranian national identity on his foreign policy 
(Persian nationalism, Shia Islamic identity, Revolutionary ideology, and modernity 
and technological advancement), and in particular, on his nuclear decisions.  
 
Ahmadinejad’s nuclear diplomacy was based on the full implementation of 
international regulations, equality of nations’ rights, compliance with the national 
will, continuing international cooperation within the framework of the International 
                                                
13 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 29 June 2015 
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), willingness to take action based on peaceful means, 
creating a fair environment for nuclear talks, and emphasis on the fact that Tehran 
would not retreat from its path of progress in achieving advanced peaceful nuclear 
technology (Gharibi 2008). Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policy was thus based on three 
main pillars: 
 
1. Excluding the monopoly of Iran’s nuclear dossier and negotiations from the 
prerogative of the three European countries (UK, France and Germany) and 
the West and therefore, turning to the East, including the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) countries in the negotiating processes. According to 
Ahmadinejad, Iran was not just defending its own nuclear rights, but the 
nuclear rights of all developing countries. Ahmadinejad’s belief was that 
Iran’s nuclear policy could become a single policy for all these countries. In so 
doing, the Ahmadinejad administration paved the way for relationships 
between Iran and countries that engaged the Non-Aligned Movement in terms 
of negotiations between Iran and EU-3 (Salamati 2014); 
 
2. Transferring the nuclear dossier from political channels to the legal framework 
of the IAEA based on the NPT and Additional Protocol; 
 
3. Being determined to keep the nuclear fuel cycle and resume nuclear activities 
that Iran had voluntarily suspended (Fallahi 2007). 
 
Ahmadinejad also stated that the nuclear programme was not an international crisis as 
portrayed by the West, but an example of the West’s hostility to Iran’s Islamic regime 
(Mousavian 2016). Ahmadinejad started talking about the Iranian nuclear programme 
in a nationalistic context. In Ahmadinejad’s speeches, one can always hear the phrase 
‘Iran’s undeniable right to nuclear technology’, and an insistence that the Iranian 
nation will not surrender to the West’s aggression and selfishness. One of 
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policies towards the nuclear issue was his confrontational 
approach towards the West, believing that taking a confrontational approach in 
nuclear diplomacy would lead to the inalienable rights of the Iranian nation in 
acquiring peaceful nuclear technology being recognised (Eyvazi 2008). In September 
2005, in a speech to the United Nations asserting Iran’s commitment to transferring 
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its nuclear know-how to other Muslim countries, the new Iranian President, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad also suggested that an international consortium could manage Iran’s 
uranium enrichment, with Iran sharing ownership with other countries. But the EU 
and the United States rejected this offer immediately (Oborne 2013). Following this 
rejection, the president stated the problem to be the U.S. seeking regime change in 
Iran, with the nuclear issue merely an excuse for American military intervention in 
Iran (Takeyh 2006). In their struggle and effort to gain their rights based on 
international law, the Islamic Republic leaders resisted being bullied by the West 
(Sahimi 2015). Addressing the Western powers as the ‘forces of darkness’ 
Ahmadinejad stated that no power would ever dare attack Iran for Iranian forces 
would be ready to oppose them (Ahmadinejad 2009a). In a speech in Bojnourd, the 
capital city of Khorasan Shomali (Northern Khorasan) province in August 2006, 
Ahmadinejad addressed the West, saying that, today, it is the Iranian people who own 
the country’s nuclear technology. Those who want to negotiate with the Iranian 
people should know to which nation they are talking. If some believe they can keep 
talking to the Iranian nation using the language of threat and intimidation, they need 
to know that they are making a bitter mistake. Referring to the nuclear programme as 
a national project for the glory of Iran and Iranians, Ahmadinejad expressed that the 
West would soon realise that they are facing a vigilant, proud people (Ahmadinejad 
2006c). 
6.3.2 Shia Islam and Islamic Revolutionary Ideology 
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy principles included the application of the notion of 
nationalism, his passion for the Twelfth Imam (Mahdaviat),14 denial of the Holocaust, 
and unquestioning obedience of velāyat-e faqih 15  (Kisacik 2012). Ahmadinejad 
introduced a new element into the religious discourse of Iranian identity when, in 
September 2005, he concluded his United Nations’ General Assembly speech with a 
prayer seeking the hasty re-appearance of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi, the 12th Imam 
of Shia Muslims (Coughlin 2007). Upon his return to Tehran, he talked to Ayatollah 
Javadi Amoli about a divine halo surrounding him during his speech (Ahmadinejad’s 
Divine Halo 2005). Given the remarkable domestic and global influence of political 
                                                
14 Mahdaviat or Mahdiism is a religious Shia term referring to a ‘belief in the Mahdi, the 12th Imam.’ 
15 Velāyat-e Faqih, which forms the central axis of contemporary Shia political thought, advocates a 
guardianship-based political system reliant on a just and capable jurist (faqih) to assume leadership of 
the government in the absence of an infallible Imam (Mahdi, the 12th Imam). 
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speeches, it is crucial to interpreting the ideological traits and aggressive tone typical 
of President Ahmadinejad and the way he incorporated this into his political discourse 
(Dehghani Firoozabadi and Zabiji 2012). In addition to Iranian/Persian nationalism, 
Shia Islam and Islamic Revolutionary ideologies also played a fundamental role in 
Ahmadinejad’s speeches on nuclear policies and Iranian regional relations (Maloney 
2002). In other words, Ahmadinejad came to power and operated within an 
intersubjective framework, which was the ‘condition of possibility’ for 
Ahmadinejad’s specific discourse. 
 
Ahmadinejad, like his predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, sought public recognition 
and legitimisation for making progress with Iran’s nuclear activities. He reflected the 
national consensus in support of the programme and claimed enriching uranium for 
peaceful purposes to be an inalienable right of the Iranian nation (Linzer 2005). In this 
regard, Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies combined Iranian/Persian nationalism with a 
religious worldview (Ansari 2007a). The importance of religious discourse for Iran’s 
nuclear programme was based on a nuclear fatwā 16 issued on June 3, 2008, by the 
Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who declared the production, 
stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons prohibited by Islam. Thus, the emergent 
religious discourse emphasised the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme. Both 
Ahmadinejad and Rouhani referred to the Supreme Leader’s fatwā while addressing 
the peaceful essence of Iran’s nuclear programme and Rouhani once declared that for 
him the fatwā is more valuable than the NPT (Tabatabai 2014). American and 
European officials however, remained sceptical of the good intentions of the fatwā 
and instead, interpreted Iran’s nuclear motivations based on the report released by the 
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and focusing on clandestine nuclear 
sites; although Western intelligence could never confirm that Iran did have a covert 
weapons’ programme (Porter 2014b). Once Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic 
Energy Organisation of Iran and former Foreign Minister, asked Khamenei to allow 
for bilateral negotiations with the U.S. over the nuclear issue, Khamenei said 
Americans could not be trusted as they have never shown goodwill to Iranians; 
however, we will give them this opportunity to announce to our people that we tried 
                                                
16 Fatwā is a religious edict, which, in Shia jurisprudence, is traditionally issued by a mujtahid – a 
Muslim jurist who is qualified to interpret the Sharia law and answer religious questions. 
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every opportunity for the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue within the 
framework of dignity, wisdom and expediency of our nation and regime. Thus, we 
will not let them justify their bad intentions (Alef 2014). 
 
Using these references during his provincial trips and also at international arenas, 
President Ahmadinejad’s motivation could have been to make Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions more appealing to his audience, both domestically and internationally 
(Lake 2011). For years, Iranian officials argued that the nuclear programme was the 
most important national asset since the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1951. In 
Ahmadinejad’s speeches as well as his acts, there appear a remarkable number of 
references to Iranian identity, with the Ahmadinejad administration believing that 
even merely halting the nuclear programme came as a challenge to the legitimacy of 
the state. As a principalist (Osulgarā), Ahmadinejad aimed at returning to the values 
of the Islamic Revolution adopted by its founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini (Takeyh and Maloney 2011).  
 
Ahmadinejad was always looking for opportunities to engage with people all around 
the world, including the American president, press, and people. The themes of 
‘Iranian nation’, ‘the right of our nation’ and ‘justice’ were repeated in his speeches. 
With his statements, President Ahmadinejad laid the foundation for a new chapter in 
Iran’s nuclear identity discourse. This would display the significance of discourse 
analysis of speeches in understanding the leader’s conceptions of identity reinforced 
by actions and discourse. Another important point in Ahmadinejad’s speeches was his 
repeated Quranic referencing. He used these references either in the religious 
discourse on the Iranian nuclear programme, or political discourse. Mohebat 
Ahdiyyih (2008) argues that Ahmadinejad’s using verses from the Quran and 
referring to the Mahdi (the 12th Shia Imam) is not a tactic; but it is very serious and he 
has had the support from Shia clerics such as Ahmad Jannati, chairman of the 
Guardian Council of Iran. The key in using Quranic verses by Iranian leaders, 
particularly Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is their reference to 
the umma (nation), which means Iranian leaders consider the interests of all Muslims 
in their foreign policy (Akbarzadeh and Barry 2016). This demonstrates the 
importance of religious discourse and identity in Iran’s politics and how the leaders 
perceive the country’s policies, including the nuclear programme, as religious in 
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nature and not simply as benign. Ahmadinejad’s aim was to revive the pure Islamic 
origins of the regime and resist Western oppression.  
6.3.3 Persian Identity 
Although Ahmadinejad is well known for his bitter religious rhetoric, he was also 
able to synthesise ‘Iranian-ness with his brand of Islam’, and treat the Iranian nation 
by portraying them as a “chosen people” (Ansari 2007a, p. 44). Thus, the fierce 
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has evoked Iranian nationalism, strongly 
reminiscent of pre-Islamic Persia (Jalili 2014). He began stressing nationalistic 
Iranian themes that became controversial to the fundamentalist and conservative 
faction. Ahmadinejad’s administration initiated the ‘Maktab-e-Iran’ (the Iranian 
School), an approach once led by Ahmadinejad's controversial chief of staff, 
Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei (Tait 2010). Both Ahmadinejad and Mashaei believed that 
the Iranian School of thought is a compilation of three discourses of Mahdaviat, 
nationalism and Shiism (Rahim Mashaei 2010). While Mashaei angered Iranian 
hardliners with his conciliatory statements about the Iranian school of thought, 
Ahmadinejad supported and defended him: 
 
I also said that Iran is a school of thought, a transcendent culture beyond 
geography and race, and I have confidence in Mr. Rahim Mashaei 
(Ahmadinejad 2010b). 
 
Ahmadinejad’s concept of Iranian or Persian nationalism is different from that 
understood by supporters of pre-Islamic nationalists who oppose Islam as a forced 
religion imposed upon them by Arabs. Ahmadinejad put forth beliefs in an Iranian 
Islam, which is a combination of all conceptions of Iranian identity. Ahmadinejad’s 
references to religious discourse were based on his loyalty and belief in the Islamic 
Revolution and the principles of the revolutionary Islamic regime in Iran. For 
example, he believed in strengthening the guardianship of the jurist (velāyat-e faqih) 
as the most authentic and legitimate spirit of the Islamic Revolution (Arjomand 2010). 
Shahram Akbarzadeh and James Barry (2016) argue that the dominant historical view 
in Iran regards the Iranian nation as heirs of an ancient culture and civilisation that,  
predates Islam, has contributed to the spread of Islamic civilisation. For Iranians, the 
two conceptions of their identity (Persian and Islamic) may be interlinked, but as 
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Brenton Clark (2012) argues, they are not identical or considered the same by the 
nation. For example, during Ahmadinejad’s administration, some scholars argued: 
“Iran was moving away from its Islamic values to revive dormant ‘Persian’ 
nationalism” (Ibid. p.76). When Iranian officials, including Ahmadinejad, emphasise 
Persian identity, it does include all Iranians regardless of their identity and religion 
(Abdolmohammadi 2015). 
 
During the second period of his presidency, Ahmadinejad focused even more on the 
Iranian nation’s sovereign right to nuclear technology, emphasising his concern about 
Western conspiracy and the efforts of the West to create a soft revolution that would 
overthrow the Islamic regime in Iran. In this case, he brought the Iranian people 
inside and outside of the country into a nationalistic spectrum, while presenting the 
nuclear programme as part of Iran’s historical aspirations to find its rightful place 
within the global nuclear order (Farhi 2009). In his shift towards the pre-Islamic 
values of Iranian society, Ahmadinejad made reference to nationalist Persian icons, 
celebrating, for example, Cyrus the Great and Ferdowsi17 (Abdolmohammadi 2015). 
In 2010, the Ahmadinejad administration expounded on the “Iranian doctrine” (Zia-
Ebrahimi, 2016, p. 212) and invoked an ephemeral passage of the Cyrus Cylinder18 in 
Tehran, thus establishing Iran’s pre-Islamic passion for human rights. This can be 
analysed by the social constructivist assumption that the structure of international 
politics is defined by both material and normative elements, with the latter pertaining 
to ideas, norms and rules that are socially and culturally produced (Jackson et al. 
2005). Such an international normative structure or environment also shapes the 
identities and interests of states, which are the agents that through their practices and 
interactions re-create that very structure; and essentially, agents and structures are 
mutually constitutive (Wendt 1987a). Ahmadinejad thus asserted that there was a 
strong link between the Iranian and Islamic identity of Iranian people in terms of 
caring about civilisation and the rights of human beings. Although many Iranians 
converted to Islam, they also embraced a multifaceted identity, with a sense of 
national identity remaining for Iranians in their continued celebration of traditional 
                                                
17 Ferdowsi is the legendary Iranian poet who remains a hero among Iranian nationalists for his life-
long dedication and personal sacrifices to preserve the national identity, language and heritage of his 
homeland. Although his efforts caused him great hardship during his lifetime, he has always been 
honoured for producing one of the greatest poetic masterpieces of all time: the Shāhnāmeh. 
18 The Cylinder belonged to Cyrus the Great, the sixth century B.C. Persian king and founder of the 
Persian Empire. The Cyrus Cylinder has been called ‘the first declaration of human rights.’ 
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Iranian holidays like Norouz, the Persian New Year, as well as their religious 
traditions (Coats and Robb 2008).  
 
In their rhetoric, Ahmadinejad and his circle highlighted nationalism as a concept 
rooted in Iranian history, especially in the context of the nuclear programme, and 
pointed out its importance to the Iranian identity, along with the Shiite identity and 
Islamic identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under Ahmadinejad's administration, 
one could see and hear Ferdowsi's poetry in government-sponsored media promoting 
the country's nuclear programme (Tabatabai 2014). As a country with nuclear 
technology, the Ahmadinejad administration was of the opinion that Iran would meet 
its own energy demands. The scientific and technological outcome of the nuclear 
programme has meant it becoming nationally regarded as a symbol of modern Iran, 
with Iranian officials and almost the majority of Iranian people thinking that their 
nation will regain its ancient honour and glory (Kisacik 2012).  
6.3.4 Technological Advancement 
Ahmadinejad believed if a country backs down even one step from its undeniable 
rights, that country is a loser. In his televised speech on March 13, 2006 
(Ahmadinejad 2005d, p. 8), he said from a position of strength that “Iran would not 
surrender to the West’s threats and rejects their demands for giving up the Iranian 
nation’s right to have peaceful nuclear technology.” In his September 19, 2005 UN 
General Assembly speech, he asserted: “Those hegemonic powers, who consider 
scientific and technological progress of independent and free nations as a challenge to 
their monopoly on these important instruments of power and who do not want to see 
such achievements in other countries, have misrepresented Iran's healthy and fully 
safeguarded technological endeavors in the nuclear field as pursuit of nuclear 
weapons (Ibid.).” In his speech for Iran’s ambassadors and head of missions abroad in 
2007, President Ahmadinejad announced, “all free nations and justice-seeking people 
from the oppressed countries, including the Iranian nation are now cooperating to 
resist against the oppressive system and thought of the West, in particular the U.S. 
and its allies” (Statement by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 2007). Western powers then 
toughened their economic sanctions and put pressure on isolating Iran in order to deny 
Tehran the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. Ahmadinejad stated that the 
West should stop bullying Iran and emphasised that imposing economic sanctions 
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over Iran’s nuclear programme only had a psychological effect on society, rather than 
an economic one (Fallahi 2017). The Supreme Leader also undermined the impact of 
economic sanctions and called them useless by proclaiming that under sanctions, Iran 
already acquired nuclear energy and that Iranian scientists had made great progress in 
uranium enrichment. He stated that sanctions are able to work to Iran’s advantage in 
certain circumstances as they can strengthen Tehran’s ambitions (Borszik 2014). 
Hence, not only did the sanctions not stop Iran’s nuclear activities, but they 
strengthened their policy of resistance against being bullied by the West (Sahimi 
2015). Ahmadinejad stated although the West seemed to be waiting for Tehran to 
retreat from its nuclear activities, Iran would not proceed with talks with anyone 
about the inalienable right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium indigenously 
(Moshirzadeh 2007). He was determined that the Iranian nation would stand by their 
leader against the arrogant Western powers and act with awareness and faith.  
 
As laid out in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as in public 
declarations, and actions of Iranian leaders and influential officials, the ultimate aim 
of Islamic revolutionary ideology is the “the rejection of arrogant and hegemonic 
discourses and establishment of a new fair international system” (Mohammad Nia 
2012, p. 43). On 7 October 2009, Ahmadinejad stated that the Iranian nation had 
resisted the pressures applied to their nuclear programme and now the time had come 
for taking advantage of this resistance. In other words, about a quarter of a century of 
economic deprivation for Iran propelled Iran’s nuclear programme based on 
independence and brought about an indigenous local nuclear programme for Iranians 
(Salamati 2014). Noting that national identity and pride in one’s nation are the 
foundations of independence, Khamenei addressed Tehran’s resistance to the West as 
the nation’s response to its oppressors through national identity, grandeur, and 
resistance against being bullied (Khamenei 2008b). It appeared that the emphasis of 
Khamenei and Ahmadinejad was on no longer tolerating or allowing any foreign 
intervention in its domestic politics. It looks like that Ahmadinejad had similar 
solutions to the world’s problems as those of Khamenei’s (Secor 2010). 
Ahmadinejad’s (2005a) focus, however, is not on Islam as a whole, but on a revival of 
justice, which according to him is not just limited to the Muslim world. According to 
Mohsen Milani (1994, p. 180), “Ahmadinejad reached out to developing countries in 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa by emphasising their shared identity not just as 
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victims of arrogant powers, but also as the cradles of culture, civilisation, and of great 
thinkers and prophets”. He described Asia, Africa, Latin American, and the Middle 
East as the regions that have been direct targets of the arrogant powers and 
emphasised the ability of the people of these regions to resist the oppressors who 
show no consideration and respect for their identity, culture, dignity, honour, and 
morality (Moaddel 1993). Governments that want to stop Iran’s nuclear programme 
have only one goal when interfering in Iran’s domestic politics and imposing their 
will on the Iranian nation. For Ahmadinejad, the nuclear issue was the manifestation 
of the will of the Iranian nation and indeed the war of wills (Ahmadinejad 2009, p. 
50). Some officials claimed that the regime’s red line was ‘UN resolution’. So, if the 
West wanted to adopt a resolution against Iran, then Iran should suspend its uranium 
enrichment activities. For some other officials, the regime’s redline was defending the 
nation’s identity by standing up for their inalienable rights, such as their right for 
peaceful nuclear energy (Firouzabadi 2015). Ahmadinejad also believed that “the 
regime’s red line is the Iranian nation’s dignity and further appeasement of Iran would 
be irreparable” (Ahmadinejad 2009, p. 51). In his speech to the people of Hamedan in 
2010, Ahmadinejad stated that Western powers consider other nations, their dignity 
and identity as their own property and thus, do not respect the dignity and identity of 
other nations. His belief was that Western powers were still behaving as if other 
nations were their colonies (Ahmadinejad 2010).   
6.3.5 The Policy of Resistance Against the West 
Showing defiance or resistance towards Western powers have long been part of Iran’s 
political culture and a sign of pride for Iranians, showing the world that they do not 
have to bend in the face of coercion (Guldimann 2007). Neil Macfarquhar (2005) 
from The New York Times interviewed a selection of Iranians from different classes 
and positions on Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology or nuclear weapons. He 
pointed out that the Iranian nation, from nuclear negotiators to academics, bazaaris, 
clerics, and students all agree that Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology 
is a matter of pride, while they all showed opposition to developing nuclear weapons. 
For example, a seminary student in Iran explained the importance of nuclear 
technology to Macfarquhar through a quote from Imam Ali, first Imam of Shia 
Muslims: “They can offer me everything from the earth and heaven, but in exchange 
if they want me to so much as take the food from an ant’s mouth that is its right to eat, 
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I won’t do it- on that basis- achieving the peaceful use of (nuclear) technology is 
really a matter of pride (for the Iranian nation) and will not stop for anything” 
(Macfarquhar 2005, p. 1). Thus, since taking office, Ahmadinejad also took over the 
conduct of Iran’s nuclear policy, presenting himself as an advocate of the nuclear 
programme; for him, Iran’s nuclear programme was a test case for the country’s 
independence and self-determination (Warnaar 2013, p. 139).  
 
Ahmadinejad emphasised Iran’s inalienable right to develop nuclear technology under 
the NPT. Much of Ahmadinejad’s discourse was a direct response to the world 
powers that were accusing Iran of noncompliance. To counter these accusations, 
Ahmadinejad was emphasizing that Iran’s nuclear programme is solely for peaceful 
purposes and was insisting on Iran’s rights under the NPT that says members who are 
committed to their obligations have the right to nuclear development, and Iran is not 
an exception to this (Ahmadinejad 2017a). Therefore, in an interview with CNN 
Ahmadinejad emphasised that Iran had the right to pursue the full nuclear cycle 
(Ahmadinejad 2005e). The nuclear issue for Ahmadinejad, like other Iranian leaders 
was an important notion of national pride, one that could easily bring about national 
honour and international prestige. However, Ahmadinejad’s defiance and 
confrontational manner hardened Iran’s relations with the international community 
(Naji 2007).   
 
One reason Tehran is so committed to its nuclear programme, according to Max 
Fisher (2015), is that uranium enrichment has symbolic significance for Iran. Fisher 
argues that for many centuries Iran has been at the centre of cultural, scientific, 
economic, religious and political thought, but that Western interference in Iran’s 
domestic affairs took away such a central position (Ibid.). The nuclear programme is a 
way for Tehran to show its resistance to the West and prevent them from controlling 
Iran’s affairs. It strengthens the revolutionary concepts of independence, freedom and 
self-reliance. Another reason is that the nuclear programme has become an issue of 
paramount importance in Iranian domestic politics. As Shahram Chubin (2010b) 
argues, the nuclear programme initially had broad popular support because of its 
promise of energy independence and scientific progress. For Ahmadinejad, Iran’s 
scientific development despite the efforts of hegemonic powers is of paramount 
importance. Resistance against arrogant powers for Ahmadinejad means defending 
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Iran’s inalienable rights in the international sphere, including its right to develop a 
peaceful nuclear technology as well as standing against injustice (Warnaar 2013).  
 
During a visit to the Province of Zanjan in 2006, President Ahmadinejad said that 
nuclear energy is a national demand. Emphasising the importance of the Iranian 
nation in achieving peaceful nuclear technology, he claimed that it could change the 
world equation. He added that Iran has the capacity to become a superpower if the 
Iranian nation believes it (Leopold 2006). On another provincial trip, Ahmadinejad 
stated that with trust in God and loyalty to the Supreme Leader, the Iranian nation was 
standing to conquer the highest peaks of science and technology and would not be 
retreating from its nuclear technology (Ahmadinejad 2014). In May 2008, Khamenei 
pointed out that no threat would hold the Iranian nation back from its right to enrich 
uranium for useful purposes (my italics). Later, in July 2008, Ahmadinejad also 
declared that Iran would not withdraw even one iota of its nuclear programme 
(Reardon 2012).  
 
On 9 April 2006, President Ahmadinejad announced Iran's indigenous uranium 
enrichment technology and the launch of a full enrichment chain at the Natanz plant. 
This day was marked as The National Day of Nuclear Technology (Mousavi and 
Zahedin Labbaf 2009). For Iranian leaders, this day became a golden day in the 
history of the Islamic Republic, showing not only the empowerment and diligence of 
Iranian scientists but also proof that the Islamic Republic had reached a stage of self-
reliance whereby no world power could withstand or threaten Iranians’ national will 
(Salamati 2014). On the first anniversary of indigenous uranium enrichment in Iran, 
April 9, 2007, Ahmadinejad gave a speech at the Natanz nuclear facility, stating 
Iran’s capability for enriching uranium on an industrial scale and proudly pointed out 
that Iran had entered the cohort of countries producing industrial nuclear fuel. While 
he repeated his belief that enriching uranium is a non-negotiable right of the Iranian 
nation, he also pointed out that Iran’s nuclear path had now become irreversible 
(Hitchcock 2009). In his speeches, Ahmadinejad always referred to Iran’s nuclear 
programme as encompassing the nuclear rights of the Iranian nation. In another 
speech in the city of Qazvin, he stated that Iran would only negotiate in equal and 
respectful conditions and without any prerequisites. However, he added that the 
Iranian nation would not negotiate over their basic rights (Ahmadinejad, 2010).  
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Decisions on the orientation of the nuclear programme are not presidents’ decisions. 
The Supreme Leader makes these decisions (Raji 2013). However, although the 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had the final say on all crucial domestic 
and foreign policy decisions, including nuclear policy, the president’s discourse does 
play a vital role in Iran’s foreign relations.  Some believe that most of the elites within 
Ahmadinejad’s administration did not have enough knowledge of diplomacy and 
foreign policy (Roshandel and Cook 2009). The new negotiating team during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency chose a path to resolve the nuclear issue that meant 
confrontation with the international community (Rouhani 2013). For example, I 
interviewed Stephan Klement19 (2015) - who joined the nuclear negotiations with Iran 
as soon as the EU was associated in Autumn 2004 and was part of the negotiations 
from 2004 to 2015 when the parties signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA)20 – he said, “I became convinced that Ahmadinejad’s nuclear negotiating 
team was taking a very ideological and dogmatic perspective. He argued that “under 
Ahmadinejad, Iran’s nuclear negotiating team had a very confrontational manner, 
which was not diplomatic, and that and during negotiations it was obvious to him that 
they did not want to make progress (Ibid.).”  
 
Ahmadinejad’s confrontational approach jeopardised Iran’s negotiating leverage to a 
great extent (Entessar 2009). He once stated in a gathering of Muslim clerics that 
Iran’s nuclear programme was like a train without brakes or a reverse gear. In 
response, the then U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, expressed that Iran 
needed a stop button and should suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities for 
further negotiations (Karimi 2007). In a 2011 annual visit to speak at the UN General 
Assembly, Ahmadinejad indicated Tehran’s intention to reduce the intensity of 
confrontation with P5+1, offering to stop producing 20% enriched uranium. However, 
the confrontational and inflammatory arguments of Ahmadinejad and his negotiating 
team caused the West to not take his offer seriously. According to a State Department 
spokesperson, “Ahmadinejad makes a lot of empty promises. He knows exactly what 
has to happen. If Iran has a serious proposal to put forward, it has to put it forward to 
                                                
19 Semi-structured phone interview, 2 September 2015   
20 JCPOA: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - an international agreement on the nuclear programme 
of Iran signed in Vienna on 14 July 2015, and between Iran, P5+1 (the five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council - China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States - plus 
Germany), and the European Union. 
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the IAEA” (Kang 2013, p. 70). In his report on Iran’s nuclear programme, Yukiya 
Amano, the IAEA Director General, showed his concern about the possible military 
dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear activities (IAEA 2011). Ahmadinejad’s reaction 
to this report was that the IAEA supported the U.S. and other Western countries. He 
thus stated that the enemies of Iran should know they would never succeed over Iran, 
while they possess nuclear weapons; they accuse Iran of building nuclear bombs. 
However, he emphasised that Iranians could build nuclear bombs if it wanted to, but 
did not need nuclear weapons. According to Ahmadinejad’s statement, the Iranian 
people act based on a rich culture, logic, morality and seeking of justice (Salamati 
2014).  
 
According to the IAEA’s report, since 2009, there have no credible indications of 
activities regarding the development of explosive devices in Iran (Amano 2015). The 
argument has, however, been on the importance and accuracy of Khamenei’s nuclear 
fatwā. The critics’ claim is that if the fatwā forbids the production, stockpiling, or use 
of nuclear weapons under Islam, why did Iran continue some activities including the 
computer modelling of a nuclear explosive device (Goodenough 2015)? Complexity 
is a theme intertwined with Ahmadinejad’s policies. They constitute a combination of 
themes such as religious values, modernity, resistance, national rights, justice, and 
respect. For example, in his 2006 UN speech, Ahmadinejad said, “Today, humanity 
passionately craves commitment to the truth, devotion to God, quest for justice and 
respect for the dignity of human beings” (Ahmadinejad 2006). 
6.3.6 The Policy of Looking to the East 
Ahmadinejad decided that his administration would prefer to be creating alliances and 
forming new relations across the globe. Proceeding with the policy of ‘look to the 
East’, the Ahmadinejad government aimed at getting closer to and cooperating with 
countries that are not among the U.S. allies (Arghavani Pirsalami 2016). So, instead 
of demanding the EU-3 fulfill their obligations in order to accept Iran’s resumption of 
its uranium enrichment, Larijani (2007) argued that continuing negotiations with the 
EU-3 was not useful. Thus, he thought it is important to negotiate with Eastern 
countries (Russia, China, and non-aligned member states) to reach a better and 
quicker resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue (Rouhani 2013b). This was based on 
Iran’s outreach to the East instead of the West and focused on opposition to Western 
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political values in the region. The discourse of Revolutionary ideology, which 
requires independence from foreign influence, is popular among non-aligned states 
(Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2010). Iran has thus tried to champion this cause and 
galvanise influential states within the Movement in a bid to gain their support for its 
Revolutionary ideology and make them value the discourse of Islamic identity. With 
the policy of ‘Looking to the East’, Larijani stated that Iran preferred to increase the 
number of negotiating countries and continue nuclear talks with the European 
countries and the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) within the 
framework of the NPT. However, this was not successful and EU-3 stopped 
negotiations when they did not receive any constructive results from negotiating with 
Russia, China and the NAM member states (Ibid.).  
 
Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Expediency Council at the time and one of the 
candidates for the 10th presidential elections, proposed that like the European 
countries that formed the EU, countries in Asia and the Middle East should form an 
alliance to serve the interests of every country in the region. Considering that the 
nuclear programme is considered a national endeavour, transcending the various 
administrations, Mohsen Rezaei proposed there could be a joint uranium enrichment 
project on Iranian soil with the U.S., the Europe, and Russia (Donyā-ye-Eghtesād 
2015). In an interview for this thesis, Reza Marashi 21  (2015) stated that “the 
Ahmadinejad administration’s worldview believed that Iran did not need to interact 
with the West, economically or socially and instead, could turn to the East, which 
would enable them to survive.” However, Marashi believes that “their worldview has 
been not only proven to be incorrect, but a dangerous and miserable failure (Ibid.).”  
6.4 The Impact of U.S.’s Iran Policies on Ahmadinejad’s Nuclear Narratives 
Iran’s nuclear policy underwent important changes and became bolder following 
Ahmadinejad’s decision to pursue the nuclear programme full speed irrespective of 
the international community’s concerns and pressures. Ahmadinejad’s administration 
believed developing a peaceful nuclear programme was Iran’s inalienable and 
legitimate right as a member of the NPT. Iranian leaders have always stated that 
Iran’s nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, including economic and energy 
prosperity (Vaez and Sadjadpour 2013). This persistence of Iranian officials in 
                                                
21 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 6 July 2015   
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referring Iran’s rights under the NPT suggests that Iran’s insistence on indigenous 
uranium enrichment is mostly a matter of ideals and integrity; as Maaike Warnaar 
(2013) argues,  Iran’s desire to develop a nuclear programme is not just based on its 
needs, but also to be recognised by world powers and under international law. Mike 
Wallace interviewed President Ahmadinejad for his programme ‘60 minutes’; he 
asked whether or not he believed President Bush who vowed not to allow Iran to 
develop nuclear weapons. In response, Ahmadinejad said that Iran is not looking for 
nuclear weapons, the problem is that President Bush wants to solve every issue with 
bombs; in Ahmadinejad’s opinion, the time of the bomb seemed to be over and in the 
past, whilst today is the era of constructive thoughts, dialogue among nations, and 
cultural exchange (CBS News 2006). 
 
George Bush’s Iran policy was based on his firm belief in Iran being a sponsor of 
terrorism and impeding peace and stability in the Middle East. He was also worried 
that Iran was only a short step away from building nuclear weapons. Therefore, in his 
State of the Union Address in 2002, Bush described Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the 
‘axis of evil’ (Bush 2002). However, the result of categorising Iran in the ‘axis of 
evil’, which was meant to strengthen the position of conservative nationalists in Iran, 
led to the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardline president in July 2005 
(Dunn 2007). While the U.S. and its allies were time and time again able to express 
their concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, 
Ahmadinejad wrote a letter to George W. Bush to discuss the undeniable 
contradictions in the international arena, including the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and 
the bloodshed of innocents, or the failure of Western liberal democracy to meet the 
needs of humanity (Ahmadinejad 2006b). Ahmadinejad’s letter to George Bush did 
not receive a direct reply from the White House, but according to the Kayhān 
newspaper, it was a symbol of Iran’s desire to restore peace in the region and a 
message to the U.S. that the complex issues in the region could not be resolved 
without the presence of such a powerful and influential country like Iran (Kayhan 
News 2006). One of the interesting aspects of Ahmadinejad’s letter to Bush, which 
was written on the verge of nuclear talks between foreign ministers of Iran and EU-3, 
was that he urged the American leader to return to the ‘religious principles’ of the 
government (Hauser 2006). Instances such as this letter and Ahmadinejad’s use of 
religion to lecture Bush was used to fostering a belief in Ahmadinejad’s faith in the 
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constructive role of ideologies. The letter has subsequently been of paramount 
importance for American officials in demonstrating the mindset of Iranian elites 
(Slackman 2006). 
 
The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists has also been a rallying point for the 
nuclear programme in Iran and promoted as a clear foreign intervention in the 
inalienable right of the Iranian nation. Iran’s nuclear martyrs are symbolised as 
evidence of Iran’s innocence and oppression. According to Khamenei (2012), these 
have been those scientists with common features and objectives, who worked 
harmoniously to keep the nuclear cycle alive. The Iranian Supreme Leader believes 
that the U.S. and Israel assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists in order to stop the 
country’s scientific movement, thus preventing the Iranian nation from the 
technological and scientific advancement that happened as a result of the blessing of 
Islam and the Islamic Revolution (Khamenei 2012). For years, the term Iran's ‘nuclear 
martyrs’ has become a rallying point for the country's nuclear programme and its right 
to uranium enrichment, regardless of the high cost of sanctions. When Majid 
Shahriari, an Iranian nuclear scientist, was targeted and killed by men on motorbikes 
who attached bombs to the windows of his car, President Ahmadinejad accused the 
West and Israel of his assassination (BBC News 2010). Manouchehr Mottaki, who 
was Iran's foreign minister at the time, also accused the UN Security Council of 
killing and injuring Iranian nuclear scientists. Shahriari was one of the nuclear 
scientists included on a UN Security Council sanctions list. Mottaki claimed that 
adopting UN resolutions against Iranian nuclear scientists had led terrorist groups to 
carry out these assassinations (Borger 2010b). On June 2013 and before the 
presidential elections in Iran, Ali Bagheri and Mahmoud Vaezi, Jalili and Rouhani’s 
representatives, respectively, attended a debate over the function of both negotiating 
teams. Vaezi criticised Ahmadinejad and Jalili’s diplomatic behaviour during the 
nuclear negotiations, believing their foreign policy not only caused the country’s 
economy to experience its steepest decline but that it could not resolve the nuclear 
issue with P5+1. Comparing the Ahmadinejad administration’s nuclear-negotiating 
process with the time when Rouhani was the chief negotiator, Vaezi expressed how 
dynamic the Rouhani’s nuclear-negotiating team was (Shargh Daily 2013a).  
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For the purpose of satisfying Iran’s national pride and also examining the possibilities 
for exiting from a nuclear stalemate, Ahmadinejad repeatedly asserted that Iran was 
already a ‘nuclear state’. Rouhani, on the contrary, had different motives compared to 
his predecessor. Rouhani and his charismatic foreign minister, Javad Zarif, decisively 
worked toward reaching the nuclear deal for ending the nuclear impasse by seeking to 
stabilise the country's economy, that is, by removal of sanctions and expansion of 
Tehran’s diplomatic horizons, regardless of the final result of the nuclear negotiations 
(Maloney 2014). However, this does not mean they would have accepted any deal just 
to improve the economic situation in Iran. In a speech celebrating his victory in the 
presidential elections, Rouhani claimed that centrifuges must spin, but so must the 
engines of industry and the economy (Rouhani 2015a); thus, we can find signs of the 
importance of people’s livelihoods as well as the importance of technological 
advancement to be the right of the nation. It is Stephan Klement’s (2015) belief that 
“the nuclear programme in Iran has always had a strong sense of nationalism. But in 
an interview conducted for this thesis, he points out he was convinced that during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency, especially when Jalili was the chief nuclear negotiator, 
this nationalistic view was used more dogmatically and ideologically, and they could 
not use it in a credible manner to strengthen their argument.” According to Klement, 
during this presidency, it was really easy to adopt sanctions on Iran, because they 
could not sell their own story very well.” This is because Ahmadinejad’s negotiating 
team had a very confrontational, rather than diplomatic way, of dealing with the 
nuclear issue.  
 
In another interview for this thesis, Walter Posch22 (2015) also suggests that “there 
was nothing to negotiate with Jalili, because he was so ideological and had no 
experience of the international political and diplomatic arena.” Posch asserts, “Jalili 
basically thought that because Iran produces oil, which the West needs, this would be 
a guarantee of no sanctions, or at least no biting sanctions. With Rouhani, however, 
who as a cleric has a legalist approach, it has been much easier. The red lines appear 
the same in both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations and the grand strategy of 
Iran can be seen as formulated via a set of important and highly efficient institutions; 
once approved, Supreme Leader Khamenei will put all his weight behind these. Posch 
                                                
22 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 6 August 2015  
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states that when it comes to implementation, Khamenei is one of the most flexible 
politicians in Iran, hence the change of political elites to find a solution – or from 
Tehran’s perspective, to prevail in negotiations.” 
 
It is important to note that many Middle Eastern societies (including Iran) are 
collectivistic in nature; as Yeganeh Hamid (2007) states, in collectivistic societies, 
identity is based on the social system. This perception is a demonstration of the 
impact of identity-based discourse on Iran’s negotiating position. By the end of 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency, nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 had reached an 
impasse and Iran’s symbolic nuclear programme remained an obstacle for progressing 
Iran’s relationship with the outside world, especially the West (Litwak 2014). 
6.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the contention that in addition to the 
Shia Islamic discourse of Iranian identity, the Ahmadinejad period also bore witness 
to the importance of Persian identity as a pre-Islamic discourse containing the values 
of Iranian identity. Discourse analysis has also enabled the identification of the 
ideologies embedded in the constructions of national identity during Ahmadinejad’s 
period. His discourses of Persian identity, Shia Islamic identity and Islamic 
Revolutionary ideology can be seen to shed light on the social constructivist notions 
of values and norms such as resistance to the West or any foreign intervention, 
victimisation, modernisation, and the rights of the nation. In his nuclear decision-
making, Ahmadinejad leaned on the people’s support of the nuclear programme, 
resistance against Western powers and emphasis of Iran’s legal and non-negotiable 
right of enriching uranium based on international treaties. His confrontational 
approach was based on the ideology that the history of the Islamic Republic shows 
anytime a hegemonic power encounters Iran. Ahmadinejad’s obvious message was 
that Iran would not retreat from its peaceful nuclear activities, not even one iota.  
 
Ahmadinejad’s narrative signalled the end of a cooperative attitude towards Western 
demands. Instead, it reasserted the importance of resisting Western pressure and the 
pursuit of nuclear activities regardless of the consequences (Barzegar 2009b). Iran’s 
nuclear issue could have been resolved without being referred to the UNSC and 
without imposing draconian sanctions, however, it turned into a movement 
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representing national pride and dignity and hallmarked by Ahmadinejad’s aggressive 
approach. His provocative statements were to indicate his firm support for the Iranian 
theocracy and Islamic Revolutionary ideologies. Therefore, based on the Islamic 
Republic’s objective of cutting the West’s hands from Iran’s domestic politics and 
becoming an independent and powerful state, Ahmadinejad aimed to gain theocratic 
support to make Iran a stronger nation, in spheres domestic, regional and 
international.  
 
For Iranian elites, including Ahmadinejad, the past will never fade away. There has 
always been a paradoxical combination of national pride and prestige in Iranian 
culture and a sense of being a victim of oppressors since the early history of Shia 
Islam and throughout Iran’s history of invasion by several powers (Ramazani 2009). 
Focusing on Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy behaviour in general, and nuclear policy in 
particular, we can clearly identify the signs of his anti-Western revolutionary 
ideology, which distinguishes Ahmadinejad from his predecessor, Mohammad 
Khatami and his successor, Hassan Rouhani. Ahmadinejad made his standpoint clear, 
his notion of ‘Iranian Islam’, pioneered by his closest advisor, Esfandiar Rahim 
Mashaei, made pre-Islamic Iranian national identity a pillar of the Ahmadinejad 
administration (Milani 2011). Like other Iranian officials, Ahmadinejad argued that 
Iran was simply pursuing its national rights in the nuclear issue, and thus, Western 
attempts to halt Iran’s nuclear progress at any time became an assault on its national 
rights (PANA 2018). 
 
The next chapter investigates Hassan Rouhani’s nuclear policy and discourse based 
on the connection between national security, prestige and bargaining leverage as well 
as nuclear negotiations. Core themes resulting from a discourse analysis of the data 
during Ahmadinejad’s presidency include national identity, Persian identity and 
culture, religion, resistance to the West, turning to the East, resistance to economic 
sanctions, justice, dignity, respect, justice, and rights of the Iranian nation. These 
themes, however, are not limited to Ahmadinejad and his administration; they can be 
seen in the speeches of president Rouhani and other Iranian officials. 
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Chapter 7. Rouhani’s Nuclear Policy: Soft but Defiant Rhetoric (2013-2015) 
 
“There are some very important points about foreign policy and the nuclear 
programme that I need to tell the Iranian people. The government’s policy in dealing 
with foreign affairs is the ‘discourse of moderation’; thus, it does not have to do 
anything with surrender, compromise, passivity or confrontation.”  
  ― Hassan Rouhani23 
                   
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a discourse analysis of president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s nuclear decision-making with regards to his conceptions of the 
discourses of Iranian national identity. In light of examining Iran’s foreign policy 
regarding its nuclear programme, this part of the thesis examines the nuclear 
discourse under president Hassan Rouhani, to find out its differences and or 
similarities with president Ahmadinejad’s nuclear discourse. This chapter will shed 
light on the Rouhani administration’s perception of the discourses of Iranian national 
identity and examine the nuclear programme as a core of Iranian identity. But before 
discussing president Rouhani’s nuclear policies, it is necessary to highlight his 
background. Born in 1948, Hassan Rouhani and his family were against the Shah’s 
regime and supported Ayatollah Khomeini. His interest in religion began in his teens 
and he studied with some outstanding Shia clerics of the time. He went on to study 
judicial law, and his political career following the Islamic revolution of 1979 
consisted of being the former commander of the Iranian air defences, former secretary 
of the Supreme National Security Council, and head chief nuclear negotiator from 
2003 to 2005 (Arkin 2013). Rouhani’s judicial and religious background, along with 
his studies in the West,24 made him a moderate diplomat and he earned the reputation 
of being the diplomat sheikh (A&E Networks Television. Accessed: November 2013). 
Solving Iran’s economic problems and spinning centrifuges were paramount 
examples of spiritual rhetoric during the presidential elections of 2013 (Harris 2014). 
According to Rouhani (2015b), domestic economic issues and spinning centrifuges 
are two sides of the same coin that are not easy to synchronise due to the concerns of 
                                                
23 President’s speech on the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Republic, 11 February 2014 
24 Hassan Rouhani earned his doctorate in constitutional law at Glasgow Caledonian University in 
Scotland. 
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the international community on easing economic sanctions [on Iran] whilst the 
centrifuges continue to spin. This is an example to demonstrate that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has been established on the principles of promoting religious and 
spiritual values, justice, respect, dignity, and also standing against the overbearing 
powers (Khamenei 2006b). 
 
Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory rhetoric increased tensions with other states, led Iran 
towards marginalisation, and was unable to bring about success in nuclear 
negotiations. However, Rouhani believes in diplomacy, negotiation and some sort of 
agreement in foreign relations (Jafari and Janbaz 2016). He has sought international 
respect for the Iranian nation and stated the only condition in which Iran would 
resume nuclear talks would be that if the West came to respect the nuclear rights of 
the Iranian nation (Rouhani 2014a). Rouhani has expressed that the country had a 
similar strategy on the nuclear programme and other important issues of national 
security during the Hashemi and Khatami administrations; both presidents’ strategies 
had been to pursue nuclear fuel technology (Rouhani 2013b). As Mohammad Daryaei 
(2015) mentioned: 
 
“Both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani regarded the same level of importance for 
national identity. They have the same position with regard to feeling proud of 
the national identity and preserving the achievements of Iranian scientists. But 
the difference is on how to tackle the nuclear issue to resolve it. President 
Rouhani believes in a process of engagement with the world powers, whereas 
President Ahmadinejad did not.”25 
 
7.2 Foreign Policy and Nuclear Diplomacy: A Policy of Détente and 
Rapprochement 
Since early 2005, Iran had begun to witness the emergence of challenges for power 
both internally and externally: elections in Europe and the U.S., the election of the 
Director General for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the 
presidential elections in Iran. Therefore, Hassan Rouhani (2013b) emphasised the 
necessity of convincing all influential institutions and organisations in Iran to actively 
                                                
25 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 9 July 2015   
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participate in resolving the nuclear issue as an indispensable national issue, that is, 
regardless of their factional differences. As a former national security adviser and 
chief nuclear negotiator under Khatami, President Rouhani demonstrated that his 
administration would alter Iran's nuclear posture. Like Ahmadinejad, President 
Rouhani is a supporter of the nuclear programme and perceives it as a symbol of 
Iran's right to sovereignty and national pride, but, unlike Ahmadinejad, he has 
adopted a constructive and interactive diplomatic strategy with the West, his top 
priority being to cooperate with Western countries and engage Iran with the global 
economy. An EU official26 reported to me that the Rouhani government decided to 
engage with world powers and negotiate a deal, in contrast with before, when there 
was no willingness to make a deal or to make any compromises whatsoever. To that 
end, Rouhani accepted the necessity of compromise and thus negotiated with the 
P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) over Iran’s 
nuclear issue (Monshipouri and Dorraj 2013). By doing so, Rouhani used a ‘key’ as 
his election symbol to show his willingness to solve Iran’s problems, including the 
nuclear crisis. His first aim was to transfer Iran’s nuclear dossier away from the UN 
Security Council and look for full closure of this by the IAEA. This paved the way for 
negotiations for the JPOA (Joint Plan of Action on November 24, 2013, and finally to 
the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) on July 14, 2015 (Wastnidge 
2016). 
 
In order to achieve the country’s goals in international politics, Hassan Rouhani 
(2013b) has referred to three elements of time, internal peace and confidence, 
claiming that his government’s strategy is to fulfil the goals of the unfinished nuclear 
programme without crossing the regime’s red line(s), regardless of the context of the 
agreement between Iran and the P5+1. If Iran’s capability to indigenously enrich 
uranium is not included in the conclusion of the agreement, the Iranian leaders and the 
people will not settle for it (Handjani 2013). Rouhani’s strategy has also included 
stopping the referral of Iran’s nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council. 
The development of nuclear technology is the legitimate right of the Iranian nation, 
whilst additionally, developing such modern and complicated nuclear technology is 
an element of pride and prestige for Iranians (Rouhani 2013c). A reformist politician 
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and former legislator, Ahmad Shirzad refers to the reporting of Iran’s nuclear dossier 
to the Security Council in 2006 as an issue jeopardising the country’s relations with 
the international community and undermining the trust between negotiating parties 
(Sciolino 2006). Emphasising the importance of the peaceful role of nuclear 
technology in the future of the country and Iran’s interaction with the world are 
among Rouhani’s key foundations for the country's growth and development 
(Rezapoor and Niakoee 2017). This is a fundamental principle of the social 
constructivism that focuses on changes in performance, behaviour, and interactions of 
the governments (Jackson et al. 2005). 
 
In the early 2000s, Iran witnessed the closing of the reformist administration of 
Iranian President Khatami with his government’s modest progress in the country’s 
nuclear crisis (Kaussler 2008). Khatami’s presidency, with its moderate and reformist 
policies, was largely constrained by opposition from hardline quarters (Mohajeri 
2017) and a lack of sufficient support from Supreme Leader Khamenei (Khamenei 
2010). Conservatives rather than Khatami loyalists dominated institutions such as the 
judiciary and the IRGC (International Crisis Group 2003). The conservatives were 
divided, splitting into traditionalists such as the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei and pragmatists like former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and 
the SNSC secretary as well as the current president, Hassan Rouhani. As Shireen 
Hunter (2014) argues, over the years following the victory of the Islamic Revolution 
and having come of age in the bases of the eight years war with Iraq, they tended to 
identify the Islamic Republic less with a revolutionary ideology and a promise of 
change but with the advocacy of Shia and Persian identities. Many of these Iranian 
‘neo-conservatives’ had links or were members of the Revolutionary Guards 
(International Crisis Group 2004), who played a prominent role in the nuclear 
programme (Alcaro 2018) (see section 4.2 on Islamic Republic of Iran’s Political 
Structure in Chapter 4). According to Hassan Rouhani (2017), besides Islamic and 
Persian discourses of identity, Iranians accepted the reality of this new world. In other 
words, they began to combine technology, economics, politics and modern culture 
with their traditional past and religious identity, creating a new mix of identity and 
livelihood (Ibid.). Iranian people do not see the conflict between being religious, 
Iranian and living a modern life, so any attempt to impose a single identity on the 
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Iranian people is ineffective. According to Rouhani, “Iranian people feel religious, 
moral, Iranian and modern, and they can experience all of these together” (Ibid. p. 2). 
 
To some extent, Iranian leaders’ conceptions of national identity are influenced by 
other powers’ perceptions of the Iranian nuclear programme. This foregrounds the 
issues of trust and distrust. For instance, despite supporting the nuclear talks, Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has always been sceptical of the U.S.’ intentions. 
Khamenei has asserted his distrust of the U.S. and has warned against the U.S. deceit 
in implementing the nuclear deal (Lob and Mahdavi 2015). Hassan Rouhani (2013b) 
criticised the previous government’s nuclear policies for not sending a complete 
expert report to senior officials as well as expressing distrust for the West and 
international organisations that have always been problematic. Rouhani, with his 
approach of engagement, was looking forward to overcoming the distrust. Reza 
Marashi27 (2015) asserted in an interview for this thesis that “following on from the 
Iran-Iraq war, Iran developed a mentality of self-sufficiency and a mentality of not 
being able to trust or rely upon  other states.” Marashi argues, “what happened during 
the Iran-Iraq war should be factored into Iran’s self-perception of power and 
prestige.” He also asserts, “Iran’s nuclear programme after the revolution was first 
strategic and survival-based imperative and then it became something that was 
ingrained in this concept of prestige and dignity and because we have to remember 
the concept of dignity and prestige gain importance when global powers tell you that 
you cannot have or do something (Ibid.).” All conceptions of Iranian national identity 
(including nationalism, Shia religion, modernity and Islamic revolutionary ideology) 
are very important factors with regard to Iran’s nuclear programme and Iran’s 
negotiations over the nuclear programme; according to Marashi, the Iranian 
government always takes each of these issues into account (Ibid.). 
 
In the eyes of the moderate government of Hassan Rouhani, negotiation and 
transparency over the nuclear programme, were perfect subjects for engagement with 
the world to demonstrate Iran's rationality in order to dissolve the walls of fear that 
had been built up around Iran, as well as removing the crippling sanctions that had 
been imposed on the country during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
                                                
27 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 6 July 2015  
 160 
(Center for Strategic Studies of Islamic Education 2015). Hassan Rouhani’s election 
campaign was based on a narrative of prudence and hope. As a moderate religious 
leader, his beliefs are rooted in diplomacy, cooperation, constructive interaction and 
the normalisation of Iran’s relations with the international community (Dehghani 
Firoozabadi and Ataei 2014). In his presidential campaign, he blamed Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s administration for the crippling economic sanctions that were imposed 
on Iran because of the government’s confrontational nuclear policy. Rouhani stated he 
would restore Iranian national pride and asked the Iranian people to support him in 
restoring the nation’s power and unity (Rouhani 2013d). In his first 100 days’ report, 
Rouhani said: “I do not want to say that all economic problems go back to the 
economic sanctions, because it was largely a matter of mismanagement. In a situation 
where more sanctions were ahead of us, and the government knew it very well, the 
former president [Ahmadinejad] said that the sanctions were just ‘torn papers’, and 
that increased the country’s dependence on foreign trade in the economic sector” 
(Rouhani 2013e). Rouhani held Ahmadinejad responsible for putting ‘brutal pressure’ 
on people under the pretext of Iran’s nuclear intentions (Ibid.).  
 
With regards to Ahmadinejad’s confrontational approach to the West, Rouhani argued 
that you cannot confront the world to gain what you want, but you must resist the 
world’s illegitimate demands (Ibid.). Contrastingly, Ahmadinejad claimed that the 
sanctions that were imposed on Iran came about due to the activities of the nuclear 
negotiating team from 2003 to 2005 when Hassan Rouhani was in charge of these 
negotiations (Ahmadinejad 2017b). Ahmadinejad argued that the sanctions were the 
cost that the Iranian people would pay because of the dramatic compromises of 
Mohammad Khatami’s reformist government (Ibid.). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on the 
other hand, considered the existing sanctions as an opportunity for Iran to reduce its 
dependence on oil (Ahmadinejad 2012a). As such, in his budget plan of 2013, he 
demanded governmental and non-governmental organisations and institutions support 
Iran’s ‘national production’ and ‘economy of resistance’ as a way to deal with 
sanctions (Ahmadinejad 2012b). Thus, Ahmadinejad considered the sanctions as an 
imperial response (Black 2010) to the exercise of national pride and unity through 
resistance, and then resistance to the sanctions as a further expression of pride and 
unity (Kaussler and Newkirk 2012). When the nuclear negotiations came closer to an 
agreement, a group of Hassan Rouhani’s critics held a conference entitled ‘We are 
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Worried’. They called Rouhani and his negotiating team ‘Compromisers’ (Ehteshami 
2014). The critics called ‘Delvāpasān’ stated that their debate was not about 
Ahmadinejad or Rouhani, but about the Iranian national interest and resistance to 
Western demands from Iran. They said the rights of the nation are not for sale; but if 
you want to sell the rights of the Iranian nation, set a world record price for them 
(Rouhani 2018a). Hassan Rouhani thinks that Delvāpasān favour the economic 
sanctions, whilst he believes sanctions are a great injustice to the Iranian nation 
(Rouhani 2018a). According to Rouhani (2013f), his administration is looking to 
engage with the world, which means believing in equality, shared interests, shared 
concerns and thus, is adopting a constructive approach to diplomacy based upon 
engagement whilst not relinquishing one's rights. One of the priorities of the Rouhani 
administration has been to de-securitise Iran’s portrait in the international system. In 
this regard, the desecuritisation of Iran’s nuclear dossier, which had become a security 
issue for actors in the international system, could be turned into a political issue, and 
therefore the best option for Rouhani (Ahmadinejad et al. 2018). As Khalili (2016) 
points out, Iran’s nuclear intentions until then were entangled with ideas such as ‘fear 
of Iran’, ‘fear from Shia Islam’, and ‘Shia Crescent’.   
 
Usually, in diplomacy, talks focus on the balance of interests and security issues, 
where the negotiating parties discuss material issues such as weapons, oil, and trade. 
However, after his election, Rouhani argued for the importance of Iranian identity and 
that understanding the discourses of Iranian national identity would be a key driver in 
reducing tension. He stated that respecting Iran on equal terms and Iran’s respectful 
behaviour to the international community are intertwined, but it will not happen until 
the world’s countries have a better understanding of each others’ identities and 
cultures (Rivera 2016). This perspective here demonstrates that “states do not enter 
the international sphere with fixed identities and interests, but rather, their attitudes to 
political mechanisms of the rule were shaped and constructed through intersubjective 
engagement in the international sphere” (Chandler 2013, p. 217). 
 
The administrations of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khatami, and 
Ahmadinejad, i.e., the 4th to 9th administrations put a great deal of effort into the 
nuclear project and played an undeniable role in its progress. However, Rouhani 
(2013b) was surprised as to why some officials of the 9th administration, from 
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Ahmadinejad’s first term of presidency, attacked those who undertook the 
responsibility of advancing the nuclear programme. In return, they attempted to 
introduce themselves as the “main characters of achieving nuclear technology and 
heroes of the nuclear industry in Iran” (Rouhani 2013b, p. 1193). In response to 
President Ahmadinejad’s announcement to enrich 3.5 per cent U-235, Hassan 
Rouhani as the former chief nuclear negotiator, criticised his successor, Ali Larijani. 
Rouhani called for striking a better balance, for more reason and less emotion 
(Alexander and Hoenig 2008). In an interview conducted for this thesis, Shahin 
Dadkhah28 compared the two leaders; according to Dadkhah, “While Ahmadinejad 
aimed at taking advantage of the nuclear programme to weaken his domestic 
competitors, Rouhani was not seeking to use the nuclear issue to resolve domestic 
issues, but also he considered resolving the nuclear crisis as a prelude to a détente 
with the West. Therefore, when he took power as Iran’s president in June 2013, his 
first attempt regarding the nuclear issue was to arrange a plan to resolve the nuclear 
crisis, and he appointed Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, and his team to be in charge of 
the nuclear dossier.” Further to this point, in another interview for this thesis, Stephan 
Klement29 (2015) is also of the belief that “the main reason for the success of 
Rouhani’s nuclear negotiating-team was the constructive cooperation of its main 
players, for Rouhani and Zarif believe in the mutual respect and understanding 
between negotiation parties as essential to reaching a desirable, yet reasonable 
agreement.” 
 
Rouhani’s ability to shift Iran’s nuclear policy has been tied to the power and will of 
the Supreme Leader (Shanahan 2015). One of Rouhani’s success factors during his 
presidency according to Bijan Khajehpour 30  (2015), has been his intelligent 
presentation. All the advancements to resolve the nuclear issue have happened under 
Khamenei’s guidance, which was not the case for Ahmadinejad and Jalili. Khajehpour 
states that Ahmadinejad wanted to be the champion, while Rouhani and Zarif 
sidestepped this and demonstrated Khamenei as the champion (Ibid.). In his letter to 
the Supreme Leader to congratulate him on the victory of the nuclear talks, Rouhani 
stressed that Iran achieved this victory when the great powers realised that economic 
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29 Semi-structured phone interview, 2 September 2015 
30 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 13 August 2015 
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sanctions could not destroy Iran’s society and as such were unable to prevent Tehran 
from progressing in its nuclear technology; president Ahmadinejad always 
emphasised Iran’s resistance to the West and that Iran would not halt its nuclear 
programme and not even give up one iota of the rights of the Iranian nation 
(Ahmadinejad 2008). In addition, Rouhani asserted, the key to Iran’s success in this 
field was the nation’s unity, consensus and most importantly, ability to act under the 
supervision of its Supreme Leader (Rouhani 2015c). In other words, in Rouhani’s 
view, it was about how the policy of resistance to the West and to economic sanctions 
had proved successful and thus, this understanding of resistance is central to Iran’s 
identity today. 
7.3 Portrait of the Dignity of the Iranian Nation 
Iran’s policies are derived from “the principles of dignity, rationality and prudence” 
(Zarif 2014, p. 57). This has specifically been highlighted in the duration of the 
nuclear negotiations and proceeded by the message of the Iranian Foreign Minister, 
Javad Zarif, inviting the Western powers to count Iran as equal in negotiations and 
respect the dignity of the Iranian nation (Zarif 2015a). Strengthening and promoting 
Iranian-Islamic culture and values and the Persian language is of paramount 
importance in Iran’s policy-making processes. Rouhani’s discourse of prudent 
moderation refers to a vision of Iran that keeps well away from tensions with the 
international community. Hassan Rouhani’s emphasis on moderation and avoiding 
extremism in addition to constructive and effective interaction with the outside world 
have been among the central issues of his election campaign (Rouhani and 
Nahavandian 2013). In so doing, the shift in the views and perceptions of foreign 
policy-makers, as well as the emergence of new literature in the political arena, all 
represent a new chapter in Rouhani’s foreign policy (Haghgoo et al. 2017). Rouhani 
(2016a) says Iran’s ability to produce nuclear energy is related to a country’s dignity 
and commensurate with Iran’s status in the world. As stated in his first UN speech 
after taking office, Iran’s drive for nuclear technology is first and foremost powered 
by a ‘demand for dignity and mutual respect’ (Rouhani 2013g). This can be explained 
using Alexander Wendt’s (1992) constructivist analysis of identities as the basis of 
interests. Indeed, actors can collectively define or hold identities about themselves 
and others, with these identities constituting the structure of the social world. In this 
way, one can argue that Rouhani seems to reason that nuclear technology is part of 
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the social construction of Iranian national identity as well as part of the existing 
international system (Lundberg 2013).  
 
The domain of identity can also be extended to Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme. 
For Iranians, having access to a nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear energy means 
diversifying energy resources. Iranians demand dignity and respect and the revival of 
their historical place in the world. Without understanding the role of identity, many of 
the problems that Iran and the West face remain unresolved (Rouhani 2013h). Hence, 
taking into consideration the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, Rouhani’s government 
pays attention to realities both domestic and international (Dehghani Firoozabadi 
2014). Iran’s endeavour is for the West to recognise its national rights and respect 
Iranians’ national dignity, independence and achievements in different aspects of 
science and technology (Zarif 2014). Interviewed for this thesis, Ambassador John 
Limbert31 (2016) argued that “if we look at the last 120 years of Iran’s history, the 
main feature has been a struggle to assert its identity. Looking at the constitutional 
period, the reforms of Reza Shah, or the nationalisation of oil, Limbert suggested that 
they all demonstrate a sense of Iranians wanting to articulate a problem, that they had 
lost their status and dignity and were being pushed around and occupied; leading to 
the need to assert their national identity in one way or another.” Limbert stated that, 
“Rightly or wrongly, the reality is that from an economic point of view, most people 
would say that nuclear power and nuclear-generated electricity does not make a lot of 
sense.” However, according to Limbert, “the reality is that for Iran, the nuclear issue 
carries great symbolic importance in terms of it being a carrier of national identity, 
dignity and Iran’s place in the world.” As Ambassador Limbert put it, “one reason for 
the success of the sides in reaching an agreement was that the P5+1 representatives 
began to understand the symbolic importance of the nuclear programme for Tehran.” 
That is, the world powers realised that the negotiations and agreement were not just 
about legal and technical issues, but that there was a large political and psychological 
component of Iranian identity to the negotiations (Hajiani and Iravani 2018). 
Likewise, John Limbert (2016) in the interview for this thesis also indicated, “if we 
look at the Iranian supporters of the nuclear deal, they stressed the deal guaranteeing 
their rights and protecting their national dignity.” Thus, Limbert emphasises “the 
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symbolic perspective of the Iranian nuclear programme,” which as he puts it “is 
clearly an important criterion (Ibid.).”  
7.3.1 The Right of the Iranian Nation 
Iranian leaders hold a similar conception of the Iranian nuclear programme as a 
symbol of Iranian national identity. It comes from one of the social constructivist 
central points on the ways actors acquire their identities and how these identities 
shape the actors’ interests, whether material or ideational interests (Van Wyk et al. 
2007). Actors share their understandings of the world and therefore construct the 
social reality according to their interpretations (Hopf 1998). For example, when 
Rouhani, for the first time after being elected as Iran’s president, attended the annual 
opening of the United Nations General Assembly, he argued that the world 
misunderstood the core of Iran’s identity; for according to him, developing a peaceful 
nuclear energy programme is at the core of that identity (Rouhani 2013f). In response 
to journalists in the Etemād newspaper, Hassan Rouhani stressed that Iran’s peaceful 
nuclear programme is a national and non-partisan issue. He also referred to the 
nuclear programme as the Iranian people’s absolute right, emphasising that his 
administration will not give up the rights of the Iranian people (Rouhani 2014b).  
7.3.2 Persian Identity 
Like his predecessors, Hassan Rouhani has also highlighted the progress of Tehran’s 
indigenous nuclear programme as a core of national identity. In an interview with 
CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Rouhani said, for the Iranian nation, nuclear technology is 
part of national pride and that Iranian people are very sensitive to this issue (Rouhani 
2014c). In that same interview, Rouhani emphasised, “it is a part of our national 
pride, that nuclear technology has become indigenous, and recently, we have 
managed to secure very considerable prowess with regards to the fabrication of 
centrifuges and not under any circumstances would Iran destroy any of its existing 
centrifuges” (Ibid.). In his election campaign, Hassan Rouhani (2013i) emphasised 
that paying attention to the Iranian culture, the Islamic culture, the Iranian identity, 
and the Islamic identity is equally important.  
 
In another speech answering the questions of Iranians who live abroad, Hassan 
Rouhani as a candidate of Iran’s presidential elections for the 11th government 
promised the Iranians abroad that he will bring respect back to the Iranian passport all 
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across the world (Rouhani 2013j). While the nuclear programme of Iran was a source 
of concern and distrust for the West, Rouhani said he will resolve this issue, so the 
West would recognise Iran’s right to the peaceful nuclear programme. He also stated 
that geographical distance cannot affect Iranian national identity, and Iranians are all 
their nationality as well as their Islamic culture (Ibid.). The ideology of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran has inherently been Islamist; however, Iran’s revolutionary leaders 
always emphasised Iranian nationalism as well as Shia Islam as equally important 
(Aarabi 2019). For the Western powers in their negotiations for Iran’s nuclear 
programme, understanding the non-material or ideational aspects of Iran’s nuclear 
programme has been very helpful (Sajjadpour and Ejtehadi 2010). Thus, the desire 
and enjoyment in representations of Iranian identity while introducing Tehran’s 
nuclear ambitions to the world have helped the West, in particular, the U.S. to 
understand Iran’s nuclear ambitions more clearly (Solomon 2016). 
7.3.3 Shia Islam and the Islamic Revolution’s Ideology 
For Rouhani, the Islamic Revolution was the foundation of national dignity and 
national identity, and the rise of Islam in Iran was a pivotal point for the country’s 
civilisation and the Islamic Revolution has been an important milestone in Iranian 
history (Rouhani 2018b). Faith is an important theme of the religious discourse on 
Iran’s nuclear policy. On 4 June 2006, in his speech on the seventeenth anniversary of 
Imam Khomeini’s death, Ayatollah Khamenei (2006c) stated that the West was 
claiming Iran’s commitment to building a nuclear bomb. According to Khamenei, this 
was an irrelevant and false claim. The Supreme Leader stated that Iran does not need 
a nuclear bomb. Iran does not have any goal to use nuclear weapons against others, 
with Khamenei asserting that the use of nuclear weapons is against Islamic law. He 
claimed that Iran does not claim a need to dominate and rule the world, like the U.S., 
and that is why they possess nuclear bombs and Iran doesn’t need them. Khamenei 
also stated that Iran’s explosive power is their ‘faith’; Iranian people and Iranian 
youth who stayed faithful and resisted in the most difficult times would thus stand 
strong against false Western accusations (Ibid.).  
 
Despite Rouhani’s emphasis on retaining Iran’s indigenous nuclear programme, like 
other religious leaders in Iran, he has also addressed the prohibition of developing 
weapons of mass destruction according to a Fatwā issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader 
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as a Shia leader, which is considered as a social reality. As agents and structures are 
theoretically interdependent, Alexander Wendt (1987a) argues that the social realities 
shape the actors’ understandings of the world. In an interview with Christiane 
Amanpour of CNN, Rouhani stated that based on its religious belief system and 
ethical standpoint, Iran disapproves of the development of weapons of mass 
destruction (Rouhani 2013). Rouhani emphasised diplomatic skills and patience as the 
two prerequisites for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. He addressed impatience and 
rushing to conclusions as factors leading to internal and external security dilemmas 
for the regime. On the other hand, he has cited that excessive caution in resolving 
nuclear issues would delay the exercise of the rights of the Iranian nation and the 
national authority (Rouhani 2013): “In a sensitive national case, the expectation is that 
all the authorities and parties support the decisions made by the system”; thus, 
Rouhani believes this is the pure meaning of responsibility (Rouhani 2013, p. 115). It 
can, therefore, be seen that Iran’s domestic postures have been directed more towards 
establishing a national identity based on the support of a coherent legitimation 
strategy.  
7.3.4 Modernity and Technological Advancement 
This section illustrates how modernity and technological advancement are used in the 
construction of Iranian national identity. In a televised interview, Rouhani (2014d) 
commented that Iran and P5+1 came to an understanding that in addition to 
indigenous enrichment, Iran needs to acquire modern nuclear technology. Hence, he 
stressed, as soon as the final nuclear deal is reached, world powers should be ready to 
provide Tehran with this modern nuclear technology (Ibid.). Stating that the two sides 
(Iran and the P5+1) will eventually come to an agreement on the nuclear issue, with 
world powers accepting Iran as an equal, Rouhani said: "To the great nation of Iran, I 
say today that the world has accepted that Iran should have nuclear technology, and 
this understanding will be win-win” (Ibid.). Peter Jenkins32 (2016) said in an interview 
for this thesis that he “believes Tehran’s resistance and insistence on pursuing a 
nuclear programme is connected to the very natural Iranian desire to take the country 
in the same direction as that travelled by Turkey, China, Japan and certain other Asian 
countries.” Thus, as Jenkins puts it, “those nations that fell behind Western Europe 
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following the European renaissance and enlightenment and were at various times 
humiliated by the West, are now catching up with it.” Jenkins also said, “post-1991, 
Saddam Hussein’s uranium enrichment programme was completely dismantled by 
UN inspectors.” So, Peter Jenkins poses a question, saying, “one has to ask, if Iran’s 
nuclear programme has been designed for security purposes, then why Iran continued 
its uranium enrichment activities during the 1990s or after the downfall of Saddam 
Hussein. According to Jenkins, this is where the idea of prestige becomes especially 
relevant (Ibid.).” 
7.3.5 The Policy of Looking to The West 
By the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the West has interpreted Iran's nuclear 
programme mostly in the form of Iranophobia, Shiaphobia, and the Shia crescent 
(Khalili 2016). However, Hassan Rouhani put constructive engagement with the 
world in the core of his nuclear diplomacy, as the centrepiece of the compromise 
discourse (Rouhani 2013l). Hassan Rouhani’s policy of constructive interaction with 
the world was considered by foreign countries, especially Europe and led to the 
emergence of a new look by foreign governments towards Iran. The status of 
European countries in the international system and their influence on important global 
issues, including Iran's nuclear dossier is of utmost importance in the foreign policy of 
the 11th government (Sanaei and Rahmati Moghaddam 2015). According to Simbar 
and Fasihi Moghaddam Lakani (2015), Rouhani's election has been a source of 
change in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and instilling hope for the 
international community; for they believe that by adopting a moderate approach, 
Rouhani's government could overcome the problems, especially the barriers in Iran’s 
relations between the two countries of Iran and the United States.  
 
In an interview with the Shargh newspaper in 2013, Rouhani also talked about his 
nuclear policy when he was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator. He stated that during this 
time, not only did he advance nuclear technology in Iran, but he also improved Iran’s 
relations with the West, preventing the referral of Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UN 
Security Council. In that sense, he secured the country from tough sanctions and the 
possibility of going to war. Rouhani’s narrative is that those in Ahmadinejad’s 
administration who opposed his nuclear policy might be unhappy with Iran’s 
technological, economic and political advancements (Rouhani 2013). When Fareed 
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Zakaria of CNN asked Rouhani about the widespread feeling in the West that Iran 
should not have any enrichment capabilities on its soil, Rouhani stated that nuclear 
technology is a very sensitive issue for the Iranian people and thus, Iran is committed 
to retaining its indigenous enrichment activities, providing nuclear fuel for its power 
plants inside the country and through the input of local Iranian scientists (Rouhani 
2014). At the DAVOS World Economic Forum in 2014, Rouhani also announced that 
nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s security strategy and that Tehran has no 
motivation for moving in that direction (Treanor and Elliott 2014).  
 
Trita Parsi (2007, p. 269), President of the National Iranian American Council 
(NIAC), expressed in his book ‘Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, 
Iran, and the United States’, that “Iranians are well aware that a decision to 
weaponise would likely weaken rather than advance Iran’s strategic position”. Parsi 
(2007) argues that for a country like Iran, weaponisation is not a reasonable strategic 
choice, as it might cause a nuclear race in the Middle East and Iran would probably 
have the most to lose from going nuclear.  Mohammad Javad Zarif is Iran’s leading 
nuclear negotiator and has been Minister of Foreign Affairs since July 23, 2013. He 
has also worked as Head of the UN Disarmament Committee in New York and as the 
Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations from 2002 to 2007, among 
other posts. Based on his experience, he stated that the nuclear crisis is a cognitive 
mental problemme; because on the one hand, the UNSC is making excuses and on the 
other, Tehran has limited understanding of the situation and so “acts naively” (Raji 
2013, p. 232); Zarif mentioned that reporting the Iranian nuclear case to the UN 
Security Council has no legal foundation because Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme 
does not jeopardise international peace and security (Ibid.).  
 
Zarif has outlined the elements of Iranian identity as being Iranian, Islamic nature, 
and revolutionary goals. For him, what distinguishes Iran from other countries is the 
prominence of the country’s Islamic revolutionary goals (Raji 2013). Javad Zarif and 
his nuclear-negotiating team have also underlined their commitment to protecting the 
Iranian national interest, especially in the nuclear arena (Ayoob 2014). Zarif has 
repeatedly talked about the Iranian nation’s desire to restore their sense of dignity and 
respect. In an interview with the New Yorker’s Robin Wright (2014), Zarif 
emphasised trust-building between Iran and the West by showing Iranians that the 
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West is ready to deal with Iran’s nuclear programme on the basis of mutual respect 
for the rights of the Iranian nation. In the same interview, Zarif highlighted, “Iran also 
wants to restore Persia’s historic standing in the annals of science, and it sees nuclear 
energy as crucial to modern development. It feels the West wants to block any such 
advancement.” Similarly, in a televised interview with Charlie Rose for his PBS 
programme on 28 April 2015, Zarif said, “Iran wants to be able to engage with the 
West based on mutual respect. Tehran does not want to experience animosity with the 
West but instead enjoy the benefits of interaction. But the Iranian nation still insists 
on its dignity, on being able to be engaged based on a strong sense of mutual respect. 
This is extremely important for Iran” (Zarif 2015a). 
 
In the ‘Iran and the Nuclear Deal’ virtual symposium convened by the Project on 
Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) in 2015, several speakers, including Scott 
Sagan33 and Abu Mohammad Asgarkhani, the so-called father of the Iranian nuclear 
programme and International Relations Professor at Tehran University, expressed that 
Iranian nuclear ambitions are more about the moral value imparted by a reinvigorated 
sense of national identity (Doyle II 2015a). In an interview for this thesis, Mark 
Fitzpatrick34 (2014) argued that “national identity and prestige are part of the rationale 
behind Iran’s nuclear programme; there are reasons why Iran is sticking to its 
industrial-scale nuclear programme, with national pride and technological 
achievements two of the reasons. Its enrichment programme has become part of the 
Iranian sense of sovereignty and independence (Ibid.).” Fitzpatrick further asserted 
that he is sure that “Western negotiators have some sense of the ‘pride’ element that 
lurks behind Iran’s position and its why they are willing to try to find creative 
solutions that would allow Iran to maintain this sense of pride.” From Fitzpatrick’s 
perspective, “the fact that has become a sense of identity that Iranians have been 
negotiating with Western powers and have been accepted as equals in the negotiating 
table has become a sense of national identity, which is as a result of their nuclear 
programme (Ibid.).” 
                                                
33 Scott Sagan is Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Senior 
Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. 
34 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 26 May 2015 
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7.3.6 The Policy of Resistance to the West 
In addition to the diplomacy of compromise and engagement with the world, Hassan 
Rouhani along with his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad believes in resistance 
against the West; or for that matter, any other power, which is inhibiting Iran’s 
technological progress, in particular its development of a peaceful nuclear technology 
(Rouhani 2015d). When Hassan Rouhani became Iran’s president in 2013, Barack 
Obama was the sitting U.S. president. During his first term, Barack Obama’s 
administration pursued a policy of reprimand with Ahmadinejad’s administration 
(Castiglioni 2013). However, in his second term, Obama stepped toward a new 
beginning with Iran’s Rouhani and offered to negotiate over Iran’s nuclear issue with 
no preconditions (Mousavian and Toossi 2017). The policy of resistance has 
especially been strengthened during the presidency of Donald Trump in the U.S. who 
is against Iran’s nuclear deal. For Donald Trump’s administration, the choice made 
was to restrain Iran’s nuclear programme further and therefore, confront a nation of 
almost 80 million Iranian people that according to Camelia Entekhabifard (2018), 
their national pride and identity speaks louder than their objection to the Islamic 
Republic’s leaders. In his speech for the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran, Rouhani (2019) emphasised, “our national identity is tied to our Islamic culture 
and identity; we are pro-negotiation and engagement with the world, but we do not 
accept any pressure or imposition.”  
7.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to outline various discourses of Iranian national 
identity, and to demonstrate that the ideologies and meanings attached to Iranian 
national identity conceptions can be illustrated through a social constructivist 
discourse analysis of president Rouhani’s speeches and decision-making. Taking this 
into consideration, Rouhani, through his call for modern-Iranian-Islamic identity, can 
be considered with regard to his idea of modern Iran. The main concept of Hassan 
Rouhani’s foreign policy or in particular, nuclear policy discourse, is moderation, 
which can be addressed as a shift away from extremism, the removal of economic 
sanctions, a balance between the right of the nation and state interests, mutual respect, 
win-win diplomacy and idealism (Jafari et al. 2018). These elements are then 
reshaped around a constructive interaction with the world. Rouhani entered the 
presidential election campaign by promising the simultaneous spinning of the 
 172 
centrifuges as well as sustaining Iranian people’s lives (Dabiri 2013). He also 
promised to promote the national, regional and international dignity of Iran, engage 
with the international system via diplomacy, promote religious democracy and 
Islamic values, and contribute to the country’s technological development and 
advancement (Rouhani 2017). In his UN speeches, Rouhani has prioritised the most 
immediate challenges and issues, and compared to Ahmadinejad, has mostly avoided 
addressing the interventions or wrongdoings of the world powers (Alemi et al. 2018). 
Instead, he has sought a working solution to the country’s technological progress, 
aiding the flourishing of the economy, and acquiring a higher position for Iran in the 
international equation, as well as improving the nation’s constructive relations with 
the outside world (Rafati 2017). 
 
In his plan for the 12th government, Rouhani (2017) argued that reviewing the current 
Iranian century, which will only last for four more years, demonstrates that Iranians, 
despite anti-colonial efforts and economic, political and cultural reforms, are still far 
from realising their ideals and aspirations. He stressed that the most important lesson 
for Iranians is that Persian identity, Shia Islamic identity, and Revolutionary ideology 
need be kept together and that the Islamic Republic of Iran means the coexistence of 
all these three discourses of identity. Rouhani has cited the Pahlavis as an example of 
a bid to eliminate Islamic identity as well as other groups who attempted to eliminate 
Persian culture and identity, believing in the failure of all of them (Ibid.). In 
Rouhani’s opinion, the Iranian nation needs to proceed by relying on the Persian, Shia 
Islamic, and Revolutionary ideology of the country, with the backing of the economic 
and scientific achievements of the modern era to achieve sustainable levels of 
development (Ibid.). Finally, taking into consideration Rouhani’s conception of the 
discourses of Iranian national identity, his period also bears witness to a discourse of 
moderation regarding Iranian national identity. But most importantly, the next chapter 
will examine the results of the thesis to demonstrate how the Iranian elite’s 











The previous two chapters addressed various discourses of Iranian national identity 
identified for discussion during the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani periods: Persian 
identity; Shia Islam; Islamic Revolution ideology; and modernity and technological 
advancement. Through a discourse analysis of texts as well as the leaders’ speeches, it 
has been possible to analyse the sets of identities and values embedded in the 
decision-making processes relating to the Iranian nuclear programme. Chapters 6 and 
7 have also provided extensive findings of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s nuclear 
decision-making processes, using the theoretical framework outlined in the second 
chapter. It is, therefore, necessary to gather those findings together into a whole, 
drawing upon the components of Iranian national identity discussed in chapter five, 
and, using discourse analysis of the interviews conducted for the purpose of this thesis 
to assess the impact of Iranian national identity components on decisions made by the 
Iranian political elites about the country’s nuclear programme. 
 
Rational choice theories, such as realism, can explain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but 
only to a point. To complete the picture, it is necessary to trace such ambitions back 
to the discursive context in which Iran’s nuclear decisions took shape, and to the 
discourse that enabled those decisions (Sect. 3.7 in Chapter 3). This method of 
analysis conforms to the social constructivist theory that international relations (IR) 
are defined by norms, ideas and international social structures that lead actors to 
redefine their interests and identities (Bozdağlıoğlu 2007). Following Alexander 
Wendt’s work, many IR scholars argue that “behaviour in the international system is 
not only driven by the distribution of power but also depends on the ‘distribution of 
identities” (Hopf and Allan 2016, p. 5). In other words, in the field of nuclear policy, 
whether the behaviour of actors is either cooperative or adversarial, depends less on a 
rational calculation of objective material resources than on how those actors 
subjectively perceive themselves and others in the international system. Whilst 
realism derives its fundamental analytical dominance by elucidating social 
constructions that vary in their distribution of objective material power capabilities, 
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constructivism acquires its central analytical leverage through subjective capabilities, 
such as norms, perceptions and preferences (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). One basic 
contribution of the constructivist literature is to challenge the notion that state identity 
and interests are not pre-given or fixed qualities (Wendt 1994). The social 
constructivist theory emphasises the importance of understanding the process through 
which actors’ identities are constructed by non-material factors (Smit, 2001: .217). Of 
course, in contrast to the realist tradition, the constructivist approach does not deny 
the effect of concrete and objective material factors on states’ foreign policy 
(Alexandrov 2003). But as Wendt (1995, p. 73) argues, it rather presumes that 
material factors “only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of 
shared knowledge in which they are embedded.” Therefore, material capabilities 
should be understood within discursive and social structures.  
 
Heinz Gärtner35 (2015) argues in an interview for this thesis that “according to social 
constructivism, identity is not a single shot picture, but it is a process, and its 
interpretation changes over time.” This, nevertheless, entails that meanings are not 
fixed, but they can change over time depending on the ideas and beliefs held by actors 
(Pardo 2014). Accordingly, this chapter examines how the identity of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has been affected and thus, constructed by its normative discourses 
at both the domestic and international level. This identity formation at both the 
domestic and international levels in turn shapes Iranian foreign policy behaviour and 
in particular, its nuclear decision-making. Heinz Gärtner (2015), for example, argues 
that “traditional approaches, such as realism, have focused on rational decision-
making, mainly to provide security, but many recent studies use social constructivism. 
Not only the emotional aspects, but also many other factors play a remarkable role in 
decision-making, according to social constructivism. For Iran in particular, national 
identity has played a very major role, especially after the 1979 revolution when Iran 
began searching for a new identity.” However, Iran’s identity as expressed by its 
political elites derived directly from its history as a revolutionary nation and hence, 
has elements of both change and continuity (Farhi 2005). Continuity can be found in 
the Iranian nation’s struggle to overcome the injustice by oppressors throughout 
history (Farazmand 1995). Some change in the dominance of Iranian national identity 
                                                
35 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 4 August 2015 
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conceptions, however, came with the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew the 
Shah (Inafuku 2010). In other words, with the Islamic Revolution, the Shia Islam and 
revolutionary ideology became more dominant that the Persian identity. As a result, 
this chapter conducts a ‘discursive review’ based on the conducted interviews that 
draw from a constructivist revisiting of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This chapter 
discusses how narratives of Iranian national identity have influenced Iran's nuclear 
policy. Having previously considered the components of Iranian identity (Chapter 5), 
this chapter will provide an overview of the prevailing identity narratives in relation 
to the nuclear programme that are based on the interviews conducted for the purpose 
of this research. This section thus looks at the way in which the construction of 
national identity components impact on the manner in which Iran makes its nuclear 
decisions.  
8.2 Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Discourses of Iranian National Identity  
Howarth and Stavakakis (2000) argue that the central concept of  discourse analysis is 
that every action and social practice, including  political phenomena, is meaningful. In 
other words, the discourse analysis interprets the data in a certain way, and that data 
renders and clarifies the social practices (Gee and Green 1998). Discourse creates a 
common way to make sense of social reality within a given culture (Mohammad Nia 
2012). It is through discourse analysis that this thesis could better clarify the impact of 
Iranian national identity components on the Iranian elites’ nuclear decision-making. 
Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami’s discourse of ‘dialogue among 
civilisations’, and his adoption of detente policy to develop a culture of peace and 
security; President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s discourse on the ‘Iranian School’ with 
an emphasis on Islamic Revolutionary ideology; President Hassan Rouhani’s 
discourse on ‘prudent moderation’, are all discourses which demonstrate how the 
political elites’ perceptions of national identity influence Tehran’s nuclear decisions. 
For David Patrikarakos (2012), the development of a peaceful nuclear technology is 
an important symbol of Iran’s modernity and identity. For Iranian leaders, the 
country's ability to make nuclear fuel indigenously and by Iranian scientists, is a 
source of national pride (Reisinezhad 2014). The symbolic importance of Iran’s 
nuclear programme among Iranian elites and the Iranian nation became even more 
vivid with the introduction of the new 50,000 rial note in March 2007, as it featured 
the symbol of a nuclear isotope along with the figure of Khomeini (Kinch 2016). 
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Iran’s nuclear decision-making has been shaped by some important discourses, 
including Persian identity, Shia Islamic and revolutionary ideology, and modernity 
and technological advancement (see chapter 5). These discourses give meaning to 
Iran’s foreign policy behaviour in general and nuclear policy behaviour in particular; 
in so doing, these discourses distinguish Iran’s nuclear ambitions from the rest of the 
world. Overall, the following discourses of Iranian national identity are the main 
resources directing the country’s foreign policy behaviour, especially since the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979.  
8.2.1 Persian National Identity 
Many Iranians see their historical and cultural achievements as a source of great 
pride. According to Gregory F. Giles (2003, p. 145), “the culmination of these 
historical, cultural, religious, and geographic influences is considered to constitute 
Iran’s ‘strategic personality’ or ‘culture’.” As R.K. Ramazani (2009, p. 2) argues:  
 
“Iranians value the influence that their ancient religion, Zoroastrianism, has 
had on Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. They take pride in 30 centuries of arts 
and artifacts, in the continuity of their cultural identity over millennia, in 
having established the first world state more than 2,500 years ago, in having 
organized the first international society that respected the religions and 
cultures of the people under their rule, in having liberated the Jews from 
Babylonian captivity, and in having influenced Greek, Arab, Mongol, and 
Turkish civilisations — not to mention having influenced Western culture 
indirectly through Iranian contributions to Islamic civilisation.” 
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech on ‘Iranian School of thought’ (2010b) that said 
“Iran is a school, a transcendental culture beyond geography and race”, and the 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s emphasis that the peaceful nuclear 
programme will keep Iran energy independent and enable it to resist the great powers 
‘like a lion’, an ancient Persian symbol of power (Christian Science Monitor 2013) 
demonstrate that leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran have appropriated symbols of 
Persian nationalism for the purposes of defining their national nuclear policy. As a 
participant for this thesis, Ali Asghar Soltanieh36 (2015) argued that “during the Iran-
                                                
36 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 12 November 2015  
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Iraq war, the most important issue was to protect international borders, which in fact 
relates to the sovereignty and integrity of the state. In the case of the nuclear 
programme, however, Iran has been showing some resistance despite the hard time 
the nation has had as a result of draconian sanctions.” Soltanieh said that “Iran had 
worked very hard not to make any compromise in principles because the Iranian 
leaders considered the principles surrounding the nuclear decisions as ‘the borders of 
identity and dignity of Iran.” Soltanieh further asserted that this was a matter of 
“inalienable sovereign right for peaceful use of nuclear energy (Ibid.).” Iran’s nuclear 
programme has become the country's key national issue. Therefore, the discourse of 
Persian nationalism and historical pride has been constructed to form a collective 
identity for Iranian officials regarding the nuclear programme (Saleh and Worrall 
2015).  
8.2.2 Shia Islamic Identity  
Iran’s nuclear decision-making has been influenced by domestic political legitimacy, 
nationalism and ideology. There are, therefore, more internal factors than Persian 
identity that shape Iran’s nuclear policy decision-making. In Iran, Shia Islamic 
identity and its revolutionary ideology include notions such as resistance, 
independence, self-sufficiency and victimisation. The discourses of Shia Islamic 
identity and the revolutionary ideology are very visible in Iranian foreign policy, 
including in its nuclear decisions. A single individual cannot change the course of 
events and decision-making process in Iran, but there are coalitions and struggles that 
result in policies. According to Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2013a), a former diplomat 
and former member of Iran's nuclear negotiating group, “the ultimate decision-maker 
in Iran’s nuclear talks if the Supreme Leader. No Iranian president can ever publicly 
say that Iran is ready to stop the enrichment of 20 per cent uranium, unless the 
Supreme Leader has allowed. If the Iranian Foreign Minister officially announced 
Iran's readiness to accept the Additional Protocol, he must have agreed with the 
Supreme Leader beforehand, without the consent of the leader”. Hassan Rouhani 
(2016b) also repeatedly emphasised his nuclear-negotiating team did not take any 
steps, unless they consulted the Supreme Leader. In the case of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, a coalition comprising Supreme Leader, the President, the Atomic 
Energy Agency of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and the Supreme 
National Security Council as the key actors was formed to consult on nuclear talks. 
 178 
Notwithstanding the influence of the coalition, one cannot ignore the effective role of 
the president, the senior clergy and the parliamentary representatives with regard to 
the nuclear negotiations (Tağma and Uzun 2012).  
8.2.3 Islamic Revolutionary Ideology 
The Islamic regime’s revolutionary ideology has also shaped the preferences of 
Iranian elites on the nuclear issue. Iranian political culture and ideology have some of 
its roots in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in the way that the nuclear programme has 
become a symbol of Iran’s self-sufficiency and independence from the West. As 
Ayatollah Khomeini said in his book, ‘Sahifeh’, the Islamic revolution cut Western 
hands and the hands of oppressors, particularly the U.S., from Iranian domestic 
politics and replaced the Iranian monarchy with a system of velāyat-e-faqih (the rule 
of Shia jurisprudence) (Khomeini 1989). While Ayatollah Khomeini was in exile in 
Najaf, he represented the Islamic Governance and the principle of velāyat-e-faqih. In 
demonstrating Islamic Revolutionary ideology, he first denied the existing 
sovereignty of the monarchy and questioned the monarchy’s dominant values 
(Mohammadi 2006). However, even among Shia jurists, not everyone was a supporter 
of Ayatollah Khomeini’s notion and practice of velāyat-e-faqih. Agha Seyed Ahmad 
Khansari, one of the greatest Shia jurisprudes and trusted by Ayatollah Khomeini 
himself, was an opponent of the principle of velāyat-e-faqih. He called velāyat-e-faqih 
trans-humane behaviour and believed even Prophet Mohammed and the Shia Imams 
did not deal with people according to velāyat-e-faqih but instead carried out normal 
human behaviour with people under their rule (Kadivar 2018). Despite his opponents, 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that velāyat-e-faqih was an acceptable political identity 
for the Muslim nation and government. In other words, political identity can be seen 
as a kind of self-consciousness appropriated as a collective consciousness of the 
citizens of Iranian society (Zahiri 2000).  
 
Iranian leaders express concern at international actions perceived to undermine the 
nation’s rightful place in regional and world affairs (McInnis 2015). They believe that 
the development of nuclear weapons is against Islamic law and thus Iran’s identity 
perceptions (Mowatt-Larssen 2011). The Islamic identity discourse around the 
prohibition of development and use of nuclear weapons has gained more attention in 
the West, especially since the intensification of the disagreements between world 
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powers and Iran over its nuclear programme. The promotion of the nuclear fatwā by 
Ayatollah Khamenei can also be seen as evidence of the peaceful nature of its nuclear 
endeavours (Ansari 2013). In 2003, news of covert nuclear activities was leaked 
internationally, leading to concerns regarding Iran’s possible military dimension. The 
nuclear programme of Iran thus quickly became one of the most controversial 
contemporary security issues in the world. To address this concern and assure the 
world that Iran’s nuclear programme was being developed solely for peaceful 
purposes, the Iranian Supreme Leader presented a nuclear narrative that was above 
the national legal framework of the State and included a kind of divine law referred to 
as fatwā (Porter 2014b).  
 
A former Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, Ramin Mehmanparast, stated that 
the cultural gap between the West and Iran is the main reason the West does not have 
an accurate understanding of Islamic beliefs and the significance of the edicts, 
suggesting that the US and its allies must take Khamenei's fatwā seriously (CBS 
News 2013). According to Gareth Porter (2014b), nobody in Iran questions the 
authenticity or legality of a fatwā and when the guardian jurist (the Supreme Leader) 
says something is forbidden, everyone accepts it. Although the fatwā issued by 
Khamenei forbidding the development and use of nuclear weapons is now a basis for 
Iran’s negotiations with the P5+1, the West does not actually believe it and wants it to 
be legally formalised (Fitzpatrick 2006). According to Hossein Mousavian (2013b), in 
2011, the Iranian government agreed to transform the fatwā into a legally binding 
document for the UN, but at that point, the distrust between Iran and the West was 
unable to facilitate such a groundbreaking step. Khamenei’s anti-nuclear weapon 
fatwā was not taken seriously by the West until 2012 when President Barak Obama’s 
administration welcomed it; it was subsequently addressed in his 2013 UN General 
Assembly speech (Porter 2014b). The Obama administration decided to recognise the 
fatwā and interpret it as a confidence-building measure, albeit with scepticism, 
addressing it as the basis for a meaningful agreement (Washington Post 2013).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Iran’s desire to obtain nuclear power began in 1957, 
during the Shah’s reign, when the United States provided Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi with nuclear technology and Iran started developing a civil nuclear 
infrastructure (Bahgat 2006). The February 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran halted the 
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nuclear programme for several years. The Iran-Iraq war, which began in 1980, caused 
much damage to Iran’s existing nuclear facilities at that time, with Iraq bombing 
power reactors under construction in Bushehr (Cirincione et al. 2011). Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s theological reason (fatwā) in 1984 after the bombing of the reactors by 
Iraq, forbidding the development and use of chemical, nuclear and all weapons of 
mass destruction in Islam caused Iran’s nuclear programme to progress slowly, and 
was the reason why Iran did not use any chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war 
(Porter 2014b). However, following Khomeini’s death in 1989, the new Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, decided to expand Iran’s nuclear capability based 
on the need for the country to have sustainable energy in the midst of dwindling oil 
reserves. In order to replace crude oil and natural gas for electricity generation, Iran 
needs nuclear energy to be able to export more gas and oil (Salameh 2015).  
 
Evoking the common point among pre and post-revolution Iranian leaders, Peter 
Jenkins37 (2016) who was interviewed for this thesis notes that “when it comes to the 
nuclear programme, the Shah and the leaders of the Islamic Republic have very 
similar ambitions and ideas about the purposes that can be served by the nuclear 
programme.” According to Jenkins, “the Shah also saw it as a programme of great 
symbolic significance, because he wanted to demonstrate to the world that his Iran 
was a sophisticated and rapidly modern country.” “The difference between the Shah 
and the leaders of the Islamic Republic,” Jenkins asserts, “is that the Shah’s regime 
did not emphasise the Islamic Shia nature of the country. In the Islamic Republic, 
there is an emphasis on both nationality and religiosity (Ibid.).” Nonetheless, Reardon 
(2012) argues that both Iranian nationalism rooted in Iran’s long history and Shia 
Islam are the elements of Iranian identity that have shaped the way Iran views itself 
and the world.  
8.2.4 Modernity and Technological Advancement 
According to Jo-Ansie van Wyk et. al (2007), constructivists believe that actors 
embark on identifying social facts in terms of their meaning and value. Once the 
actors have constructed the identity of a particular social fact, they then attribute new 
meanings to that fact (Zehfuss 2001). The next step for the actors, nonetheless, would 
be to construct social practices based on mutually constitutive norms, rules and 
                                                
37 Semi-structured phone interview, 5 March 2016   
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institutions to engage with that social fact (Wendt 1992). Modernity and technological 
advancement could be identified as another constructed identity in respect of Iran’s 
nuclear programme. As Ali Asghar Soltanieh (2015) argues in an interview for this 
thesis, “for Iranians, identity is attached to the part of history occurring in the area of 
science and technology.” That is why Soltanieh believes that “Iran’s achievements in 
outer space, sending satellites into the orbit, and in nano-technology fields, are 
sources of pride for the nation.” Thus, Soltanieh posits that “Iran’s background of 
nuclear science and technology, as well as its rich civilisation, has played a key role in 
this issue (Ibid.).” In order to say why the development of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle 
been portrayed as a unifying symbol of national identity in Iran, in another interview 
for this thesis, Hossein Mousavian38 (2015) comments; “first, the culture of resistance 
- in the course of their long history, Iranians have been repeatedly invaded and 
defeated by foreign enemies including the Greeks, the Ottomans, the Arabs, the 
Mongols, the Turks, the Ottomans, the British and the Russians. The result of those 
invasions and defeats has cultured a deep sense of victimisation. It is no wonder that 
Iranians are often seeking justice, are combatants, and thus resist bullying and outside 
force and pressure. Second, Iran’s adamancy also stems from its strong nationalistic 
sentiments- i.e., national pride- and this is arguably the programme’s driving force. 
This sentiment endures through their long civilisation and cultural heritage (Ibid.).” 
Pointing to the relationship between constitutive identities and social facts, Shahin 
Dadkhah 39  (2016) has also argued that “one cannot deny the Iranian people’s 
sensitivity to foreign intervention and thus, the West’s opposition to the nuclear 
programme brought about the perception that again the West was going to prevent 
Iran from autonomous decision-making” and put Iran’s energy self-sufficiency to a 
halt. 
 
Mohammad Daryaei40 (2015) points to the fact that “Iran has always wanted to be at 
the cutting edge of technology, to be independent, and proud whenever they develop a 
technology indigenously. For this reason, Iran wished to continue its nuclear fuel 
cycle activity.” The ways and reasons that actors act as they do, Alexander Wendt 
                                                
38 Semi-structured email interview, 16 August 2015 
39 Semi-structured phone interview 28 April 2016   
40 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 9 July 2015   
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(1992) argues is fundamentally shaped by shared understandings within a society. 
From a constructivist perspective, one way to explain the role of nuclear energy self-
sufficiency in Iran is through the particular understanding assigned to it in the context 
of energy independence or independence from other world powers. Mohammad 
Daryaei (2015) who was interviewed for this thesis argues that “independence is part 
of Iranians’ feelings and sense of pride culturally, and it is not exchangeable, because 
it is embedded in the mottoes and ideals that were socially constructed during or after 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and anything contributing to strengthening that 
feeling would be especially appreciated by the Iranian elites.” According to Daryaei, 
“despite a lot of limitations, pressures and sanctions and without the help of any 
foreign aid, Iranians have tried hard to have some of their ideas developed by young 
Iranian scientists, and then, crown it with an achievement like the nuclear fuel cycle. 
This has created a sense of national pride for Iranians, that is, because Iranian nuclear 
decision-makers believe they had no outside help, and their young scientists’ 
achievements were due to hard work. This has become something very precious, to 
keep, preserve and fight for” (Ibid.). However, “Daryaei also notes that this is not 
limited to the issue of nuclear energy. Iranians are also very proud of their scientists 
in the fields of nano-technology and communication. For example, those who 
developed the satellites sent into orbit are also respected as Iran’s national heroes. 
Despite the pressures, any new development and any new technology worked on by 
Iranian scientists are much appreciated, giving Iranians a sense of self-confidence and 
independence (Ibid.).”  
 
Stephan Klement41 (2015) is another participant to this thesis who pointed out that 
Iran’s motivation and desire to develop its nuclear programme indigenously and 
master nuclear technology was because “the Americans and French did not cooperate 
in Iran’s nuclear programme after the revolution and that the Russians were not 
committed to their fulfilment of the Bushehr power plant.” He argued, “it is very 
difficult for many people in Europe to understand this because here, they have moved 
towards an anti-nuclear stance where developing nuclear energy is not considered a 
good investment. But in many developing countries this is completely different.” 
Therefore, as Klement mentions, “Iran is technically one of the countries where 
                                                
41 Semi-structured phone interview, 2 September 2015 
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nuclear science has a very high value and is well supported.” Also from his 
impressions of the nuclear talks, Klement notes that “Iran is a country, which is very 
much striving for high-tech development. Even before the Islamic Revolution, the 
nuclear programme was seen as a symbol of modern development and technology 
(Ibid.).”  
 
Another area of interest for constructivists has particularly been shared conceptions of 
the self and others. This shared conception is the social process of shared identity 
formation, and the way these identities shape understandings of collective interests 
(Wendt 1992). Addressing the shared conceptions of self and others, Mohammad 
Marandi42 (2015) has pointed out that “Western companies received a great deal of 
money to build Iran’s nuclear infrastructure before the Islamic Revolution, but pulled 
out and left the infrastructure incomplete subsequent to the revolution.” According to 
Ali Farazmand (1995), after the revolution, Iranians felt a strong sense of sovereignty, 
especially as the Islamic Republic became a seriously independent country. 
Furthermore, Marandi (2015) said in an interview for this research that “Iranian 
leaders and the population as a whole have a strong sense of self-determination, 
indeed, it was completely unacceptable for Iran to relinquish any part of their 
sovereignty. This basically has the same status for Iran; land is more touchable or 
concrete while the nuclear issue is perhaps in some ways less concrete, however, it 
has the same impact on Iranian mentality, as it is linked to the notion of rights and 
independence.” The ideas behind the revolution in Iran according to Marandi included 
“independence, sovereignty, and indigenous values. Thus, following the Islamic 
Revolution, Iran promoted its own indigenous culture and ideas, such as 
independence, freedom and dignity, ideas that are extremely valuable to Iranians 
(Ibid.).” 
 
As seen in the context of the ideological orientations of Iranian identity conceptions, 
one finds that the concept of modernity that comes from the country’s nuclear energy 
mastery is underpinned by both religious and nationalistic identities (Akbarzadeh and 
Barry 2016). Walter Posch43 (2015) who has been interviewed for this thesis also 
                                                
42 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 29 June 2015 
43 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 6 August 2015  
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argues that “the Iranian nuclear programme has been portrayed as a modernising 
project, something both nationalists and Islamist nationalists are very fond of.” Posch 
asserts, “When the nuclear programme in Iran resumed under Rafsanjani, it attracted 
some Western-educated technicians and scientists” who some of them have been 
assassinated between 2010 and 2012 (Ibid.). From one point of view, the assassination 
of Iranian nuclear scientists has been a rallying point for the nuclear programme in 
Iran and a foreign intervention towards the inalienable right of the Iranian nation. 
Indeed, the assassinated scientists have become known as nuclear martyrs. 
Martyrdom entitles to Muslims who have died while defending their faith and sacred 
values (Mohammad Nia 2012) and dates back to when Imam Hossein, the third Shia 
Imam, and his followers were killed in the battle of Karbalā44 by Caliph Yazid's army. 
Iran’s nuclear martyrs are symbolised as the evidence of Iran’s innocence and 
oppression. According to Khamenei (2012), these have been the scientists with 
common features and objectives, who worked harmoniously to keep the nuclear cycle 
alive. The Supreme Leader believes the U.S. and Israel assassinated these Iranian 
nuclear scientists in order to stop the country moving forward scientifically; that is, to 
prevent the Iranian nation from the technological and scientific advancement that 
happened as a result of the blessing of Islam and the Islamic Revolution (Khamenei 
2012).  
 
Iran's ‘nuclear martyrs’ have thus become a rallying point for the country's nuclear 
programme and its right to uranium enrichment, regardless of the high cost of 
sanctions. When Majid Shahriari, an Iranian nuclear scientist, was targeted and killed 
by men on motorbikes who attached bombs to the windows of his car, President 
Ahmadinejad accused the West and Israel of his assassination (BBC News 2010). 
Manouchehr Mottaki, who was Iran's Foreign Minister at the time, also accused the 
UN Security Council of killing and injuring Iranian nuclear scientists. Shahriari was 
one of the nuclear scientists included on a UN Security Council sanctions list. Mottaki 
claimed adopting the UN resolutions against Iranian nuclear scientists led terrorist 
groups to carry out these assassinations (Borger 2010b). From another point of view, 
it is Bijan Khajehpour45 (2015) who believes that “the U.S. government increased the 
level of sanctions to make it more painful for Iranian society, thus pressurising the 
                                                
44 https://www.al-islam.org/story-of-the-holy-kaaba-and-its-people-shabbar/third-imam-husayn-ibn-ali 
45 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 13 August 2015 
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regime to stop its nuclear programme.” But Khajehpour insists “this was a 
miscalculation, because U.S. pressure strengthened the importance of the nuclear 
programme, allowing it to emerge as an issue of dignity for Iranian society, even 
those who were against the Islamic regime at the time (Ibid.).” In a similar vein, Greg 
Thielman46 (2014) considers the economic sanctions counterproductive, as they could 
not prevent Iranians from pursuing a policy of resistance against the U.S.  
8.3 Representation of Conceptions of Iranian National Identity - Various Factors 
and Factions  
Pointing at the consistency of Iran’s foreign policy behaviour under Khatami and 
Ahmadinejad, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (2007) attributes this consistency to a 
culturally constituted solidarity about the country’s role in international affairs that is 
strong enough to go beyond the various factions of Iranian politics. This, Adib-
Moghaddam (2007, pp. 70–71) discusses that “functions as the guardian of identity, 
represents a web of shared ideals, images, norms, and institutions, and provides for 
the foreign policy elites a coherent, if systematically abstract, overall orientation in 
the conduct of international affairs.” Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2012), who 
previously served as the spokesman for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the 
international community during Khatami’s presidency, discussed alternative 
approaches represented by Iranian decision-makers and political factions for 
interacting with the IAEA and/or accepting the additional protocol.  
 
The first approach was the ‘Confrontational Approach’, with proponents of this 
believing that signing the additional protocol was humiliating for Iran as it was a sign 
of Western intention to conduct a military attack on the country. This approach called 
for a halt to Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief 
of Kayhan newspaper, who was appointed as editor directly by the Supreme Leader, 
was one of the proponents encouraging Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT. The second 
approach was the ‘Nuclear Rights Approach’ that proposed Iran should cooperate and 
abide by its commitments to the IAEA. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, former Iranian 
ambassador to the IAEA, was one of the proponents of this approach. The third 
approach was the ‘Grand Bargain Approach’ that emphasised the normalisation of 
Tehran-Washington relations. The advocates of this approach believed that while 
                                                
46 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 9 September 2014 
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U.S.-Iran relations remained hostile, the nuclear crisis would not be resolved. Seyed 
Hossein Mousavian was among the proponents of this approach. The fourth approach 
was the ‘Eastern Bloc Approach’, which believed it was necessary to create a 
powerful bloc consisting of the Non-Aligned Movement, Russia and China to resist 
U.S. pressure. Ali Larijani, the current chairman of the Iranian Parliament and the 
chief nuclear negotiator from 2005 to 2007, was a proponent of this approach. The 
fifth approach was the ‘Conciliatory Approach’ that posited Iran should suspend its 
uranium enrichment activities. The sixth approach was the ‘Pragmatic Approach’ that 
suggested the nuclear crisis was merely a political crisis with the proponents of this 
approach believing in the necessity of confidence with the international community. 
They spoke against expelling any of the IAEA inspectors or withdrawing from the 
NPT. Rafsanjani, Khatami, Rouhani and Kharrazi were among the supporters of this 
approach (Ibid.).   
 
Analysing the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a difficult task. But 
given the different approaches adopted by the Iranian political elites, it is worth 
noting that the political elites in Iran are generally grouped into four political factions: 
principalists, traditional conservatives, pragmatic conservatives, and reformists (Stein 
2015). The principalists and traditional conservatives believe in the ideological 
principles of the Islamic Revolution. These factions do not believe in an international 
status quo and most particularly, they see the U.S. as a threat to the regime and to 
Iran’s regional power. The Parliament, the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian 
Council are among principalists, while the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
is identified as a traditional conservative. The principalists and traditional 
conservatives have the support of hardliners, the IRGC, and Basiji47 veterans who 
themselves support the Islamisation of society and ask for strong state control over the 
economy. The former President, Ahmadinejad, was also a principalist (Ansari 2007a). 
He pursued a confrontational foreign policy that was endorsed by the Supreme Leader 
as well as by hardliners and militarists, but his aggressive foreign policy led to 
draconian sanctions and international isolation (Rassam 2016). The pragmatic 
conservatives are ideologically conservative but are more willing to put away their 
ideological enthusiasm and stick to pragmatic social and cultural policies. They are 
                                                
47 Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia established in Iran in 1979 on the order of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, founder and leader of the Islamic Revolution. Basijis are members of the Basij militia. 
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also supporters of economic liberalisation. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 48  was a 
pragmatic conservative, popular among the bāzaaris (the merchant class). The 
reformists are representatives of the ideological left in the Iranian political system. 
They support economic openness and liberalisation as well as rapprochement with the 
West. The Former president, Khatami, with his policy endorsing the ‘dialogue of 
civilisations’, green movement leaders (Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi) as 
well as current President, Hassan Rouhani, are reformists (Saikal 2009). The reformist 
team of Rouhani-Zarif pursued a cooperative way forward with the West that resulted 
in a solution for the Iranian nuclear crisis (Rassam 2016). 
 
After discussing the Iranian national identity discourses and their effect on decision-
making in the realm of nuclear policy in Iran in chapters 5,6, 7 and examining 
different factions of Iran’s policymakers and their possible approaches in chapter 4, 
this chapter now unravels the various layers of decision-making enacted by each 
group of elites.  Mohammad Daryaei (2015) argues, that “in order to make decisions 
inside Iran, it is necessary to tackle different layers. These layers are very much 
affected by discourse. To talk about the identity or discourse that affects Iranian 
identity, Daryaei divides the discourse into three different types. These all affect the 
layers of decision-making in Iran, and are religious discourse, legal discourse, and 
political discourse.”  
 
One needs to bear in mind that “in the religious discourse, there are many top clerics 
among them the Supreme Leader who believes while we have our rights and we have 
to stand with using the technologies, we are not allowed to go for the nuclear weapons 
because Islam forbids us. This is very important, which again affects the decisions 
and it really changed the discourse, and also the identity, which would be created in 
the framework of the social interaction among the religious people.” Daryaei (2015) 
states that he has had close ties with many of the Olamā (clerics) and really senses 
them as a dominant factor in pushing the fact that Tehran is not allowed to accept any 
oppression or injustice (Zolm). These clerics insist that Tehran is not allowed to 
compromise, but at the same time, argue that Iran is not allowed to hold nuclear 
                                                
48 Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was an influential Iranian politician and one of the founding fathers of 
the Islamic Republic. He served as the fourth President of Iran from 3 August 1989 until 3 August 
1997. He was the head of the Assembly of Experts from 2007 until 2011 and chairman of the 
Expediency Discernment Council. Rafsanjani passed away on 8 January 2017. 
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weapons (Ibid.). Hence, it is likely we can date the birth of political Islam in Iran back 
to the 1979 Islamic Revolution that ended Iran’s monarchy. Iranian religious and 
political landscapes were drastically changed under Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Shia Islam became an integral part of the country's 
political structure, forming a new type of government characterised by velāyat-e 
faqih, or the rule of the Islamic jurist. The reason being was that Khomeini believed 
the Iranian government should operate according to Sharia, or Islamic law, and thus 
an Islamic jurist—or faqih—was established to oversee the country's political 
establishment.  
 
After the revolution, constitutional changes made way for a governance system 
upheld by three pillars of power—the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, 
with Khomeini at the very top of the Islamic Republic's power structure (Bruno 
2008). Therefore, religious beliefs started to form the backbone of Iran's political 
structure. With the increasing role of Grand Ayatollahs (senior clerics) in Iran’s 
political structure, they soon became more and more integrated into top-level 
decision-making, including in respect of the Iranian nuclear programme. After the 
Geneva historical agreement in 2013, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, travelled 
to the Holy city of Qom to visit the Grand Ayatollahs there and gave them a report of 
the government’s nuclear achievements. It seems that this trip reflected an 
appreciation for the strong support of religious authorities and the Supreme Leader of 
the Iranian negotiators (Shargh Daily 2013b). Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi showed his 
support for the government’s recent diplomacy in negotiating with the P5+1. He 
stressed the need for continued efforts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to neutralise 
Shia-phobia in the region and in the Islamic world more generally.  
 
Ayatollah Seyed Abol-Hassan Mahdavi, Isfahan’s provisional Friday prayer Imam, 
mentioned that Iran’s right to uranium enrichment had been officially recognised in 
the negotiations; also, that the Islamic Republic of Iran is among 11 countries in the 
world with nuclear technology. He also stressed that the negotiations were included in 
the framework accepted by the Supreme Leader, the authorities and parliament. 
Ayatollah Nouri Tabarsi further stated, “the Iranian Foreign Minister had been shown 
resistance to the decisions made by the six world powers of the UN Security Council 
and gained results that were accepted by the leaders of Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, 
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Ayatollah Nouri Tabarsi emphasised the result of these negotiations should not be 
unfairly criticised (Kaviani 2014).” Following the JCPOA, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli 
referred to success in the negotiations as a divine blessing and recommended the 
government to be patient. Grand Ayatollah Shobeiri Zanjani appreciated the 
government’s efforts to achieve major gains and emphasised that trying to please God 
and serve the people would bring about a final victory (Nazar-e marāje’-e ezām-e 
taghlid az tavāfogh-e haste’i [Grand Ayatollahs Opinion on the Iran Nuclear Deal] 
2016). In addition, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, Tehran’s substitute Friday prayer 
leader, backed the country’s nuclear negotiators and as mentioned in The Tehran 
Times, called the negotiators “the children of the nation”. Ahmad Khatami 
recommended keeping Iranian youth and analysts updated with the political issues 
and taking a moderate position regarding the ongoing nuclear talks (Tehran Times 
2015). These can be seen as directly related to the religious perspective of Iranian 
identity. Indeed, it is very important for the Iranian government to have the support of 
the Grand Ayatollahs for their decision-making and policies. As the religious leaders 
of the Iranian nation, the Grand Ayatollahs have a major role in keeping different 
political factions in one camp.  
 
The other discourse according to Daryaei (2015) is legal discourse. He argues that 
those who are working on the development of the discourse are trying to place the 
framework of the NPT as a main contributor to the decision-making. That means as a 
legally sovereign country, Iran is allowed to make independent decisions, even 
withdrawing from the NPT regulations. Hence, in the legal discourse, according to 
Daryaei, there is the UN charter, sovereign rights, independent states, NPT and based 
on Article 4 of NPT, which recognises each country’s right and the decisions of the 
conference reviews, which emphasise that the decisions on fuel cycle activities should 
be respected. That is why, in terms of legal discourse, nobody is allowed to even 
compromise minutely on the legal right of the Iranian people based on their rights 
according to the NPT (Ibid.). This legal discourse is in line with the second approach 
argued for by Seyed Mohammad Mousavian (2012), that is, the ‘Nuclear Rights 
Approach’ that believes Iran should cooperate and abide by its commitments to the 
IAEA. Mohammad Daryaei (2015) goes on to discuss a third approach, which is 
political discourse. As he states, political discourse is very popular and much 
supported among strategists and those trying to visualise security for the country. In 
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terms of political discourse, Iran should not do anything to endanger the country’s 
security. According to the supporters of political discourse, Daryaei comments, “you 
have to work based on our rights, but you are not allowed to go for nuclear weapons, 
because the introduction of nuclear weapons to the nuclear energy policy of Iran 
would not really bring Iran security, but rather insecurity.” (Ibid.) These three 
discourses try to reinforce each other and thus, bring about a sense of unity among 
people, creating the culture or identity of the nation (Ibid.). Daryaei asserts that 
Iranians want to be independent, to be on top of new technology, and then exhibit 
pride in this. So, self-confidence and autonomy can be said to be rooted in the social 
character of Iranians. According to Daryaei, it is unfortunate that the West has not 
recognised this matter, but it is really a misunderstanding based on misinformation. 
The majority of Iranians are united and work within the framework of these three 
main discourses; the Iranian identity is thus socially constructed as a result of 
reinforcing the interaction among them (Ibid.). 
 
After explaining the different discourses and their view on the nuclear programme, it 
is time to discuss how various political factions in Iran support the Iranian nuclear 
programme and the peaceful advancement of the full nuclear fuel cycle. However, 
these factions have different perspectives towards the relative costs and benefits of the 
nuclear programme, as well as the West’s defiance, including toughening its 
economic sanctions against Iran. The principalists and traditional conservatives seek 
domestic legitimacy from the nuclear programme (Naji 2007). Principalists consider 
reformists as weak and under the influence of the West (Ansari 2007b). On the other 
hand, pragmatist conservatives and reformists who also support the nuclear 
programme do not see any advantage in continuing disputes with the West. These two 
factions instead support rapprochement with the West and believe in pursuing a 
settlement for the Iranian nuclear crisis by carrying out negotiations with the West 
 
Figure 1 shows the interaction between components of Iranian national identity and 






Figure 1- Iranian national identity components and their relationship with actors 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain through discourse analysis of 
interviews, how the main goal of Iran’s nuclear programme has stretched beyond 
merely security issues. This is because it has caused more insecurity for Iran, both at 
the domestic and international level and in several fields including defence and the 
economy. As Arash Reisinezhad (2014) argues, for Iran, the nuclear programme has 
provided an important symbol of the country’s modernity and national identity. Based 
on the constructivist perspective, identity formation at both domestic and international 
levels is a continuous process, in which social identities interact with each other, and 
whereby states shape and reshape new definitions of the identity of themselves and 
others. Identity formation is an act of the elites in every society that reinterpret the 
identities and reset their priorities according to intersubjective social reality 
(Bozdağlıoğlu 2007). 
 
In order to understand the impact of Iranian elites’ conceptions of national identity on 
decisions affecting Iran's nuclear programme and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations, it is 
















programme as set out in chapter 4. This chapter provided a discursive analysis of the 
Iranian nuclear programme based on different factors including political factions, 
their approaches, and the impact of Iranian national identity conceptions upon them. It 
discussed that Iranian leaders, from Mohammad Reza Shah to the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the presidents have all had rather similar motivation 
towards the nuclear programme. Their belief that generating electricity by nuclear 
power is a more economical way of producing domestic energy means that Iran would 
be free to increase its oil and gas exports. However, the economic benefit is just one 
dimension for Iranian leaders, the other and perhaps important dimension being that 
nuclear technology is able to bring about prestige for the Iranian nation (Patrikarakos 
2012). For Iranian officials, acquiring peaceful nuclear technology means ensuring 
national security, but more importantly, preserving prestige and national pride, some 
of the main characteristics of Tehran’s regime (Kisacik 2012) 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, the symbolic value of the Iranian nuclear 
programme is another significant element. It has put Iran in an equal position with 
other countries in the negotiation process, bringing Iran international prestige 
(Reardon 2012). Discourse analysis of the events regarding the nuclear programme in 
Iran reveals how Iranian leaders and different camps and coalitions have continuously 
emphasised the nuclear programme as a symbol of national identity, self-reliance, 
independence, technological advancement and modernity (Tağma and Uzun 2012). In 
other words, as Scott Sagan (1996) argues, although these symbols and norms alone 
do not have any influence,  their power comes from the political elites’ conceptions of 












Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
“Achievements in nuclear technology are, in fact, good news for the 
Iranian nation so that they can move forward over the routes leading to 
high peaks of science and technology. Therefore, the nuclear 
programme should never stop or slow down. 
 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the role and implications 
of Iran’s nuclear ambitions in terms of Iranian leaders’ conceptions of the discourses 
of Iranian national identity. The key question at the heart of this discussion is: why 
has the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle been portrayed as a unifying 
symbol of national identity in Iran, especially since 2002, following the revelation of 
clandestine nuclear activities? Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that the main 
goal of Iran’s nuclear programme has stretched beyond merely security issues. That 
is, Iran’s argument about its nuclear programme is based on non-military objectives. 
In this case, Tehran's nuclear narrative has always been fashioned around three 
distinct, yet intertwined themes: Persian nationalism, religion, and modernisation. 
Hence, in order for their quest for nuclear technology to be recognised and to 
consolidate national unity on the basis of maintaining Iranian prestige, dignity and 
national honour, Iranian leaders must seek international legitimacy (Lob and Mahdavi 
2015). In a profound sense, Iran’s nuclear programme has been tied to the regime’s 
need for recognition as well as for seeking out respect and international status in a bid 
to revive Iranian nationalism. One of the fundamental principles of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran was independence from foreign intervention and influence. And so, 
the national narrative of the Iranian nuclear programme has bought about a 
combination of legitimacy and empowerment in terms of the Islamic Republic’s belief 
in technological advancement (Bowen et al. 2016). This chapter engages with the 
question of how particular elements of Iranian identity shape Iranian nuclear decisions 
and which values and ideological perspectives play a prominent role in driving the 
nuclear programme. As Kinch (2016) puts it, Iran’s ambition to develop an 
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indigenous peaceful nuclear technology is a symbolic intention that comes from its 
social, cultural, and political identity.  
 
Given the nature of the topic of nuclear technology in Iran, elites from different 
factions have discussed from their own point of view and based on their own 
conceptions of Iranian national identity. However, among the elites there seems to be 
a consensus that the nuclear programme is the inalienable right of the nation and that 
nuclear weapons are prohibited by the Islamic law (with a fatwā issued by the 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei). Generally speaking, the notion of national 
identity is the key driver behind nuclear decisions in Iran. The other questions 
proposed in this research asked: how has portraying the nuclear programme as a 
unifying symbol of national identity affected Iran’s highest level formal decision-
making and policymaking processes? How can one explain the paradoxical 
implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear behaviour using social 
constructivism? In response to the first and main question of the research, the thesis 
has committed to the intricate process of understanding and analysing Iran’s nuclear 
policy from an ideational perspective. Thus, the thesis embodies the examination of 
the first question initially based on describing Iranian national identity components, 
including Persian nationalism, Shia Islamic identity, Islamic Revolutionary ideology, 
and modernity and technological advancement; and then examining the question by 
analysing elites’ nuclear discourse in Iran. Answering this question is an important 
first step for policy makers and then for policy experts and academics. Knowing the 
origins of Iranian national identity and how it affects nuclear policymaking, will allow 
for the addressing of conflicts. This puzzle regarding the complexity of Iran’s nuclear 
decision-making process and its ideational aspects led me to a more general version of 
the question motivating this project. That is, how Iranian identity is constructed and 
understood, and why Iranian identity is deployed in the way that it is. The objective of 
this thesis is to specify the relationship between the Iranian elites’ perception of 
national identity and nuclear politics. Hence, an integral part of the thesis has been to 
analyse how Iranians in general and Iranian elites, in particular, perceive their 
national identity.  
 
Most particularly, chapter 2 offered the necessary theoretical framework to answer 
these questions. This thesis is based on the theory of social constructivism that 
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centralises the history, identity and norms that shape foreign policy. As Jack Snyder 
(2004) states, constructivism focuses on ideas, values, culture and identity in societies 
and it is these elements that shape or constitute international politics. Snyder’s (1977) 
belief was that the political elites articulate a unique strategic culture related to 
security issues that is also a wider manifestation of public opinion. He asserted that 
this leads to a socialisation process and in turn, this leads to achieving a set of beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviour patterns with regard to nuclear strategy. The utility of 
strategic culture showed its importance later on in the work of Alexander Wendt, who 
argued that state identities and interests are socially constructed by means of 
knowledgeable practice (Wendt 1992). Valerie Hudson (1997) also argues that 
constructivism considers culture (and identity) as an evolving system of shared 
meanings and ideas that governs (elite’s) perceptions, communications, and actions 
(Lantis 2002). I expanded the social constructivist approach to international relations 
on this topic to include the implications of Iranian elites’ conceptions of national 
identity on nuclear policies and nuclear negotiations. The constructivist approach 
explains why, given all the sanctions imposed by the West, Iran has refused to stop its 
nuclear programme. The most significant manifestation of the constructivist approach 
with regard to Iran’s nuclear decisions can be demonstrated, mostly in chapters 6, 7, 
and 8, which show how the shared meanings, understandings, and expectations of the 
Iranian elite about nuclear technology affect their nuclear decision-making. This 
would have not been easily predicted by instrumental rational approaches. Studies of 
the discursive construction of Iranian national identity have tended toward various 
approaches (Coe and Neumann 2011): the combination of Iranian cultural elements 
and Islamic values, accompanied with the Western norms of governance and attitudes 
towards nation-state building, has produced a complex and multi-dimensional identity 
for the Islamic Republic (Sadeghi 2007). This is well reflected in the structures that 
constitute the rationale of Iran’s nuclear decision-making process.  
 
Iran’s nuclear programme is regarded as a sacred value for many Iranians (Rose 
2013), with sacred values those that surpass rational cost-benefit analysis. Finding an 
equivalent for these in anything material is not possible, as they are purely 
transcendent ideals (Begley 2006). As such, the West’s economic restrictions on 
Iran’s nuclear programme backfired, resulting with Tehran not suspending its uranium 
enrichment activities. Thus, the Iranian government went on to defend its inalienable 
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right to enrich uranium indigenously based on sacred political discourse, framing the 
nuclear issue as an ongoing instance of resistance to the West, and taking place in a 
deep historical context (Dehghani et al. 2010). Iran’s attempt to obtain nuclear 
technology for the sake of recovering its so-called historic greatness is classified in 
the status discourse (Doyle II 2015b). The major discursive resources Tehran has 
drawn upon to construct and project such a social identity are Shia Islamic identity, a 
collective discourse of Persian national identity, and a post-colonial struggle to 
advance the universal cause of ‘the oppressed and dispossessed’. This behaviour can 
be understood in the framework of the normative system that is governing the 
contemporary international relations (Ramazani 2004). Why does the use of the 
Islamic discourse of Iranian national identity matter in shaping Iran’s nuclear 
narratives? In the first instance, Islam has proven to play a major role in the public life 
of Muslim societies as demonstrated by a Pew survey of Muslim countries 
(Ghannoushi 2016). Ahmadinejad’s presidency reinvigorated Iranian nationalism as 
an alternative to Islamic narratives and the basis for policy decisions, bringing the 
complex dynamic between religion and nation back to the forefront of Iranian society 
and political realities. Moreover, the nationalist and religious components of the 
nuclear narrative that developed during the Ahmadinejad years continue to shape the 
Iranian nuclear narrative. These components were inherited by the Rouhani 
government and used to ornate the Iranian nuclear-negotiating team’s narrative during 
the diplomatic process, serving Tehran’s objectives abroad and helping it sell the 
process and the deal at home. In addition to Iran’s national interests, the ideology of 
Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution also continues to shape Iran’s foreign policy behaviour 
(Katzman 2015). It demonstrates that Iranian leaders have not only acted on rational-
choice calculations or utilitarian assessments of national concern (Etzioni 2011) but 
endeavoured to pursue the country’s national interests, protecting its national security 
within a certain cultural and ideological framework and with a particular national 
identity-image they constructed to protect themselves and their interests (Chandler 
2006); this is a significant variable that conventional theories of international 
relations, realism and neorealism, in particular, fail to take into account.  
 
Chapter 3 provided a methodological approach to better understand the nuclear policy 
behaviour of Iranian elites. Understanding Iranian foreign and nuclear policy 
behaviour is difficult, due to its normative and revolutionary dimensions. In order to 
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explain Iranian nuclear policy in the post-revolutionary era, chapter 3 applied a 
discourse analysis to demonstrate how Iranian national identity and Islamic 
Revolutionary ideology are socially constructed. Discourse analysis enables 
consideration of meaning-making, allowing the researcher to develop an 
understanding of social roles and their relations with collective identities (Gee and 
Handford 2012). In so doing, discourse analysis enables us to explain the sets of 
meanings and values that constitute Iranian national identity. And so, a combination 
of discourse analysis as the method and social constructivist approach as the theory 
has been used to study Iran’s nuclear policy behaviour. In referring to the nuclear 
programme as being at the core of national identity, conceptions of the Iranian elite 
can be seen as influenced by the construction of social and cultural norms and their 
impact on understandings of national security and national development. Science and 
technology are the desired forms of modernity for bringing about fundamental 
changes to the country’s national and international status (Abraham 1998).  
 
Chapter 4 provided a historical context of Iran’s nuclear programme and the entities 
that are involved in nuclear decision-making. Chapter 5 discussed the components of 
Iranian national identity and their impact on nuclear decisions. The next three 
chapters focused on the discourse analysis of the research. Chapter 6 focused on the 
discourse analysis of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s nuclear decision-making based on his 
speeches and the research interviews as well as other primary and secondary sources. 
Chapter 7 discussed president Hassan Rouhani’s nuclear decision-making with regard 
to his conceptions of the discourses of Iranian national identity. And chapter 8 
examined the results of the thesis, demonstrating how Iranian elites’ conception of 
national identity affects nuclear decision-making. A detailed discourse analysis of 
various speeches and interviews demonstrated that despite the differences between the 
opinions and actions of the political elite, there are also a number of similarities. One 
is that for both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations, the nature of the Iranian 
nuclear programme has a direct relationship with conceptions of national identity. As 
a country with nuclear technology, both the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani 
administrations have been of the opinion that by pursuing a peaceful nuclear energy 
programme, Iran will meet its own energy demands. The scientific and technological 
outcome of the nuclear programme has also come to be regarded nationally as a 
symbol of modern Iran. For Iran, technological advancement has deep roots in 
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national independence and self-reliance. Hence, the nuclear programme creating a 
new basis for Iranian identity that demonstrates Iran’s level of independence and 
modernity and its importance for the world, which is referred to as international 
prestige (Abraham 2006). Another fundamental factor in conceptions of Iranian 
national identity has been the anti-Western nature of the Islamic Republic, which 
originated in the primary ideologies of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. To discern the 
impact of Iranian elites’ conceptions of national identity on decisions affecting Iran’s 
nuclear programme and nuclear negotiations, these three chapters adopted a discourse 
analysis of elite interviews. Speech and media analysis was also carried out, focusing 
on the period from Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2005 to July 2015 and Rouhani’s 
presidency, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and 
the P5+1 was achieved. 
 
Analysing the interplay between the Iranian elites’ conception of national identity and 
nuclear policies sheds light on the significance of national identity for the functioning 
of nuclear policies during the period investigated. However, it is worth noting that this 
thesis discusses the contemporary constructions of Iranian identity that interpret the 
past in particular ways. Firstly, Iranian national identity is a product of a long history 
mixed with religious beliefs. The Iranian philosophy of identity that considers human 
beings as the principle and the truth has existed from the dawn of the civilisation and 
resides in the culture of Iran. One indicator of Iranian identity is the spirit of pride and 
endurance. The ways to measure this indicator include the extent to which a nation is 
proud of its country and nationality, the importance of religion in people’s lives, and 
whether they think there is a clear boundary between right and wrong. Secondly, the 
Islamic Republic and its ideals, principles and values determine one of the 
fundamentals of Iranian national identity. Thus, the identity of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran contains elements of Islamic identity, the Islamic Republic, and Iranian 
nationalism. For the purpose of this research, I worked on contemporary nuclear 
policies and the way that Iranian national identity conceptions have shaped and 
interpreted nuclear policies and decision-making. Even as national identity 
conceptions shifted in favour of religion and Islamic Revolutionary ideology after the 
1979 revolution in Iran, the Persian national identity was never been undermined in 
society and the current Islamic regime in Iran has been unable to prevent itself from 
referring to its ancient Persian identity when confronted with issues of legitimacy 
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(Zia-Ebrahimi 2016). According to David Thaler (2010), the nuclear issue in Iran has 
revealed certain aspects of factionalism amongst the Iranian elite.  
 
There have been different views among policymakers in Iran regarding how to deal 
with the nuclear programme on the international scene; these policies have been either 
to comply or to confront. Whilst reformists and pragmatists alike view the nuclear 
programme as being a win-win game, the principalists or hardliners are concerned 
that complying with the West’s interests and demands on the nuclear issue would be 
considered as a retreat that would lead to the loss of legitimacy for the Islamic 
Republic. The Islamic Republic’s elites determinedly believe that there are three 
factors underlying U.S. enmity towards Iran: first, the Islamic nature of Iran’s regime; 
second, Iran’s constant effort towards independence; and, third, that the U.S. tends to 
be the dominant power in the region, with control of energy resources (Ibid.). The 
dynamic interaction of Iranian elites’ conception of national identity sheds light on 
Tehran’s nuclear decision-making. Iran’s nuclear policies are not the mere posturing 
of a single president or leader, but official state policies; thus, whether Ahmadinejad 
or Rouhani or any other individual is Iran’s president, the nuclear policies will not 
change based on their decisions. Nevertheless, the peaking of all negotiating parties’ 
leverage and regional turmoil were equally important in ultimately pushing both sides 
(Iran and the P5+1) to an agreement. The leaders’ conceptions of Iranian national 
identity based on a shared understanding of Iranian culture and society were of 
paramount importance in making nuclear policy decisions. Hooman Majd49 (2014) 
believes that political elites in Iran, whether conservative, moderate or reformist, will 
not surrender the Iranian nation’s dignity by giving up to the dictates of Western 
powers; hence, any deal, including the nuclear deal must take the dignity of the nation 
into consideration. Majd also argues that the nuclear deal was not a face-saving deal 
for the Iranian elite, but a matter of affording the Iranian nation the dignity it deserves 
(Ibid.). 
9.2 Key Findings 
This research was an attempt to delve into the depths of the nuclear policy-making 
process in Iran, focusing on the impact of national identity conceptions on nuclear 
                                                
49 Hooman Majd is an Iranian-American journalist and commentator on Iranian affairs; he is the author 
of The Ministry of Guidance Invites You Not to Stay: An American Family in Iran. 
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decision-making. Even though the literature on this topic is gradually expanding, 
looking at the process through the analysis of Iranian elites’ speech and interviews 
remains unique, and this is the thesis’s core contribution to knowledge. The research 
represents the connection between national identity, prestige and bargaining leverage, 
and nuclear negotiations. According to social constructivism, states’ culture and 
identity are not established realities, but the outcomes of historical and social 
processes (Guzzini and Leander 2005). When Iran and the P5+1 stopped acting based 
upon the shared understanding of each other that had been in place since 1979, the 
animosity and hostility present in the negotiations reduced. The constructive 
diplomatic process they adopted was able to replace the ineffective negotiation 
process that took place for over a decade.   
 
The identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran is complex due to its claim of a deep 
connection between the culture of the Persian Empire and Iranians’ Shia and Islamic 
roots. In order to understand Iranian national identity and its effects on foreign policy 
and relations with others, one needs to learn more about this complexity (Tarzi 2011). 
There have always been challenges between the main components of Iranian identity - 
Persian, Islamic and modernisation. Mohammad Reza Shah’s concentration on 
Persian and modern identities caused resistance among a large societal group that was 
also fond of religious and Islamic values. This identity of resistance has emerged as a 
remarkable social movement along with the emergence of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran (Castells 2010). Nuclear decision-making in Iran is mostly centralised in the 
hands of hard-liners and religious political elites (Ashley 2012). With its ties to Shia 
Islamic, nationalistic, revolutionary and modern identities, the nuclear programme 
allows the Iranian regime to interpret its image as an anti-Western power that has 
been victimised by the great powers and now seeks equality and mutual respect  
(Adebahr 2014). Iran shows resistance to the Western perception of the social 
construction of Iran’s nuclear ambitions (Hecht 1998). According to Shahram Chubin 
(2014, p. 76) “Iran suffers from a status discrepancy: a gap between its own and 
others' perceptions of its importance. It wants to sit at the top table with the big boys, 
not be relegated to dining with its smaller rivals in the Gulf.” 
 
Within the circle of Iranian elites, the nature of the nuclear programme has been 
treated as symbolic - in other words, Iran’s nuclear programme with its indigenous 
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and independent nature for enriching uranium has been referred to as a unifying 
symbol of Iranian identity. With its goal of scientific and technological advancement, 
the nuclear programme has been framed as a prestigious entity for the Iranian nation, 
both at home and abroad. Indigenous technological advancement and self-reliance on 
Iranian scientists have been the watchwords of Iran’s nuclear programme and closely 
related to the rights of the Iranian nation. Over the past 15 years, Iranian nuclear 
activities have had their ups and downs. For Iranian leaders, developing nuclear 
technology has been an important issue regarding the country’s independence from 
the West, that is, retrieving its historic grandeur through the modernisation of the 
country’s technology. Iranian leaders have claimed that Tehran’s nuclear activities 
have solely peaceful purposes, emphasising that the nuclear programme in Iran is a 
symbolic activity that demonstrates Iran’s technological advancement and thus, is an 
inalienable right of the Iranian nation. At one point, the Iranian leaders moved 
forward and stated that the nuclear programme in Iran is a gesture of modernity for all 
Muslim countries (Safarian 2011). 
 
Regardless of the differences in nuclear policies, and foreign policies more generally, 
all Iranian officials have taken the same stance in relation to the nature of Iran’s 
nuclear programme. This can be identified and assessed in the context of national 
identity, national interest, regional and international respect, justice and equality. 
Despite the more anti-Western policy of Ahmadinejad’s administration and a more 
moderate policy of Rouhani’s government, their foreign policy preferences have been 
functions of the country’s national priorities. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad 
Javad Zarif (2015b) emphasised the efforts of Iranian scientists to own the nuclear 
programme and benefit from the fruits of their own efforts; Zarif called the outcome 
of the nuclear programme a source of national pride and dignity. As Mohammad 
Marandi50 (2015) argues, regardless of whom Ahmadinejad or Rouhani are and 
whether Ahmadinejad successfully moved in the direction of resolving the nuclear 
issue or not, the U.S. needs to recognise that the peaceful nuclear programme for 
Iranians is not only a matter of technology and decades of investment, nor is it simply 
about producing medicine and electricity; rather, it is an issue linked to dignity and 
sovereignty (Ibid.).  
                                                
50 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 29 June 2015  
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The Islamic Republic’s leaders’ strategy has been to tie Iranian national identity to the 
cause of nuclear empowerment, engaging them in a process of constructive 
diplomacy. Iran’s Supreme Leader believes that the Iranian government must clarify 
for the international community that Iran’s nuclear programme is not based on 
decisions made by different administrations, but rather is determined according to the 
regime’s fundamental convictions. Both the Ahmadinejad and the Rouhani 
administrations and nuclear-negotiating teams agreed on one important point, that is, 
expecting Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technologies, including uranium 
enrichment, to be recognised and respected. However, during governance by 
moderates, it has always been more amenable for Tehran to compromise on the 
nuclear issue. Reza Marashi51 (2015) believes the negatives of the Ahmadinejad 
approach to nuclear negotiations and policies outweighed the positives; however, 
Ahmadinejad’s positive policy of  scientific and technological advancement, in 
different areas including nuclear technology and space technology, Marashi believes 
it empowered the Rouhani administration in particular and the Iranian government 
more generally to negotiate from a position of strength, even though it was reached at 
a heavy cost (Ibid.). In the same manner, Ali Vaez52 (2015) also argues that both the 
Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s negotiating-teams aimed at ending the nuclear crisis, but 
they also pursued two different approaches. Ahmadinejad’s nuclear-negotiating team 
pursued a confrontational approach with an ideological lexicon that was 
incomprehensible to Iran’s Western interlocutors. Rouhani’s negotiators, on the other 
hand, pursued a more conciliatory approach, comprising of pragmatic and 
professional diplomats who knew full well how to handle multilateral negotiations. 
Bar (2004) believes that socio-cultural norms and religious conventions, as the traits 
of Iranian national identity and character, have a paramount influence on Iranian 
negotiation tactics. However, I disagree with Bar’s analysis of the Iranian negotiators’ 
tendency towards mistrust and conspiracy theories that suggest “any negotiations with 
Iranians should be based on clear short-term incentives and threats, and not on 
incremental long-term confidence building” (Bar 2004, p. 45).  
 
                                                
51 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 6 July 2015  
52 Semi-structured Skype interview, 25 June 2015 
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Looking at the history of nuclear negotiations with Iran and its final result, we can see 
how aggressive behaviour and tactics on behalf of Iran and the West did not succeed, 
while diplomacy, trust and mutual understanding, in addition to respecting each 
others’ rights, produced a successful result, bringing about the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA). For the Iranian elite, a peaceful nuclear programme has not 
been solely about technology, resulting from decades of investment, or about 
producing medicine and electricity; rather it has been linked to dignity and 
sovereignty. The West’s efforts to coerce Iran into altering its nuclear policy have not 
been successful due to a lack of understanding of the extent to which Iranian national 
identity affects the nation’s attitudes towards nuclear development and openness to 
cooperate with Western powers. There is a need to look at Iran, not necessarily 
through the lens of a nuclear weapons programme, but rather via the lens of the 
regime’s overall nuclear aspirations. There is a shocking lack of understanding of 
Iran’s political and cultural dynamics in the West, especially the United States’ 
government, according to Jofi Josef53 (2014). As the issue of national identity is not 
well established and understood within policy circles, there is no real appreciation of 
the Iranian national identity; what has occurred over the past four decades is mostly a 
black and white perception of Iran (Ibid.). In order to understand the complex system 
of national nuclear policies, we must thus focus on the shared national identities of the 
decision-making elite (Ritchie, 2008). 
 
The elites of the Islamic Republic perceive Iran to occupy a unique centrality in the 
Middle East that is shaped by a strong sense of Iranian identity and awareness of the 
country’s role in the region as one of its main historical powers (Mohseni 2015). In 
the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, national identity was introduced as the 
centrepiece of Islamist discourse. Other components of national identity have been 
related to this pivotal component. However, the neglect of each one has become 
costly. Naturally, in every case of Iranian foreign policy, various elements of national 
identity have been revealed. For instance, as Rostami et al. (2015) put it, the notion of 
victimisation, which comes from Iran being invaded historically by other powers, 
shows itself in the elite’s desire for modernity and technological advancement. In 
addition to its culture and worldwide empire (Ghirshman 1971), Iran bears the 
                                                
53 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 11 September 2014 
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memory of many defeats and the sense of humiliation and victimisation that comes 
from being repeatedly invaded, conquered, and humiliated by other powers, including 
the Arabs, the Mongols, the Turks, and the Greeks. This has created a sense of 
insecurity and inferiority and led Iranians on a search to regain their historic pride and 
grandeur (Thaler 2010). The 1979 Islamic Revolution also greatly influenced Iran’s 
strategic culture and identity by formalising a sense of victimisation while also 
introducing a radical Shia ideology of moqāvemat (resistance) against zolm (injustice) 
(Fischer 2003). Therefore, regarding the nuclear issue, the emphasis of the Iranian 
nation is on respect, dignity, equality and justice, which have historically been the 
perspective of the nation and culture, as well as on modern and advanced 
technologies.  
 
Just as this rich history has become part of Iranian culture, in the case of the nuclear 
issue, it is expected that the international community will consider and respect Iran as 
well. As Ali Asghar Soltanieh54 (2015) argues, in the nuclear negotiations between 
Iran and the world powers, the historical mentality of Iranians, formed from their 
culture and civilisation, in no way allows Iran to accept the terms of an opposing 
party as the superior actor, although this view may harm the country’s physical 
security. Moreover, in terms of the nuclear issue, efforts to achieve independence and 
self-sufficiency are of paramount importance. The task of the Islamic Republic is to 
strive for the realisation of this objective by acquiring nuclear technology that gives 
authority and prestige to the nation, and through which it can serve the components of 
Iranian national identity.  
 
The 1979 Islamic Revolution also heralded the notion of the Supreme Leadership, 
which would replace the country’s 2500-year-old monarchy. Thus, the requirements 
for the Supreme Leadership and its authority eventually changed to reflect the shift in 
regime policy and the revolutionary ideology (Tabatabai 2015b). Iran’s newly born 
national identity as the Islamic Republic of Iran has deepened Iran’s quest to become 
a civilian nuclear power and promote their own conception of modernity (Griffiths 
2018). Iran has invested significant resources of time, manpower and money to 
acquire nuclear capability, which has come at an enormous national cost, resulting in 
                                                
54 Semi-structured face-to-face interview, 12 November 2015  
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crippling economic sanctions and barriers to international trading (Ladha 2012). In 
theory, economic sanctions should have brought Iran to the negotiating table and 
given power to the negotiating parties. In practice, they did not change Iran’s nuclear 
policies but did significantly constrain Iran’s nuclear activities, preventing Tehran 
from the possibility of assembling a nuclear arsenal (Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 
2011). It is worth mentioning that putting more economic pressure on Iran not only 
did not prevent Tehran from pursuing its nuclear activities, but it also reinforced a 
sense of nationalistic resolve, turning the nuclear programme into a symbolic and 
national issue. However, it also reinforced an adversarial self-other construction. The 
leaders’ determination, be it aggressive (Ahmadinejad) or harmonious (Rouhani) may 
reflect the protective cover for a strengthened national identity, and thus at heart, be 
an example of psychologically based resistance to external pressure. Iran’s presidents 
have sought to strengthen national identity and combat external intervention 
throughout the nuclear programme. 
 
The topics identified in this thesis can offer the international community and 
policymakers a template or blueprint to constructively understand the normative 
process of Iran’s nuclear decision-making at national, regional, and international 
levels. The underlying argument here is that understanding Iran’s nuclear behaviour 
requires a thorough understanding of first, Iranian national identity conceptions, and 
second, the Iranian elites’ conceptions of national identity and its relation to nuclear 
policies in a social and historical context. It is worth noting that the constructivist 
approach is not simply about ideational factors, rather it believes that material 
structures find their meaning through the shared knowledge embedded in agents’ 
actions and interactions (Wendt 1995). In summary, the nuclear discourses that have 
been discussed in this thesis relate to the social construction of the Iranian national 
identity in a number of ways. As such, the ideas and conceptions embedded in various 
discourses, including those associated with Persian nationalism, Shia Islam, Islamic 
Revolutionary ideologies and technological advancement, have all been essential to 
the non-traditional formation of Iran’s nuclear policies throughout the critical years of 
nuclear negotiations. Escalating tensions between Iran and the West over Tehran’s 
development of its nuclear programme in spite of crippling sanctions gives a reason to 
reconceptualise and reinterpret the non-traditional scope and consequences of Iran’s 
nuclear pursuits. In other words, the non-traditional perspective in this chapter and in 
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the thesis as a whole is about reinterpreting Iran’s nuclear decisions from a theoretical 
standpoint in which the concept of security is no longer merely related to the military 
dimension of interstate relations. The non-traditional aspect of security has multiple 
interpretations that include non-military issues including cultural norms and the 
values of society (Emmers et al. 2017). 
9.3 Reflection: The Importance of Key Findings 
The use of the Iranian discourse of national identity to shape Iran’s nuclear narrative 
has two key implications. While, in this thesis, these are discussed in the context of 
respect and resistance, they can also be applied to broader foreign policy issues. First, 
nationalism plays a key role in shaping identity and galvanising social and political 
support. Therefore, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, in nationalistic terms, the 
legitimisation of a given programme or ambition can be a game changer (Goodhand 
and Sedra 2016). Iranian and Islamic identities have proven to be major forces in the 
public life of Iranian society (Moallem 2005). Understanding the potential of 
modernisation as a galvanising factor of identity, Iran has tried to appeal to various 
audiences by putting forward the idea of a national nuclear ambition - nuclear energy 
and self-sufficiency - as a rallying point for the Iranian nation. In general, national 
identity in Iran is shaped around the Persian ideal, which to a great extent has 
continued to hold Iran together, preserving its political, cultural, and territorial 
integrity as well as sovereignty (Mozaffari 2014). In Iran, as in other states, language, 
history, religion, geography, and culture are basic to national identity (Saleh 2013). 
However, it is the relationship of the people with nationalism and religion that has 
shaped their attitude toward Iranian and Islamic discourses in the country’s foreign 
and nuclear policy (Berger 2010). Lastly, the attitude of individuals, governments, 
and regimes toward the international system is also shaped by their views of national 
identity as a dynamic historical process of social construction, and the place of this 
within the world (Ting 2008). This idea also describes the consequence of Iran’s 
referral to its particular religious and cultural beliefs at the expense of universal 
norms. To conclude, Iranian officials view their country’s nuclear programme through 
the lens of national identity components that include Persian nationalism, religion, 
and modernity.  
 
It is worth noting that there are limitations to the construction of identity in foreign 
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policy that must continue to pay special attention to the realm of hard or materialistic 
security. This would appear to suggest limitations in a constructivist approach to 
foreign policy analysis. While the primacy of security-seeking behaviour has been 
subsumed within the constructivist view of identity, it is still clear that the policy area 
is concerned with hard power as well as soft power. However, to concede to realism 
on this statement and end the matter there would be too simplistic. That is because it 
would fail to take account of how the various issue areas considered in this research 
interact with the construction of various discourses of Iranian national identity in 
order to shape nuclear ambitions faced in each discourse. Security provision must 
remain important to policy but also to the very identity of a state. Addressing these 
weaknesses and anomalies requires more comprehensive research. 
9.4 Avenues for Future Research 
In this thesis, I have offered a theoretical framework to study a particular historical 
development, Iranian nuclear policy during the administrations of Ahmadinejad and 
Rouhani (2005-2015), which led to a historical achievement, the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015. I believe this framework can be extended to 
examine further developments in resolving the complex issue of a WMD Free Zone in 
the Middle East and progress combating nuclear terrorism. As a model for 
nonproliferation across the region, I believe this framework expands on my doctoral 
research on Iran’s nuclear ambitions from a non-traditional perspective. However, the 
idea to establish a Middle East WMD Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) has been evolving 
over the last four decades. MEWMDFZ was first formalised with a mutual resolution 
offered by Iran and Egypt during the 1974 United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) (Kane 2015). Establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East has also 
been stalled for decades because of disagreements among the states in the region 
regarding different conditions (Foradori and Malin 2012). The MEWMDFZ will not 
happen unless all the countries in the region engage with global nuclear disarmament 
and a non-proliferation regime. Improving the effect of regional security dynamics in 
terms of serving the interests of countries in the region will, in the long term, benefit 
global interests. 
 
The historic nuclear agreement with Iran can be seen as a path towards further 
confidence building between Iran and the international community. The US might not 
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be able to solve all the global problems single-handedly, however, it has the power to 
motivate other nuclear weapon states to seek global disarmament (Perkovich 2008).  
A nuclear deal with Iran could not only prevent regional proliferation, but also the 
civil and proxy wars that cause so much turmoil in the Middle East. Moreover, it 
could help to increase the likelihood of normalising the relationship between the 
United States and Iran. Kenneth Pollack (2015) argues that these issues are important 
in determining whether a nuclear deal with Iran can lead to greater instability in the 
Middle East. In other words, further research can be allocated to examine whether the 
momentum built by the JCPOA would be also able to help bring about a constructive 
dialogue between Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbours. One significant avenue of further 
research is to examine the effect of the Iran deal in the complex system of 
international institutions that govern the nuclear world. This includes the IAEA, the 
UNSC and the EU’s diplomatic efforts in balancing Iranian nuclear ambitions within 
the global nuclear order. The matter, however, is open to political struggle, which is 




















Appendix I: List of Interview Participants 
 
1. Shahin Dadkhah- interview date: 28 April 2016- Dadkhah is former adviser 
to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rouhani 
and former nuclear negotiator. 
2. Mohammad Daryaei- interview date: 9 July 2015- Daryaei is a University 
professor, and senior disarmament researcher with diplomatic engagement on 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation issues in Iran. 
3. Mark Fitzpatrick- interview date: 26 May 2015- London’s IISS former 
Director for its Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme. Mr. 
Fitzpatrick had previously served for four years at the US Mission to 
International Organisations in Vienna, including working as Charge d’Affairs 
and Counselor for Nuclear Policy, in charge of liaising with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
4. Heinz Gärtner- interview date: 4 August 2015- Gärtner is a Professor at the 
University of Vienna and Academic Director of the Austrian Institute for 
International Affairs (oiip). Dr. Gärtner specialises in European, international 
security, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. 
5. Peter Jenkins- interview date: 5 March 2016- Jenkins was the UK 
Ambassador to the IAEA and UN (Vienna) (2001-06) and has been involved 
in Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the EU3 (UK, France, Germany). 
6. Jofi Joseph- interview date: 11 September 2014- Joseph is an experienced 
public policy professional and an independent consultant. He has worked at 
senior levels of the Executive Branch and on Capitol Hill as a former senior 
advisor and director of White House / National Security Council, and the US 
Department of State. 
7. Bijan Khajehpour- interview date: 13 August 2015- Khajehpour is a 
Strategist, Analyst, and Entrepreneur. He is a managing partner at Atieh 
International, the Vienna based international arm of the Atieh Group of 
Companies, a group of strategic consulting firms based in Tehran, Iran.   
8. Stephan Klement- interview date: 2 September 2015- Klement is the Head of 
Euratom Co-ordination and International Relations Unit at the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Energy. Dr. Klement joined the nuclear 
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negotiations with Iran as soon as the EU was associated in Autumn 2004 and 
he has been part of the negotiations from 2004 to 2015. 
9. John Limbert- interview date: 7 January 2016- Ambassador John Limbert 
most recently served as the highest-ranking official at the State Department 
dealing solely with Iranian issues, appointed in November 2009 as the first-
ever US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran. He is a veteran US 
diplomat and a former official at the US Embassy in Tehran, where he was 
held captive during the Iran hostage crisis. 
10. Mohammad Marandi- interview date: 29 June 2015- Marandi is an Iranian 
academic, political analyst and an expert in American studies and postcolonial 
literature. 
11. Reza Marashi- interview date: 6 July 2015- Marashi is the Research Director 
for the National Iranian American Council (NIAC).  He came to NIAC after 
four years in the Office of Iranian Affairs at the US Department of State. He 
has presented and observed all nuclear talks since 2013. 
12. Seyed Hossein Mousavian- interview date: 16 August 2015- Mousavian is an 
associate research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at 
Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs. Dr. Mousavian had previously served as a diplomat in several 
missions including as Head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s 
National Security Council, Spokesman for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with 
the international community, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Secretary of the 
Supreme National Security Council, Vice President of the Center for Strategic 
Research for International Affairs, General Director of Foreign Ministry for 
West Europe, Chief of Parliament Administration, and other prominent roles. 
13. Walter Posch- interview date: 6 August 2015- Posch is a senior research 
fellow focusing on security-related issues of the Middle East with the Institute 
for Peace Support and Conflict Management (IFK) of the Austrian National 
Defence Academy. 
14. Ali Asghar Soltanieh- interview date: 12 November 2015- Soltanieh is 
former Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
15. Greg Thielman- interview date: 9 September 2014- Thielman is a former 
senior fellow of the Arms Control Association and member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations and was previously a US Foreign Service Officer. 
 211 
16. Ali Vaez- interview date: 25 June 2015- Vaez is the International Crisis 
Group's senior analyst on Iran. Before joining Crisis Group, he headed the Iran 
project at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC, focusing 



































AEOI                           Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran  
EU-3                        Permanent European Members of the United Nations Security 
Council, including United Kingdom, France, and Germany 
HEU                            Highly Enriched Uranium 
IAEA                           International Atomic Energy Agency 
IAEA INFCIRC         IAEA Information Circular 
LEU                            Low-Enriched Uranium 
IRGC                          Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
JPOA                          Joint Plan of Action 
JCPOA                       Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
MEK                           Mujahedeen-e Khalq 
MEWMDFZ              Middle East WMD Free Zone 
NAM                           Non-Aligned Movement 
NCRI                          National Council of Resistance of Iran 
NPT                            Non-Proliferation Treaty 
P5+1                           Permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, 
including United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, 
China, and Germany   
PMD                           Possible Military Dimensions 
POMEPS                   Project on Middle East Political Science 
SA                               Safeguards Agreement 
SNSC                          Supreme National Security Council 
TNRC                         Tehran Nuclear Research Center  
UNGA                        United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC                         United Nations Security Council 
UK                              United Kingdom 
U.S.                             United States 







Āzādi                                Liberty 
Bazaaris                           The merchant class and workers of bazaars 
Delvāpasān                      The concerned or worried group, critics of Hassan Rouhani 
Esteghlāl                          Independence 
Ezzat                                Dignity 
Faqih                                Islamic jurist 
Fatwā                               A religious edict 
Ferdowsi                          Persian poet and the author of Shāhnāmeh (Book of Kings) 
Gharbzadegi                    Westoxification 
Hekmat                            Wisdom       
Hoviyyat                          Identity 
Imam Hossein                 Third Imam of Shia Muslims 
Karbalā                            A city in Iraq where Imam Hossein was martyred 
Majles                              Parliament 
Mahdaviat                      Or Mahdiism is a religious Shia term referring to a ‘belief in 
                                         the Mahdi, the 12th Imam            
Martyrdom                     Entitles to Martyrs, or Muslims who have died while  
                                         defending their faith and sacred values   
Maslahat                          Expediency 
Moqāvemat                      Resistance  
Nationalism                     (Taken from the French) in the sense of prioritising being 
                                          Iranian or Persian 
Norouz                             The Persian New Year 
Olamā                              The clerics 
Osulgarā                          Principalist, fundamentalist 
Persian                             The majority ethnic group in Iran and also referring to the  
                                          ancient Iranian culture and religion 
Sharia                              The Islamic law 
Shia                                  A branch of Islam, which holds that Prophet Muhammad  
                                         designated Ali as his successor and the Imam (leader) after 
                                         him 
Supreme Leader             Referring to the Supreme Leader of Iran 
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Turkmanchāy                An agreement between Persia (Iran) and the Russian Empire 
Umma                             Nation 
Velāyat-e-faqih              Guardianship of the Jurist 
Zolm                                Injustice 
Zoroaster                        Ancient Iranian Prophet (Zartosht) 
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